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Chapter 1
Quality Signaling and Online
Reviews
Jesse Kalinowski
Abstract
A rapidly growing literature documents several sources of persistent bias
related to crowdsourced information on online review and reputation plat-
forms. In this paper, I extend the literature by empirically investigating the
impact on consumer ratings and text-based reviews resulting from a positive
quality signal. In addition, I explore the nuances of this effect in terms of user
and product characteristics, and identify how ratings signals can impact con-
sumer expectations. Using a novel dataset of more than four million business
1
2reviews from Yelp.com, I exploit the platform’s rounding threshold for display-
ing business ratings using a regression discontinuity framework. Through this
mechanism, I measure the ceteris paribus rating and review effect of a one-half
star increase in the rounded rating presented to users by Yelp. A penalized
LASSO regression is used to overcome the high-dimensional aspect of text
data, and allow us to classify review sentiment. I identify a significant impact
of a positive quality signal on consumers’ rating and review of business estab-
lishments. Specifically, a one-half star difference in Yelp’s 5-star rating results
in users of the review platform rating businesses up to 0.04-stars higher on av-
erage, while simultaneously being 2% more likely to express positive sentiment
in the review text. Additionally, investigating specific keywords and phrases
related to levels of disappointment, I find that while users are less likely to
be disappointed when presented with the positive signal, they are more likely
to be mildly disappointed. This confirms that consumer expectations are, to
some extent, driven by these reputation systems.
31.1 Introduction
The supply of online review and information aggregation platforms is growing
rapidly. Websites and mobile apps such as HealthGrades and Vitals allow
users to review medical professionals; Angie’s List and Thumbtack for local
services; and Glassdoor for companies and jobs. Despite controversy, Peeple
even allows mobile users to rate individual persons. Reviews and ratings are
also a key institutional component in product matching markets such as Ama-
zon and eBay. By implementing reputation mechanisms, platforms mitigate
potential market failure concerns resulting from information asymmetry and
moral hazard due to large numbers of differentiated goods and often relatively
anonymous market participants. In turn, reputation plays a pivotal role in
product selection by consumers. Marketing research suggests that in 2017
more than 85% of U.S. internet consumers surveyed trust online reviews, and
as many as 97% actively use the services.1
Clearly, user-generated feedback plays a key role in purchasing decisions,
providing meaningful information to prospective consumers as it relates to
experience goods, and perhaps more importantly, a frame for those services
where quality is not easily distinguishable. As such, we would like to bet-
ter understand the behaviors that impact the composition and quality of this
feedback. A rapidly growing literature documents several sources of persis-
1https://www.brightlocal.com/learn/local-consumer-review-survey/
4tent bias related to crowdsourced information on online review and reputation
platforms. In this paper, we extend the literature by empirically investigat-
ing the impact on consumer ratings and text-based reviews resulting from a
potentially exogenous positive quality signal. In addition, we explore the nu-
ances of this effect in terms of user and product characteristics. Specifically,
we investigate how asymmetric information about product or service quality
and user experience play key roles. Further, we identify how user-generated
content can impact consumer expectations. Using a novel dataset of more
than four million business reviews from Yelp.com, we exploit the platform’s
rounding threshold for displaying business ratings using a regression disconti-
nuity framework. The “5-star” system shared by Yelp and most online review
platforms simplifies the measurement. Through this mechanism, we measure
the ceteris paribus rating and review effect of a one-half star difference in the
rounded rating presented to users by Yelp.
While star ratings and review text are often related (one-star reviewers
rarely have positive things to say), they are treated a bit differently by con-
sumers of reputation platforms. For example, from the perspective of a patron,
a low average rating can be “cancelled out” by one stellar comment. Addi-
tionally, review text can give researchers an idea about the reviewers expecta-
tions ; something that a single rating of one through five, or a thumbs up or
thumbs down, cannot. For these reasons, we extend the regression discontinu-
ity design to examine the effect of a positive signal of quality has on the text
5of reviews left by Yelp platform users. This examination is done through a
more traditional method, keyword search, as well as modern natural language
processing (NLP) techniques such as crowdsourced dictionary- and machine
learning-based sentiment analysis.
There are several interesting findings in this paper. First, we identify
a significant impact of a exogenous quality signal on consumers’ rating and
review of business establishments. Specifically, the ceteris paribus effect of a
one-half star change in the rounded rating presented to users by Yelp results
in users of the review platform rating businesses 0.04-stars higher on average,
while simultaneously being 2% less likely to express negative sentiment in the
review text. I also show that when consumers are unable to accurately identify
the quality of the service provided, they rely far more heavily on“the crowd”.
Though these are not extraordinary large impacts, consider that Yelp.com
alone has more than 180 million unique visitors a month and more than 140
million reviews. Additionally, internet retailers like Amazon and eBay use a
very similar reputation system, and their traffic dwarfs that of Yelp. Second, I
find causal evidence that consumers’ expectations are, in part, driven by these
reputation systems. Small one-half star changes in Yelp’s displayed rounded
rating lead to measurable differences in consumer expectations about product
quality. The results suggest that a blunt reputation instrument like a rounded-
star rating may not always be appropriate.
Yelp is a crowdsourcing Internet platform meant to provide consumers with
6access to information about local businesses. The service’s distinctive feature
is user-generated reviews and ratings aggregated to provide an overall quality
perception for each establishment. As of September 2017, the platform is active
in 29 countries, receives 188 million unique visitors per month, lists more than
2 million businesses, and has 142 million written reviews. Consumers are able
to retrieve, and contribute, information on a number of business categories,
including shopping, restaurants, home and local services, beauty and fitness,
health, and travel among others. Not only is this information impactful for
consumers, but businesses are increasingly finding that success or failure is
dependent on their Yelp representation.2
We investigate the rating and sentiment effect associated with online repu-
tation signals by utilizing a dataset Yelp.com provides to academic researchers.
I causally identify each of the two effects using a regression discontinuity design
similar to Luca [2016]. Yelp’s consumer facing product motivates this design.
For each establishment, the platform displays several pieces of information
to the user. This information includes business characteristics, a selection
of written reviews, and, importantly, an average five-star rating. The aver-
age five-star rating, prominent at the top of the business page and in search
queries, is rounded to the nearest half-star. This feature allows the researcher
to take advantage of the discontinuity around the rounding thresholds.
2Anecdotes from San Francisco: https://www.sfgate.com/restaurants/article/Boon-or-
bane-Yelp-s-impact-undeniable-5664925.php
7The effect of importance refers to the propensity of reviewers to rate the
establishment higher or lower if they see a signal in the form of either side of
the rounding threshold for Yelp’s rating system. For example, if the marginal
reviewer, prior to a positive signal, would rate a restaurant ‘4-stars’ but instead
sees the signal and rates it ‘5-stars’, their impact is 1 additional star out
of 5. However, I do not simultaneously observe both outcomes for a single
individual. Around the rounding threshold, some reviewers see the positive
signal (Yelp rounded their restaurant’s observed rating up) and some reviewers
for which there is the status quo, despite similar true average ratings. By
looking around this discontinuity - those reviewers that see a signal and those
that do not - I measure the average rating impact associated with the positive
signal.
Evaluating the impact that a discrete shift in observable rating has on sub-
sequent consumer ratings meaningfully allows the researcher to question the
accuracy of any ratings-based reputation system. It does not, however, give
any information about individual consumer beliefs. To truly understand the
effect of potentially irrelevant information on consumer beliefs and expecta-
tions, the researcher needs to observe those beliefs. To do this, I algorithmi-
cally identify sentiment in text-based reviews, and inspect the likelihood of
negative sentiment around the aforementioned discontinuity. The algorithm
is trained on a subset of data, 50% of those reviews not included in the RDD
bandwidth, where I assume a clear delineation in sentiment. In particular,
8I use one-star reviews as an indicator of negative sentiment, and five-star re-
views for positive sentiment. Once trained, cross-validation is done on another
subset of data (drawn without replacement). Finally, I apply the algorithm to
all review observations in the RDD bandwidth to find the predicted sentiment
of each. This allows us to inspect the likelihood of negative sentiment around
the threshold.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section two considers the existing litera-
ture and identifies this research’s place in it. Section three explores the data.
Section four presents the empirical strategy for both the econometrics and the
machine learning. The results follow in section five, while section six expands
on them to include robustness checks. I conclude with section seven.
1.2 Literature Review
Reputation mechanisms have considerable effects on the markets in which they
operate. For eBay sellers in particular, negative reviews are tightly linked to
relatively lower prices and significantly fewer sales. Cabral and Hortacsu [2010]
show that this interaction between eBay buyers and seller reputation has a
strong influence on the likelihood of sellers exiting the market. Luca [2016]
and Pallais [2014] echo this sentiment on the demand side. Though the former
focuses on restaurants and the latter on entry-level labor, the two studies
9agree that strong and informative reputation signals result in significant shifts
in demand. In particular, the effect is increasing with information quality.
It is necessary then to better understand the signal itself. There is a grow-
ing literature studying the incentives platform participants face when con-
tributing online content and its impact on information quality. In the market-
ing, management, and economics literature, this focuses mainly on promotional
content and review fraud. Ott et al. [2012] and Luca and Zervas [2016] find
fairly widespread ”suspicious” review activity on Yelp. Dellarocas [2006] shows
theoretically that not only does welfare decrease with this kind of content ma-
nipulation, but also that information quality can degrade significantly given
certain platform characteristics. Mayzlin et al. [2014] and Ott et al. [2012]
confirm this empirically, in five-star ratings and review text respectively.
Much of the existing research on the quality of user-generated content and
its potential biases focuses on selection issues and platform design challenges.
Because reviewers selectively choose which products, services, or businesses to
review, the decision itself can have implications for the quality of the content.
Hu et al. [2009] refer to two forms of bias that arise from this decision - under-
reporting bias and purchasing bias. The authors believe that together these
explain the famous J-shaped curve of ratings distributions often seen in online
ratings. Lafky [2014] build on this work and suggest that a nontrivial cost to
reviewing, such as the inconvenience of doing so, may explain the shape as
well. Using an experiment, they further show that the U or J-shape is not
10
reflective of true product quality. In general, this line of research suggests that
offering some kind of reward to providing feedback may reduce bias related
to self-selection. Though Li et al. [2018] caution that if the seller is the one
incentivizing product feedback, only high quality sellers will do so. In the
context of bias relating to self-selection, this paper focuses on the second-order
effects, or information that impacts active users on the platform - consumers
who have chosen to participate in providing feedback.
There is a small and relatively new literature on the impact of social influ-
ence, herd behavior, and other peer effects on user-generated information qual-
ity. These studies mainly focus on aggregators and social networks (Reddit,
Twitter, etc.), but the findings are more generalizable. Specifically, platform
users have a propensity to use noisy or unvetted information to inform the con-
tent that they contribute [see Muchnik et al. [2013] and Bakshy et al. [2011]].
This can cascade to create situations where the distributions of online reviews
for products are markedly different than what independent offline reviews look
like Hu et al. [2009]. In this paper, I link platform user incentives and peer
effects, and causally identify a measure which may be loosely interpreted as
the impact of previous rating behavior (or peer effects).
While there is a deep literature on credence goods, it focuses mostly on
theoretical properties of these markets [see Dulleck et al. [2011a]], and testable
implications for laboratory and field experiments [see Kerschbamer and Sut-
ter [2017] for a review]. It is clear reputation plays an important role when
11
consumers are unable to identify the quality of the provided service. Huck
et al. [2012] study the relationship between reputation and competition, while
Bolton et al. [2013] suggest that reciprocity in the feedback mechanisms is
distortionary in both the mechanism value and the market. In this paper,
I focus on the relationship between a reputation mechanism and consumer
experiences with credence goods.
Identifying review bias in online markets has long been a data availability
issue. More recently however, firms are willing to provide useful data through
collaborative academic-industry research partnerships. In this way, Filippas
et al. [2018] find that the high relative cost of negative feedback erodes the
quality of reputation information in a two-sided matching market for online
labor, biasing it in a positive direction. Nosko and Tadelis [2015] note a
similar finding, adding that for eBay buyers a single negative experience often
results in users leaving the platform (without providing feedback), leading to
a reputation externality and persistent positive bias. Fradkin et al. [2018] find
that this sorting effect actually dominates bias due to behavioral factors such
as retaliation and reciprocity. This paper builds on this strand of literature by
investigating the role of noisy signal quality in online reputation platforms.
There is rich literature on sentiment analysis in computer science, linguis-
tics, and statistics. I draw several methods from these areas for use in this
paper. Following the recommendation of Gentzkow et al. [2017], I adopt a
LASSO classification algorithm and apply it to the full set of reviews to iden-
12
tify text-based sentiment. The authors note that LASSO (and other penalized
linear models) with L1 penalization has the benefit of being both intuitive and
not computationally burdensome. This particular method uses flexible text
and word patterns to predict a given outcome; here, this outcome is negative,
positive, or neutral sentiment. Similar to this paper, Baylis [2018] uses several
flexible NLP algorithms to identify sentiment on Twitter, inside of a causal
framework.
Dictionary-based text analysis, where the outcome of interested (senti-
ment) is measured directly as a score and attached to specific words, have
a history in economics research. Groseclose and Milyo [2005] study politi-
cal slant in media using text from news broadcast transcripts and articles.
Due to computational complexity, they reduce the search-space to just key-
words. Gentzkow and Shapiro [2010] extend this idea beyond keyword search
to phrases as well.
1.3 Data
Yelp provides academic researchers with a select sample of their data. The col-
lected dataset is split into 3 key components: businesses, reviews, and users.
The data contains detailed information on 144,072 businesses; 4,153,150 re-
views, and 1,029,432 users for twelve U.S. and Canadian cities from October
13
2004 through January 2017. The business data includes static characteristics
for each business listed on the platform. Among these are a unique business
ID, location information, hours of operation, and business categories.
Table 1.1: User Summary Statistics
Statistic N Mean St. Dev. Min Max
All Users 1,029,432
Reviews 24.319 82.066 0 11,284
Average Rating 3.709 1.097 1 5
# of Friends 28.873 119.369 1 14,995
Years Elite 0.166 0.860 0 13
Elite Users 49,704
Reviews 234.294 268.979 1 11,284
Average Rating 3.817 0.308 1 5
# of Friends 215.915 429.440 1 14,995
Years Elite 3.432 2.029 1 13
Female Users 485,193
Reviews 25.276 83.799 0 10,421
Average Rating 3.768 1.081 1 5
# of Friends 30.758 117.299 1 7,885
Years Elite 0.202 0.949 0 13
For these data, Yelp defines ‘users’ as those platform account holders that
made at least one review of a business in at least one of the twelve cities.
Yelp categorizes reviewers as either standard or ‘elite’, and determines this
status via a proprietary algorithm that utilizes user review and ‘social’ data.
There are 49,704 elite users in the dataset. Additionally, the data suggest
quite a bit of differentiation between users [see Table 1.1]. Elite users are
14
more experienced than the average, and also have a larger network of friends.
It is interesting to note that although only 5% of users are elite, those elite
users have had the designation for 3.4 years on average. Female users make
up less than half of the platform. However, they are responsible for 51% of
the total number of reviews.
Figure 1.1: Distribution of Yelp Ratings
0.0
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Note: the dashed line is the location of the mean.
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When reviewing a business, a Yelp user must select an integer rating on a
one- to five-star scale. She also must additionally provide a text review with a
maximum character limit of 5000. The review data incorporates both of these
elements for every Yelp review made in each city, along with a date, business
ID, and user ID. Figure 1.1 shows the distribution of Yelp ratings among all
businesses in the data. Note that this aggregate distribution does confirm a
J-shaped distribution for Yelp reviews, a la Hu et al. [2009].
Table 1.2: Business Summary Statistics
Business Category Businesses Reviews Users Ratings
Counts Mean Median Std. Dev.
Active Life 6722 126391 84052 3.96 5 1.34
Arts & Entertainment 4721 266967 148446 3.59 4 1.38
Automotive 8554 138598 100590 3.66 5 1.72
Beauty & Spas 13711 238704 161595 4.03 5 1.48
Education 1921 21223 18522 4.04 5 1.43
Event Planning & Services 7224 298747 194667 3.59 4 1.41
Financial Services 1738 13309 11883 3.42 5 1.81
Food 21189 747688 309964 3.84 4 1.29
Health & Medical 10476 118392 86981 3.85 5 1.66
Home Services 11241 137884 102905 3.77 5 1.72
Hotels & Travel 4857 219412 148268 3.26 4 1.5
Local Services 8133 102252 80189 3.95 5 1.61
Nightlife 10524 666464 308631 3.67 4 1.33
Pets 2901 44329 34194 4.06 5 1.5
Professional Services 3234 36760 32961 3.87 5 1.69
Public Services & Government 1024 17776 12932 3.69 4 1.45
Real Estate 3212 31346 28556 3.12 4 1.82
Restaurants 48485 2584437 721779 3.7 4 1.33
Shopping 22466 291559 155820 3.75 4 1.5
Yelp platform users, both business owners and reviewers, may select any
16
category or subcategory that describes an establishment. There are 21 ‘parent
categories’ and more than 700 subcategories. Table 1.2 delineates businesses
and reviews by parent category, excluding those with under 1000 businesses. I
draw your attention to two interesting descriptives. First, the ratio of reviews
to users leaving those reviews differs significantly between business categories.
Second, the mean review fluctuates a fair amount as well. Figure 1.2 illustrates
the ratings distributions for four parent categories; two - Restaurants, and
Hotels & Travel - that I would generally consider to be providing experience
goods to consumers, and two - Automotive, and Health & Medical - that
provide services that align with the Dulleck and Kerschbamer [2006] definition
of credence goods. Each exhibits a J-shaped distribution. However, it is
clear that, at least descriptively, Automotive and Health & Medical are more
extreme in the shape of the ’J’.
1.4 Empirical Framework
Yelp’s five-star rounded rating motives the identifying Regression Discontinu-
ity Design (RDD) in this paper. In this section, I discuss the implementation.
The size of these data allow for the ideal implementation of nonparametric
local linear regression [Lee and Lemieux, 2010]. It is then up to the researcher
to identify the appropriate bandwidth, a discussion I save for section six. The
17
Figure 1.2: Distribution of Ratings - Four Parent Categories
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Note: the dashed line is the location of the mean.
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main RDD specification is extended to explore heterogenous effects. In these
situations, the literature is relatively undecided on whether to use subsample
regression or treatment interactions [Hsu and Shen, 2016]. As such, I employ
each where it is appropriate.
1.4.1 Regression Discontinuity Design
Yelp’s user dashboard motivates the design of this methodology [see Figure
1.3]. The platform provides users, both active and passive, with a graphical
representation of an average rating for each establishment, rounded to the
nearest half-star. A business with a true average rating of 4.24 will be rounded
to 4 stars, while a business with a true average rating of 4.25 will be rounded to
4.5 stars. Thus, there is “local randomization” in the rating that is displayed
to users, despite nearly identical true quality, as measured by the true average
rating. The empirical strategy in this paper takes advantage of that variation
to estimate the effect of treatment, i.e. viewing a displayed rating that is
potentially exogenous to true quality.
We follow Imbens and Lemieux [2008] and present a nonparametric local
linear regression model which, under most conditions, will provide a consistent
estimate. This amounts to estimating a standard regression where I choose
a specific window on either side of the threshold for the forcing variable [Lee
and Lemieux, 2010]. Large data ease the choice of this bandwidth, as it allows
19
Figure 1.3: Yelp Dashboard
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higher relative ”closeness” to the inflection point. This is convenient, because
even if the underlying data generating process near the threshold is nonlinear,
this closeness enables a linear specification to approximate it.
The estimating equation within the specified bandwidth reduces to
Ratingjnt = βTjt + γRjt + τjnt + αj + δn + jnt, (1.1)
where
T =

1, if a review is just above a rounding cutoff
0, if a review is just below a rounding cutoff.
(1.2)
Rjt is the real average rating (excluding Ratingjnt) around time t, and α and δ
are business category and reviewer fixed-effects respectively. Because I utilize
a pooled sample of all ratings, and therefor ratings switches around different
rounding cutoffs, a bin or cutoff specific fixed-effect, τ , is necessary. That
is, to control for the specific ratings switch that is occurring; for example,
3 to 3.5 stars as opposed to 4 to 4.5 stars. The main results of the paper
use a bandwidth of 0.10 for the forcing variable, Rjt, on either side of the
cutoff point. As this choice is relatively arbitrary, I explore other bandwidth
specifications, along nonlinear parametric models, in section six.
The identifying assumption relies on pseudo-random assignment (of busi-
nesses) to either side of the rounding cutoff, i.e. at some ratings that are
arbitrarily close to the threshold, ratings-affecting characteristics should be
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similar. One criticism of the regression discontinuity approach in this context
is that treatment may just be capturing true quality increases (over the discon-
tinuous Yelp average rating), which consumers reflect in their future reviews
and ratings. Without specific information related to true quality for each busi-
ness, this effect cannot be totally discounted.3 I cannot entirely remove this
as a possibility. However, some characteristics of the data and methodology
should convince us that, if I am picking up this effect, it is second-order at best.
First, the large nature of the data, over the reviewer and business dimensions,
allow us to take advantage of an arbitrarily close threshold around the dis-
continuity. As noted above, if this threshold is sufficiently small, any jump at
the discontinuity must be associated with the treatment itself. Second, when
possible, I include fixed-effects related to business categories in the model. In
most cases, I would expect the true quality of a business to be time-invariant.
In this case, similar to Dai et al. [2012], category-level fixed-effects will control
for long-run increases in unmeasured true quality.
3Note here that I am not referring to the true average rating. At a given point in time,
the true average rating cannot capture a discrete change in quality. For example, if new
management improves the quality of food in a restaurant overnight, this will not be reflected
in the average rating at that time, but will be reflected in future ratings. Dai et al. [2012]
suggest that the true average rating at the end of the data is a suitable control. In testing,
including this as a control had no effect on the results.
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1.4.2 Sentiment and Word-search
Here, I use two techniques to identify sentiment in the Yelp text-based reviews
– dictionary- and machine learning-based methods. Dictionary-based methods
rely heavily on prior information about the mapping function of words to
sentiment [Gentzkow et al., 2017]. I cannot rely too much on this assumption
here as words in and out of context can have very different meanings; and
there is no general structure of reviews that lends itself to certainty about
the prior information, i.e. context words are used in. However, the sentiment
dictionaries themselves are thoughtfully developed for somewhat of a general
purpose, usually through crowdsourcing means. Additionally, there is a long
history of using dictionary-based methods in the economics literature [noted in
Section 2 are Gentzkow and Shapiro [2010] and Groseclose and Milyo [2005]],
including studies involving user generated text on the internet, such as Baylis
[2018].
In the case of most internet-based user generated content, reviews included,
the information in the data itself is more relevant than prior beliefs. Text re-
views are often accompanied by a piece of information relevant to the sentiment
information in the review itself - a numeric rating (e.g. one-star ratings will
tend to contain text that reflects the choice of one-star). These data lend
themselves to training a supervised machine learning model to predict text
sentiment. This is especially true for large data sets where segmenting the
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data into a sufficiently sized training sample and hold-out sample for cross-
validation is trivial.
Here, I follow the suggestion of Gentzkow et al. [2017] and use a linear
model with L1 penalization for sentiment prediction, specifically a LASSO
regression. Note that the term ’linear’ refers to the functional relationship
between the outcome (sentiment) and the predictor (text as a vector of words).
I further specify a binomial link function due to the dichotomous nature of the
outcome - negative or positive sentiment.
Even with high-performance computing resources, the feature set of 1-
4 million text reviews is computationally burdensome. In order to reduce
that burden and prepare the text data for analysis, I employ a word selec-
tion method common in natural language processing called “term-frequency-
inverse-document-frequency” (TF-IDF). TF-IDF has several desirable proper-
ties: First, it excludes words that are very common (in many reviews). Second,
it excludes words that are very rare (in very few reviews). Lastly, it provides
a useful weight for each term [Gentzkow et al., 2017]. Choosing the cutoff
weight for exclusion is up to the practitioner.
It is likely that there is significant heterogeneity in review text between
business types. As such, I train and apply the prediction algorithm separately
to each parent category. Additionally, it is standard practice to use the pre-
dicted probability of positive sentiment as the outcome variable, as opposed
to a dichotomous measure representing positive or negative sentiment only.
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Thus, the dependent variable in the nonparametric model, will be a contin-
uous measure, s ∈ [0, 1]. This is a convenient way to allow practitioners to
approximate neutral sentiment [Gentzkow et al., 2017].
1.5 Results
Here, I apply the methods discussed in section four. With an appropriately
chosen bandwidth on average rating, and controls for both business category
and user fixed effects, I identify a significant impact of a positive quality signal
on consumers’ rating and review of business establishments. Specifically, an
uninformative - in the sense that it does not reflect actual quality - positive
signal results in users of the review platform rating businesses higher. I also
find casual evidence that consumers’ expectations are somewhat driven by
these reputation systems, suggesting that a blunt reputation instrument like
a rounded-star rating may not always be appropriate.
1.5.1 Quality Signal and Ratings
Table 1.3 walks in the estimates for the regression discontinuity of an exoge-
nous (at the threshold) signal of restaurant quality on user ratings. Specifi-
cally, I look at businesses that switch from just below a discontinuity to just
above, and refer to this as treatment. The estimate is stable in sign and always
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Table 1.3: Regression Discontinuity Estimates
Dependent Variable is Star Rating
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.059∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
True Average Rating 0.846∗∗∗ 1.156∗∗∗ 1.154∗∗∗ 0.930∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.036) (0.036) (0.040)
Constant 0.498∗∗∗
(0.006)
Bin FEs Y es Y es Y es
Category FEs Y es Y es
User FEs Y es
Observations 1,481,819 1,481,819 1,480,703 1,480,703
Adjusted R2 0.169 0.169 0.169 0.357
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors are calculated according to Calonico et al. (2018)
highly significant, moving between a positive impact of 0.027 and 0.059 stars,
i.e. those reviewers exposed to treatment increase their own star rating of the
establishment by between 0.027 and 0.059 stars on average. I would expect
the coefficient on treatment for Model (1) to be large relative to (2), espe-
cially if the distribution of ratings is left-skewed. Tables 1.1 and 1.2 hint that
there may be both a business category-specific component and user-specific
component to ratings that is likely fixed across time. By incorporating rat-
ings bin fixed effects, I control for higher average ratings given to businesses
around the threshold cutoffs on the right side of the distribution. A priori, it
is difficult to establish a directional change to the estimates when controlling
for time invariant category fixed-effects. Unobserved business heterogeneity
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likely comes from a variety of places - reviewer quality preferences as it relates
to location, type of business, hours open, etc. Additionally, users themselves
have idiosyncratic preferences for quality. Thus, I include a user fixed-effect
as well.
Category-specific fixed effects do little to influence the measured impact
of the positive quality signal. It is possible that due to the idiosyncratic
nature of inter-category ratings behavior, much of the time-invariant category
variation is actually being absorbed by bin fixed-effects. Adding user fixed-
effects, however, increases the magnitude of the treatment coefficient by a
factor of 1.6. This suggests a strong relationship between treatment and star
rating within users over time. The results from the fully specified model (4) on
pooled data in Table 1.3 imply that the magnitude of the effect of a positive
quality signal on ratings is approximately 5% that of a 1-star increase in the
true average rating of an establishment. In the following two subsections, I
investigate how this impact changes across heterogenous users and businesses.
The estimates in Table 1.3 for the total effect of treatment come from a
sample pooled across rounding thresholds. In Tables 1.4 and 1.5, and Figure
1.4, I explore how this effect delineates across these cutoffs individually.4 For
all but the highest rounding threshold, there is a positive impact of treatment.
That is, users are more likely to give a higher star rating, across all but one
cutoff, if they find themselves on the positive side of the rounding threshold,
4Tables 1.15 and 1.16 add category fixed-effects and are left for the Appendix.
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Table 1.4: RDD Estimates by Cutoff
Dependent Variable is Star Rating
1.25 1.75 2.25 2.75
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.011 0.316∗∗∗ 0.089∗∗∗ 0.139∗∗∗
(0.062) (0.040) (0.028) (0.018)
True Average Rating 2.489∗∗∗ −2.210∗∗∗ 1.426∗∗∗ 0.118
(0.476) (0.337) (0.222) (0.148)
Observations 8,321 21,528 50,020 113,236
Adjusted R2 0.011 0.003 0.006 0.003
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors are calculated according to Calonico et al. (2018)
Table 1.5: RDD Estimates by Cutoff
Dependent Variable is Star Rating
3.25 3.75 4.25 4.75
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.052∗∗∗ 0.033∗∗∗ 0.020∗∗∗ −0.137∗∗∗
(0.011) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010)
True Average Rating 0.987∗∗∗ 1.225∗∗∗ 0.966∗∗∗ 2.704∗∗∗
(0.093) (0.067) (0.061) (0.084)
Observations 257,886 440,735 424,626 165,467
Adjusted R2 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.011
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors are calculated according to Calonico et al. (2018)
28
quality held constant. With some exceptions, the effect dissipates as we move
toward higher and higher thresholds. There are a few potential behavioral
explanations for this. First, relative to the cutoff, there is a “ceiling effect”
at those levels, e.g. for a 2.5 stars rated restaurant, users may be willing to
give anywhere from a 1 to 5 stars, but for a 4.5 rated restaurant, 1 through 3
stars are a lot less likely and there is nothing higher than 5. Second, reviewers
may be more critical of established well-rated restaurants, a point I address
indirectly in sections 5.3 and 5.4. Though, the large negative coefficient on
treatment around the 4.75 cutoff suggests this may be the case.
1.5.2 Heterogenous Effects of the Quality Signal on Rat-
ings
There are two possible sources of heterogenous effects of treatment that I can
identify in the data. The first is with respect to product or service characteris-
tics. However, I do not directly observe the service provided to the consumer.
Thus, I proxy with Yelp parent categories. The second source of testable het-
erogeneity is that of the reviewers. I find that the impact of treatment on user
ratings differs across both service and user characteristics.
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Figure 1.4: RDD Plots for Individual Cutoffs
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Product Characteristics
As it relates to users interpretation of quality, one of the most obvious and
important ways to separate business categories is by experience and credence
goods. Credence goods are those goods and services for which the consumer
is unable to accurately determine quality. Examples include many aspects of
medical care, information technology, automotive maintenance, and financial
services [Dulleck et al., 2011b]. Among the 21 parent categories for businesses
on Yelp, four contain services typical though of as credence goods: Automotive,
Financial Services, Health & Medical, and Professional Services. It is obvious
that with such broad categories and many businesses under each, quality of
the service provided will not always be obscured. Fortunately, Dulleck et al.
[2011b] note that many of the typical findings related to credence goods hold
under circumstances where quality is weakly discernible as well.
Table 1.6 shows subsample regression estimates for each of four business
categories: restaurants, travel related, automotive, and medical. Restaurants
was chosen as it is the single largest category and also an experience good, serv-
ing as a good benchmark. Travel related services are also typically experience
goods and Hotels & Travel has a sample size closer to the largest categories
representing credence goods in the data - Automotive and Health & Medical.
Thus, I note in Table 1.6 the differences between the coefficients on treatment
for Restaurants and Hotels & Travel versus Automotive and Health & Medical.
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Table 1.6: Heterogeniety in Business Type Discontinuity Estimates
Dependent Variable is Star Rating
Restaurants Hotels & Travel Automotive Health & Medical
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.034∗∗∗ 0.025 0.075∗∗ 0.069
(0.006) (0.024) (0.033) (0.042)
True Average Rating 1.084∗∗∗ 1.219∗∗∗ 1.615∗∗∗ 1.188∗∗∗
(0.048) (0.213) (0.273) (0.345)
Observations 783,244 43,045 40,612 24,748
Adjusted R2 0.137 0.227 0.182 0.177
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors are calculated according to Calonico et al. (2018). Bin and user fixed-
effects are suppressed.
I find that all of the estimates have a stable sign, however, they vary greatly
in relative magnitude. The user rating effect of the positive quality signal is
more than twice as large for medical and automotive establishments as it is
for restaurants and travel-related businesses.
For further precision, and the ability to test across establishments, I turn
to a model where treatment is interacted with a dichotomous variable for
whether or not the business belongs to a parent category typically associated
with credence goods. Table 1.7 allows for some important take-aways. First,
businesses associated with credence goods, within the discontinuity bandwidth,
are rated slightly lower on average. Second, the coefficient on the interaction
term is three times the magnitude of the treatment effect alone. This suggests
that when there is asymmetric information related to product quality, or it is in
someway obscured from the consumer, those consumers rely heavily on other
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Table 1.7: Heterogeniety in Business Type Pooled Discontinuity Estimates
Dependent Variable is Star Rating
Treatment 0.023∗∗∗
(0.004)
Credence −0.020∗∗∗
(0.007)
True Average Rating 1.154∗∗∗
(0.036)
Treatment X Credence 0.081∗∗∗
(0.010)
Observations 1,481,819
Adjusted R2 0.169
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors are calculated according to Calonico et al. (2018). Bin and user fixed-
effects are suppressed.
signals to infer quality. In this case, one important signal is the experience of
others suggested by the Yelp rating.
Users
There are two ways in which the data allow us to differentiate Yelp platform
users – gender and elite status. Although Yelp does not provide the gender
of individuals in the sample, I predict it using the provided first name of
the user, approximate location, and Social Security Administration data and
Census micro-data. The Yelp data provide elite status, along with the years
that the user was elite. The latter allow us to use the results to infer a bit
more about the relationship between treatment and experience.
For Table 1.8, I specify three full interaction models and show only the co-
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Table 1.8: Heterogeniety in Users Discontinuity Estimates
Dependent Variable is Star Rating
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment X Female −0.0003
(0.004)
Treatment X Years Elite > 0 −0.059∗∗∗
(0.005)
Treatment X Years Elite > 3 −0.052∗∗∗
(0.006)
Observations 1,066,517 1,480,703 1,480,703
Adjusted R2 0.319 0.170 0.169
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
The models are specified and estimated as a full interaction, but only
results for the relevant terms are presented.
efficient for the relevant interaction. The interpretation for female is straight-
forward, but the two elite models are worth explaining. Because Yelp provides
the exact years in which a user is considered elite, I am able to observe whether
a user was elite at the time a review was made. Thus, the interpretation of the
two elite coefficients is the impact of treatment if the reviewer was consider
elite status at the time she submitted the rating.
Using a mix of Social Security Administration baby name data and IPUMS
Census micro-data, I am only able to identify gender for approximately three-
quarters of the sample. For this reason, I caution against putting too much
stock in the estimates relating to gender. In addition, covariate values, such
as that on the True Average Rating (suppressed from the results), change in
unintuitive ways, i.e. the sign of the coefficient becomes negative. I leave the
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estimates for posterity’s sake and to provide a simple benchmark.
From the estimates in Table 1.8, I see that females do not respond dif-
ferently to treatment. It is interesting that although female reviewers leave
slightly higher reviews on average, there is no differentiation in the impact of
treatment by gender. In contrast, elite reviewers do respond differently to the
positive quality signal, though the effect does not appear to get stronger with
a reviewers elite tenure. A reviewer who is considered elite at the time of treat-
ment will give a review 0.06 stars lower than the average treated reviewers, a
large relative impact. There are a few possible explanations for this. First,
experience may in fact be important when it comes to evaluating true quality.
Second, the algorithm Yelp uses to identify elite reviewers targets those users
who are less susceptible to potentially exogenous quality signals.
1.5.3 Quality Signal and Sentiment
As noted in section four, I use two methods to identify sentiment in the Yelp
review text. The first is a dictionary-based method where the tokenized words
in the text are compared to the sentiment dictionary and the text is given
a composite sentiment score. I use two dictionaries, both based on internet
content, but collected and labeled in very different ways. AFINN was manually
collected and labeled by one person using internet blogs as a source [Nielsen,
2011]. Bing was manually collected but labeled using various crowdsourcing
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techniques [Liu, 2012]. The second method, a machine learning classification
algorithm, is discussed in depth in section four.
Table 1.9: Regression Discontinuity Estimates on Text-based Sentiment
Dependent Variable
AFINN Bing LASSO
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment 0.012∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.001) (0.003)
True Average 0.033 0.006 0.011
(0.034) (0.022) (0.009)
Observations 1,420,744 1,429,324 1,481,819
Adjusted R2 0.301 0.311 0.336
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Standard errors are clustered at the business level. Bin, category, and
user fixed-effects are suppressed.
Table 1.9 shows the results for the three models that measure the impact
of treatment on text-based sentiment. Since I am still utilizing the RDD
framework, all three are interpretable as linear probability models where the
probability is that of a review containing positive sentiment. The sign on the
treatment coefficient is once again stable, suggesting that treated individuals
are 1-2% more likely to express positive sentiment in their reviews. Although
the effect size is relatively small, this results confirms the earlier findings on
rating behavior for review text as well. The two results suggest that individu-
als’ ratings and reviews are susceptible to change based on the positive quality
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signal.
1.5.4 Quality Signal and Expectations
With sentiment alone it is difficult to determine how consumer expectations
are related to the positive signal. In order to establish a relationship in this
regard, I drill down further into the text and focus on phrases related to
disappointment. In the first model, I look at how treatment impacts disap-
pointment, without regard for the severity of disappointment. In practice,
this means I used a simple text search algorithm to determine if a reviewer is
disappointed. The size of the dataset allows us to drill down further and look
for phrases that express mild disappointment. The second model captures this
idea. The testable hypothesis is that because Yelp displays a higher quality
signal to treated reviewers, they should be more likely to be disappointed.
Additionally, because I are looking across very small windows of true quality,
mild disappointment may be more likely.
Table 1.10 gives us the results for each of the aforementioned models. The
effect sizes for both are small. This is not surprising given how relatively
few observations expressed easily observable disappointment. Because these
are both interpretable as linear probability models, both coefficients have an
effect size less than 1%. The probability of being disappointed decreases with
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Table 1.10: Regression Discontinuity Estimates on Text-based
Disappointment
Dependent Variable
Disappointment Mild Disappointment
(1) (2)
Treatment −0.005∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.0001)
True Average −0.005 −0.00005
(0.010) (0.0001)
Observations 1,481,819 1,481,819
Adjusted R2 0.417 0.423
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
treatment by 0.5%. Given the results on sentiment, and disappointment’s
connection to negative sentiment, this should not be a surprise. However, the
second model does confirm the intuition, albeit with a small effect size. The
probability a treated individual is mildly disappointed decreases by 0.1%. This
suggests that consumers may tie their expectations to these ratings systems.
While designers build reputation mechanisms with this in mind, it also suggests
that there may be unintended consequences. The results here suggest the
impact may be showing a user a rating that is artificially inflated due to
rounding.
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1.6 Validity of the Regression Discontinuity
Design
We find that the nonparametric specification of the regression discontinuity
design is robust to modest changes in bandwidth. Among all tests below,
the sign of the treatment effect remained stable. Additionally, the differences
in magnitude are minimal when comparing a flexible parametric model to
two nonparametric specifications. I argue that optimizing agents, reviewers
and (indirectly) businesses, have imprecise control over the forcing variable,
despite being able to directly affect it. A form of the McCrary [2008] test on the
distribution of average ratings confirms there is little evidence of manipulation.
1.6.1 Bandwidth Selection in a Nonparametric Model
Bandwidth selection is a key component of RDD validity when estimating the
local linear regression with a rectangular kernel ([Imbens and Lemieux, 2008];
[Lee and Lemieux, 2010]). Since I am not using data-driven methods as in
Cattaneo et al. [2016], it is necessary, then, to show that under different band-
width specifications, the estimates are relatively stable or move in intuitive
directions. Table 1.11 provides these results for (4) in Table 1.3 (full specifica-
tion, including all fixed-effects) under two additional bandwidth choices - 0.05
and 0.15. I choose these values to vary the bandwidth in both directions from
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the main specification in section 1.5 of 0.10.
Table 1.11: Regression Discontinuity Estimates Varying Bandwidth
Dependent Variable is Star Rating
Bandwidth
0.05 0.15
(1) (2)
Treatment 0.022∗∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.004)
True Average Rating 1.227∗∗∗ 0.907∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.021)
Observations 757,143 2,222,261
Adjusted R2 0.379 0.347
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors are calculated according to Calonico et al. (2018). Bin, category,
and user fixed-effects are suppressed.
In Table 1.11, I show shrinking the bandwidth gives results fairly consistent
with the main specification, while increasing it results in a large fluctuation
in magnitude of the treatment coefficient. Bringing the bandwidth in by 0.05
on each side of the cutoff point maintains relative “closeness” to this thresh-
old, and due to the size of the dataset, there is still sufficient variation among
businesses and user ratings. The stability of this result relative to the main
specification gives credibility to the latter. There is little doubt that businesses
within 0.10 stars of each other are of similar true quality. It is unsurprising,
then, that increasing the bandwidth results in an estimate for the coefficient on
treatment nearly 100% greater in magnitude than the specification in section
1.5. When I increase the bandwidth to 0.15, I could conceivably be comparing
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businesses that are 0.30 stars apart in their average rating, a nontrivial differ-
ence. Thus, it is likely that under this specification, I am no longer operating
under the conditions which allow for an unbiased nonparametric estimator.
1.6.2 Parametric Specifications
If I no longer have a valid nonparametric model, as in section 6.1 for a band-
width of 0.15, I may then assume I am mis-specifying a parametric form of
the regression discontinuity design. Thus, if I am able to correctly specify a
functional form, the result should be in line with a valid nonparametric estima-
tor. In this section, I approach this two ways. First, I estimate a parametric
form of equation (2) from section 1.4.1 where I account for nonlinear trends
in the forcing variable via polynomial regression. Table 1.12 presents these
results for quadratic and cubic specifications. The estimate on treatment for
both models is consistent with (2) from Table 1.11, suggesting a more flexible
functional form is needed.
To increase flexibility in the model, I follow the suggestion of Lee and
Lemieux [2010] and estimate a pooled regression. Here, nonlinear trends and
slope can change as the forcing variable crosses the threshold. Table 1.13 walks
in this result by first presenting the treatment effect for a parametric model
where just the slope may change on either side of the cutoff. It is not until I add
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Table 1.12: Parametric Regression Discontinuity Estimates - Nonlinearities
Dependent Variable is Star Rating
Quadratic Quadratic Cubic Cubic
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.037∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.048∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004)
True Average Rating 1.087∗∗∗ 0.938∗∗∗ 0.295 −0.111
(0.058) (0.065) (0.184) (0.216)
Quadratic −0.006 −0.004 0.232∗∗∗ 0.308∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.008) (0.053) (0.062)
Cubic −0.023∗∗∗ −0.030∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.006)
Category/User FEs No Y es No Y es
Observations 2,223,887 2,222,261 2,223,887 2,222,261
Adjusted R2 0.170 0.347 0.170 0.347
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Bin fixed-effects suppressed.
a flexible nonlinear trend that we see a meaningful change in the coefficient of
interest. Importantly, the magnitude of the effect is close to what I find in my
nonparametric estimations with relatively small bandwidth in sections 5.1 and
6.1. This reconciliation suggests that the choice of bandwidth is reasonable,
and the RDD is valid.
1.6.3 Manipulation Testing
In order for the RDD to be valid, it must be true that optimizing agents do not
have precise control over the forcing variable [Lee and Lemieux, 2010]. That is
to say, businesses and reviewers must not be able to manipulate establishment’s
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Table 1.13: Parametric Regression Discontinuity Estimates - Changes in
Slope
Dependent Variable is Star Rating
(1) (2)
Treatment 0.047∗∗∗ 0.030∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006)
True Average Rating 0.939∗∗∗ 1.346∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.133)
Quadratic Forcing Variable No Y es
Observations 2,222,261 2,222,261
Adjusted R2 0.347 0.347
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Bin, category, and user fixed-effects are suppressed.
average rating with precision. Given the positive relationship between Yelp
ratings and demand [see Luca [2016]; and Anderson and Magruder [2012]],
businesses have incentive to manipulate ratings in their favor. There are two
reasons to expect that the control they do have over their customer facing
Yelp rating is dull at best. The first is institutional; Yelp algorithmically
removes ratings they believe to be fraudulent. Using proprietary raw data,
Luca and Zervas [2016] find that 16% of restaurant reviews on the platform
are suspicious, while Yelp claims to filter about 20% of all reviews. Conversely,
post-filtering by Yelp, Ott et al. [2012] find that 4% of reviews still on the
platform are fake. Second, those reviewers that are able to manipulate ratings
can use only a blunt instrument. Since the platform never reveals the true
average rating of an establishment, reviewers are unable to precisely control
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it.
Table 1.14: Manipulation Testing Based on Density Discontinuity
Dependent Variable is Probability Mass
Above Threshold 0.001
(0.005)
Constant 0.014∗∗∗
(0.002)
Observations 72
Adjusted R2 −0.014
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
McCrary [2008] suggests a distribution test to identifying manipulation of
the forcing variable in regression discontinuity designs. Here, it is relatively
straightforward to apply. We would expect that if there is manipulation, there
would be clumping of average ratings for businesses right above the rounding
threshold. To test for this, I first discretize the continuous average rating to
80 bins, each containing 0.05 of the continuous rating (e.g. 2 - 2.05), and
compute the discrete probability distribution. Clumping would occur in the
bins directly following a rounding threshold, 3.25 to 3.30 for instance. Figure
1.5 presents the discrete distribution, where the red bars are the bins directly
above a threshold. To formally test for manipulation, I regress the probability
mass on a dummy variable specifying wether a bin directly follows the cutoff.
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The results for this regression [see Table 1.14] suggest that there is not enough
evidence to reject the null of no manipulation.
Figure 1.5: Probability Mass of Average Rating
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1.6.4 External Validity
It is clear the reference population for the work herein is limited to those
active users of the Yelp rating and review platform. However, platforms with
user-generated content like Yelp have a passive user-base that typically far
exceeds the contributing user-base. In a company blog post in 2012, Yelp
itself suggested that active users represent only 1% of the total number of
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visitors to the site. In additional, recall that self-selection plays a key role in
passive users of the platform becoming active reviewers. It is difficult, then,
to suggest that the intuition from the results in section 1.5 extends to all users
of the platform.
In extrapolating the results in section 1.5 to other platforms that use similar
rating schemes, some caution must be taken. As discussed in section 1.2,
self-selection plays an important role in determining the population of active
reviewers on a particular service. Institutional details, such as the perceived
cost of leaving a review, can significantly impact this choice by users ([Wang,
2010]; and [Lafky, 2014]). If these details change from platform to platform, it
is also reasonable to expect the distributional characteristics of active users to
change as well. For instance, if Yelp required, and credibly enforced, reviewers
to use their real identities, I would expect the makeup of active users to be
different than if the policy did not exist. For this reason, I cannot assume that
different active user populations across platforms are similar.
1.7 Conclusion
A positive quality signal has a significant impact on consumers’ perception of
that business, as evidence from Yelp ratings and text-based reviews. Using a
RDD around Yelp.com’s rounding threshold, I find that, ceteris paribus, a one-
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half star difference in the rounded rating presented to users by Yelp results
in reviewers on the platform rating businesses 0.04-stars higher on average.
This positive effect persists over heterogeneous business types, some of which
experience an impact twice that of the average business. Here, I focus on the
distinction between experience and credence goods and services. With expe-
rience goods, reviewers are able to discern subjective quality for themselves.
However, intuition tells us that if we are unable to precisely identify the qual-
ity of the good or service provided, as with credence goods, we are likely to
frame our rating of the experience on other things. My results suggest that
we may link it to the experience of others.
User heterogeneity plays an important role as well. Those reviewers that
Yelp identifies as experienced enough for an ‘elite’ designation do not have as
strong of a response to the signal. It is intuitive that experienced reviewers
would be less susceptible to a potentially uninformative signal, or perhaps
they may ignore it altogether and form their opinions separate from others.
Somewhat counterintuitively, this effect does not get stronger as experience
increases.
We further investigate how the signal effect propagates through the text-
based reviews left by platform users. In the face of an uninformative - in the
sense that it does not reflect actual quality - positive signal, Yelp reviewers
are 2% less likely to express negative sentiment in the review text. When rec-
onciling this result with above, our intuition plays a key role in understanding
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the difference. It is likely that a combination of herding effects and decreased
friction with numeric ratings play key roles. Finally, by investigating specific
key words and phrases related to levels of disappointment, I find that, while
users are less likely to be disappointed when presented with the positive signal,
they are more likely to be mildly disappointed. This suggests that consumer
expectations are, to some extent, driven by these reputation systems. If shown
five stars instead of the four-point-five star counterfactual, for the same level
of true quality, consumers respond appropriately in their review and express
more mild disappointment.
One piece I am unable to flesh out is where this effect originates. For
example, we can never know the timing of the review compared to eating the
meal at a specific restaurant. Just like we can never know if the effect originates
starting at the time the user saw the Yelp rating, likely before going to the
establishment; or if it presents itself when the user goes to review the business,
or a combination of both. A properly designed experiment, or utilization of
proprietary platform data may be able to tease out the issue of timing.
In the absolute sense, the magnitude of the effects I find are not particularly
large. However, we must keep in mind that Yelp.com’s reputation mechanism
is incredibly impactful for businesses, and hundreds of millions of people use it
monthly. Additionally, most major internet retailers and ratings platforms use
a similar five-star system. It is important to note that I utilize the rounding
threshold signal because of the ease with which it fit a RDD, enabling us
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identify a causal rating and review impact. However, reputation platform
reviewers face potentially hundreds of quality signals, whether or not they are
related to the true quality of the service provided. This research suggests that
these signals are a potentially important determinant of user behavior, and
add to the literature suggesting that there are significant incentives to avoid
(provide) negative (positive) quality signals, however informative, and “prop
up” the rating of a product or service offered. While I do not measure a welfare
effect, possible extensions to this work should include investigating the value
to rating and review manipulation in these settings.
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1.8 Appendix: Tables and Figures
Table 1.15: RDD Estimates by Cutoff
Dependent Variable is Star Rating
1.25 1.75 2.25 2.75
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.182∗∗∗ −0.150∗∗∗ 0.055∗ 0.030
(0.053) (0.044) (0.030) (0.020)
True Average Rating −7.432∗∗∗ −1.160∗∗∗ −2.709∗∗∗ −1.299∗∗∗
(0.444) (0.385) (0.262) (0.169)
Business FEs Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 8,321 21,528 50,020 113,236
Adjusted R2 0.009 0.002 0.003 0.001
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors are calculated according to Calonico et al. (2018).
Table 1.16: RDD Estimates by Cutoff
Dependent Variable is Star Rating
3.25 3.75 4.25 4.75
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Treatment 0.052∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.008) (0.007) (0.010)
True Average Rating −1.225∗∗∗ −1.293∗∗∗ −0.859∗∗∗ −2.504∗∗∗
(0.103) (0.075) (0.067) (0.092)
Business FEs Y es Y es Y es Y es
Observations 257,886 440,735 424,626 165,467
Adjusted R2 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.008
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Robust standard errors are calculated according to Calonico et al. (2018).
Chapter 2
Patent Validity and the Timing
of Settlements
Talia Bar
Jesse Kalinowski
Abstract
We study the timing of settlement in patent disputes, accounting for an al-
leged infringer’s effort to challenge patent validity. Early settlements are more
likely reached when the disputed patent is weak. Late settlements take place
when the infringer was successful in identifying evidence that challenges patent
validity. Thus, there is a tendency to settle disputes over patents that would
have likely been invalidated in court. Fee shifting induces more patent suits,
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early settlements, and more effort to invalidate patents when parties did not
settle early. We consider additional policy reforms and shed light on disputes
involving patent assertion entities.
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2.1 Introduction
The United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) receives more than
500,000 patent applications each year. The office examines every patent ap-
plication to determine if it satisfies the legal patentability requirements. The
review process, however, is imperfect and the patent office grants patents con-
taining claims that could later be found invalid in court. While only a small
fraction of granted patents are ever litigated, a significant share of litigated
patents are found to contain invalid claims. Indeed, using a dataset of cases
filed in 2008 and 2009, Allison et al. [2014] find that infringers win validity
challenges 42% of the time.
In this paper we model settlements and litigation in patent disputes. We
consider the timing of settlement and the role of efforts to invalidate the patent
claims in determining the outcome of negotiations. Settlement timing plays
an important financial role in litigation. As the process draws out, costs tend
to accrue quickly. Thus, settling shortly after a legal demand is made will
often mean avoiding the majority of these costs. But, it is not uncommon for
parties to reach a late settlement. If parties settle just before trial, they incur
most of the expenses associated with litigation [Gryphon, 2011].
In our model there are two stages of negotiations. The early stage involves
costless (or low cost) negotiations and relies on the information available at the
time the patentee filed the suit. If the parties do not settle early, the alleged
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infringer will exert effort to search for prior art or other evidence that could
invalidate one or more of the patent claims. Challenging the validity of the
patent is a common defense for an alleged infringer.1 Late stage negotiations
take place, in our model, after the strength of the evidence challenging validity
is revealed. The outcomes of late settlement and trial depend on this evidence.
We characterize conditions under which the parties settle early, settle late,
or continue to trial, and we identify the determinants of settlement amounts
and of the infringer’s effort to invalidate the patent. In this paper, we consider
a patent to be of higher quality the higher the probability that it is valid. A
patentee that holds a low-quality patent anticipates a higher probability that
strong evidence of invalidity would be found and is therefore more likely to
settle early. We show that when a late settlement is reached, it is only after the
alleged infringer found strong evidence questioning patent invalidity. Farrell
and Merges [2004] reason that litigation does not reliably fix patent office
errors due to skewed incentives to challenge and defend patents. Our paper
complements their argument. We claim that the court’s ability to correct the
patent office’s mistakes is further limited by parties’ strategic incentives to
settle precisely when patent invalidity is most likely.
Patent Assertion Entities (PAE)—firms that do not research or produce
the goods for which they own the intellectual property, but assert a patent to
1In the US, patents are presumed valid and the burden of proof of invalidity rests on the
challenger.
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extract rent—are an increasing source of policy debate. According to Chien
[2013], PAEs were responsible for 62% of total US patent litigation cases in
2012, up from 19% in 2006. Mazzeo et al. [2013] suggest that PAEs may be
more willing to settle litigation before a court decision and that PAEs have
lower success rates in terms of validity and infringement. Herein, we attempt
to provide some insight on the behavior of PAEs and the alleged infringers
they sue, and how their behavior compares to that of practicing entities. We
argue that with lower costs of litigation, and lower sustained losses in the event
of patent invalidation, PAEs will file infringement suits on patents that are,
on average, of lower quality.
In light of our model, we investigate the effects of recent US intellectual
property policy measures. The first, the 2011 Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act (AIA) took aim at modernizing the US patent system through broad
reforms. Importantly, these reforms included non-trivial changes to the def-
inition of prior art. The AIA also introduced a new process for challenging
the validity of patents – Inter partes Review. The second, the Innovation Act
(IA), which has not passed the US senate at this time, seeks to disrupt current
“troll-like” behavior in patent litigation, such as the often observed tactic by
PAEs to transfer ownership of patents to shell companies who then initiate
the patent suit [Gollwitzer III, 2015].
In patent cases in the US each party typically pays its own attorney fees.
US 35 U.S.C. 285 states that, “The court in exceptional cases may award rea-
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sonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.” Under a fee shifting rule, the
loser may be required to also pay the fees of the winning party. Interestingly,
a recent Supreme Court ruling tends toward a more supportive environment
for fee-shifting in patent litigation.2 The Innovation Act also proposes changes
that would make fee shifting the default.3 We modify our model to incorpo-
rate fee shifting, and we compare outcomes in a fee-shifting regime versus the
baseline model without fee-shifting.
We also consider a version of the model in which the patentee exerts effort
to prove infringement at the same time as the infringement puts effort to
invalidate the patent. Here we highlight a special feature of patent litigation.
If the court finds that the patent is invalid, whether or not the patent was
infringed becomes irrelevant. Considering their reaction functions, we find
that the alleged infringer’s has an incentive to put more effort to invalidate
the patent the more effort the patentee exerts to show infringement, but the
patentee’s effort decreases with that of the infringer.
Our paper contributes to the literature on settlements and litigation. In
models of legal disputes, trials can occur when the parties have different per-
ceptions regarding the probability that the plaintiff will prevail, when there is
some source of information asymmetry or when there are asymmetric stakes
(see surveys by Cooter and Rubinfeld [1989], and Lanjouw and Lerner [2000]).
2Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014), see
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/12-1184 gdhl.pdf
3See https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/9
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Our model falls into the asymmetric stakes category, which aligns with the ap-
plication of patents disputes. Several scholars have noted that, for a patentee,
winning a trial against one infringer would strengthen the patentee’s position
against future infringers (see for example Choi [1998] and Farrell and Shapiro
[2008]). Thus, the patentee’s benefit from winning can exceed the payments
received from the infringer, and if the patent is invalidated, the loss extends
beyond the current case. Asymmetric stakes also capture payoff differences in
firms’ future stream of profits. Specifically, a monopoly’s profits exceed the
sum of duopoly profits, therefore, a practicing patentee’s gain from excluding
the infringer in future periods may exceed the infringer’s loss of future profits
(see Lanjouw and Lerner [2000]).
Following Farrell and Shapiro [2008] we assume common belief about the
probability of validity of the patent. While simplicity is our main reason for
using a symmetric information model, the assumption seems reasonable in the
context of patent disputes. Patents are publicly available and include all rele-
vant prior art known to the examiner at the time the patent was issued.4 Prior
art is by definition public information and can be acquired by both patentee
and infringer Additional support for our approach is found in an empirical
4Prior art references can be disclosed by the applicant as well as added by the examiner.
Atal and Bar [2010] argue that patentees likely have little incentive to search intensively for
prior art before they apply for a patent According to Langinier and Marcoul [2016], however,
patent applicants may have an incentive to conceal prior art in patent applications despite
the legal requirement to disclose. This concern is alleviated when examiners are committed
to a certain intensity of search which is unaffected by the volume of prior art disclosed by
patent applicants.
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study of the predictors of litigation outcomes: Siegelman and Waldfogel [1999]
show that intellectual property suits have a relatively high ratio of institutional
plaintiffs and a higher proportion of repeat players among plaintiffs compared
to other cases. Their structural estimation results suggest that there are higher
stakes for plaintiffs in intellectual property cases. At the same time, the per-
cent of plaintiffs that represent themselves, which is taken to be one measure
of information asymmetry, was zero in the intellectual property cases in their
dataset.
In many contributions on legal disputes, only one settlement offer is made
(see for example Bebchuk [1984] and Reinganum and Wilde [1986] for gen-
eral litigation, Meurer [1989] and Crampes and Langinier [2002] for patent
litigation). Spier (1992) introduces dynamics to a model of pre-trial negoti-
ations, and examines the timing of settlement. In her model, costs incurred
preparing for trial and bargaining provide an incentive to settle early, while
private knowledge that the defendant has about the outcome of trial provides
an incentive for a settlement “on the courthouse steps.”5 Like Spier [1992], we
also allow for more than one round of negotiations and consider the timing
of settlement. While in her model late settlements and trial are driven by
one sided incomplete information and the plaintiff can learn about the defen-
5Fournier and Zuehlke [1996] simulate Spier’s model to derive comparative statics and
empirically explore its predictions. Fenn and Rickman [1999] test predictions from Spier’s
model using data from English health care providers on clinical negligence and employee
claims.
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dant’s type when a settlement offer is refused, in our model, the driving force
is asymmetric stakes and both parties learn about the quality of the patent
if an early settlement is not reached. Importantly, we account for prior art
search or other efforts to invalidate the patent.
More recently, Lee and Bernhardt [2016] study the discovery process in
civil litigation. In their model, the defendant has private information about
the probability that he would be found not liable in trial. The timing of
settlements serves as a signal of the defendant type. Our papers are similar
in some ways, for example, there are two take-it-or-leave-it settlement offers
with a discovery process in between, and the timing and size of settlements are
endogenous. However, there are key differences in modeling and applications.
Like Spier [1992], they also assume one sided asymmetric information. In
our application, if an alleged infringer has strong evidence of invalidity, this
evidence should be verifiable and the infringer would have an incentive to reveal
it early, and so asymmetric information seems less likely to be the driving force
in patent disputes than in other applications. Some of our results are quite
different. With asymmetric information, an informed defendant who has a low
probability of prevailing in a trial is more likely to accept an early settlement
offer, since discovery would reveal his low type. In our model, prior art search
could reveal new information that would invalidate the patent. Thus, early
settlements are more likely to occur when the patentee has a low probability
of validity – i.e. when the accused infringer has a stronger case. A discovery
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stage is also accounted for in other asymmetric information litigation models.
For example, Schrag [1999] shows that judges can increase the probability
of early settlement by limiting pre-trial discovery; Schwartz and Wickelgren
[2009] show that discovery can reduce the probability and size of pre-discovery
settlement offers.
Lemley and Shapiro [2005] describe patent prosecution and patent litiga-
tion in the United States. They offer an excellent review of empirical and the-
oretical work on patent dispute. According to the authors, “Modeling patents
as probabilistic rights requires us to rethink [...] our approach to patent liti-
gation, the efficacy of litigation as a means of invalidating patents that were
improperly issued and antitrust policy toward the settlement of patent law-
suits.” We account for the probabilistic nature of patents and offer insights into
invalidation through litigation. Cremers et al. [2016] theoretically and empir-
ically compare a bifurcated patent system in which infringement and validity
are determined independently in separate courts, and a non-bifurcated system
in which infringement and validity are decided jointly. The US has a non-
bifurcated system, however, this is to some extent changing with a significant
increase in administrative challenges of patent validity since the introduction
of Inter Partes Review.
Our paper also joins an emerging body of literature that examines the
behavior of PAEs. Tucker [2013], Mazzeo et al. [2013], and Bessen and Meurer
[2014] offer empirical studies. Theoretical work related to PAEs, or of the
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broader group of non-practicing entities (NPEs), is scarce. In one recent paper,
Cosandier et al. [2014] model competition between NPEs and operating firms
to win a patent auction. Choi and Gerlach [2017] examine the incentives
of NPEs to acquire patent portfolios and compare them to the incentives of
practicing entities. Our results are also related to contributions that compared
the English rule (in which litigation costs are shifted) and the American rule.
Consistent with the earlier findings, see for example Katz [1987], we also find
higher effort in a system with fee shifting.
The present paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model.
Section 3 presents the outcomes of dispute and characterizes search efforts and
settlement amounts. We extend the model in Section 4 to include a system
with fee-shifting. In Section 5 we discuss other issues related to patent policy
reforms and PAEs. In Section 6 we modify the model to allow both parties
simultaneously exert effort. Finally, Section 7 offers concluding remarks. All
proofs are provided in the Appendix.
2.2 Model
Our model is a sequential game between a patentee and an accused patent
infringer, with two rounds of settlements negotiations before a possible trial.
A patentee accuses a firm of patent infringement, she makes a first settlement
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offer. If it is rejected the alleged infringer has an opportunity to exert effort
to find invalidating prior art, and both parties incur discovery costs. Then
the patentee makes a second settlement offer. If the second settlement offer
is also rejected, the patentee could drop the suit or the parties go to trial.
Both the patentee and the alleged infringer (or simply, the infringer) are risk
neutral. For simplicity, there is no discounting. We now describe the process
and payoffs in more detail.
Initially, both parties believe that the probability that the claims at issue
are valid is θ. Patents may have multiple claims, and it is possible that some
claims are valid and others are not. To keep things simple, we will refer to the
validity of the patent, and we consider the patent as being of higher quality the
higher its probability of validity. Patent validity largely dependent on the prior
art, which is public information and it is reasonable that both patentee and
infringer are similarly familiar with the relevant technology. We see no reason
to assume that one party is necessarily more knowledgeable than the other,
and accounting for possible differences in prior beliefs would add complexity
to notation.
At the start of the game, the patentee decides to accuse an party of infringe-
ment, the cost of initiating the suit is c0. The patentee proposes a settlement
amount of s1. We abstract from the details of settlement agreements, that in
some cases take the form of licensing agreements, and consider the settlement
as one payment. If the offer is accepted the game ends with s1 paid by the
62
alleged infringer to the patentee.
If the early stage settlement offer is rejected, the infringer will exert costly
effort, ea ∈ [0,∞), to find new evidence that the patent is invalid. Under
US patent law, the challenger of a patent would need to provide “clear and
convincing evidence” in order to invalidate a patent in court (see Kesan and
Ball [2006]). Prior art search could allow the infringer to bring evidence that
a patent claim is anticipated or obvious.6 We assume that if the patent has
invalid claims, the infringer who exerts effort ea will reveal strong evidence of
invalidity with a probability that is given by a differentiable function, F (ea) ,
with F (0) = 0, and lim
ea→∞
F (ea) = 1.
7 This probability increases with effort
(F ′(ea) = f(ea) > 0) at a decreasing rate (f ′(ea) < 0) . If the patent is valid,
the patentee will never find strong evidence of invalidity. Thus, the probability
that strong evidence of invalidity is found is p (ea) = (1− θ)F (ea) . Denote
the case in which the infringer found weak evidence i = 0 and the case of
strong evidence i = 1.8 During this period of time the parties also incur pre-
trial litigation costs denoted by dp and da; a large component of these costs
6There are other grounds for patent claims to be invalid including: indefiniteness, en-
ablement, written description, unpatentable subject matter.
7The function F has properties of a cumulative distribution function. But, the interpre-
tation is different, F (e) is the probability of finding strong evidence given e, and not the
probability that effort does not exceed e.
8In our model, weak evidence could due to the patent being valid so that there is no
evidence to be found, or due to insufficient or search. For simplicity, we do not distringuish
between weak evidence and no evidence. Either way, we think of the infringer as bringing
in argument that are less likely to result in a win for the infringer.
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are often associated with discovery.9
Before the next round of settlement negotiations, the patentee learns about
the infringer’s efforts and the results of his search. This assumption may
be justified by the legal pre-trial discovery process in which each party can
obtain documents and request answers from the other parties. The patentee
then makes a new settlement offer s2,i. This offer depends on the strength
of evidence, i = 0, 1 because as described below, the strength of evidence
determines the probability that the patentee will win in trial. If the offer is
accepted, this payment is made by the infringer to the patentee and the game
ends. If the second period offer is rejected, the patentee will choose whether
to drop her suit or to litigate to trial. In our model, the alleged infringer does
not have an incentive to challenge the validity of the patent in unless he is
litigated for infringement.
The probability that the court rules in favor of the patentee in trial depends
on the strength of evidence, αi for i = 0, 1. We assume α0 > α1, that is, the
court is more likely to rule in favor of the patentee if the evidence of invalidity is
weak. Note that while the probability that the infringer finds strong evidence
depended on the prior probability of validity (θ) and on search effort (ea) , after
the search ended, the conditional probabilities αi only depend on the evidence
revealed and not on θ or ea. The reason for this assumption is that the court
9We abstract away from the availability of different ways to challenge validity, such as
inter partes review or the filing of a declaratory judgment.
64
cannot rule against a patentee based on Bayesian updating of prior beliefs,
but only based on the evidence that is presented during trial. For example,
if the infringer exerts no effort to find prior art that invalidates the patent,
the probability of validity right before trial is still θ, which may be low. But,
without evidence of invalidity, the patent will most likely remain valid.
A second question that courts deal with in patent disputes is the question of
whether there was infringement. In most of the paper we focused on the issue
of validity, and assume that the patentee had found evidence of infringement
before filing the suit, so that there is a fixed probability β that the court will
find that the patent was infringed. In section 6, we will consider the possibility
that the patentee exerts effort to prove infringement simultaneously with the
infringer’s effort to invalidate the patent. If the court rules in favor of the
patentee, the patentee will obtain a gross payoff, W, and the infringer will
suffer a loss, D.10 These payoffs account not only for the damages awarded,
but also for the effect that the outcome of the dispute has on the firms’ future
profits and reputation. If the patent is invalidated, the patentee will suffer a
loss of L. Litigation costs at the trial stage are cp for the patentee and ca for
the alleged infringer.
10We do not consider the way damages are determined. Schankerman and Scotchmer
[2001], compare two doctrines of damages, lost profits and unjust enrichment, they show
that with either doctrines, infringement may not be deterred.
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2.3 Analysis
We solve for the subgame perfect equilibrium using backwards induction. In
the event the parties did not reach any settlement agreement, the patentee’s
expected payoffs from trial are
piTi,p = αiβW − (1− αi)L− cp − dp, (2.1)
and the infringer’s expected payoffs from trial are
piTi,a = −αiβD − ca − da − ea, (2.2)
where i = 0 or i = 1 if the infringer found weak or strong evidence respectively.
If the patentee drops the suit, the parties’ payoffs are the costs that they
already sunk, −dp for the patentee and −da − ea for the infringer.
We define the return from litigation threshold that makes the patentee
indifferent between continuing to trial and dropping the suit when the infringer
found evidence of strength i = 0, 1 as
W Ti =
1
βαi
[(1− αi)L+ cp] . (2.3)
Because α0 > α1 > 0, the threshold is higher when strong evidence is found;
W T1 > W
T
0 > 0. For W > W
T
1 the patentee will litigate to trial whether the
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infringer found strong or weak evidence of invalidity. We refer to this range
as the “high returns to litigation” range. For W in the intermediate range,
W T1 ≥ W > W T0 , the patentee will drop the suit if the infringer revealed strong
evidence of invalidity, but will litigate to trial if the infringer can only present
weak evidence of invalidity. If W ≤ W T0 , the patentee will not litigate to trial
even if the evidence against its patent is weak.
Definition 1. There are high returns to litigation if W > W T1 , and low returns
to litigation if W ≤ W T1 .
We first consider settlement negotiation in the context of high returns to
litigation, and then for the low returns to litigation scenario.
2.3.1 High Returns to Litigation
In the second round of negotiations, the results of the infringer’s search effort
are known to both parties. When weak (i = 0) or strong (i = 1) evidence was
found, an agreement will be reached if there exists a settlement amount s2,i
that would make both parties at least as well off as they would be if they
continued with litigation,
αiβD + ca ≥ s2,i ≥ αiβW − (1− αi)L− cp for i = 0, 1.
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A settlement is reached when total trial costs, ca+cp, exceeds the total expected
benefits from the trial, αiβ (W −D) − (1 − αi)L.11 The parties necessarily
settle if W ≤ D, but asymmetric stakes in favor of the patentee might bring
the parties to trial. Rearranging, we find that the parties settle if
W ≤ W Si :=
(1− αi)L+ ca + cp
αiβ
+D for i = 0, 1. (2.4)
In this case, under the assumption that the patentee makes a take-it-or-leave-it
offer, the patentee will make a settlement offer equal to
s2,i = αiβD + ca. (2.5)
Comparing the thresholds in the cases of strong (i = 1) and weak (i = 0)
evidence we find that W S1 > W
S
0 . That is, if a settlement can be reached when
there is only weak evidence of invalidity, then it can also be reached when there
is strong evidence of invalidity. In other words, the parties are more likely to
settle when the court would have likely ruled the patent invalid. Additionally,
note that W S1 > W
T
1 . Therefore, there are values of W in the high returns
to litigation range for which, if the parties did not settle earlier and if the
infringer found strong evidence that could invalidate the patent, the parties
would settle late. The order of W S0 and W
T
1 depends on the parameters of
11Payoffs in the inquality do not include the sunk costs ea, da and dp which would be
incurred whether the parties settle or continue to trial.
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the model.12 When the infringer’s trial costs (ca) and damages (D) are high,
there are values of W in the high returns to litigation range for which a late
settlement would be reached if a parties did not settle earlier even if only weak
evidence of invalidity was revealed.
Before entering the second stage of negotiations, if the first settlement offer
was rejected, the infringer engages in prior art search. Given the probability of
validity θ, the probability that the infringer finds strong evidence of invalidity
with search effort ea is given by p (ea) = (1− θ)F (ea). We use piha to denote
the alleged infringer’s (a) payoff in the high returns to litigation range (h) .
The infringer will choose an effort level to maximize his payoff or minimize his
cost:
−piha = min
ea≥0
[(1−(1− θ)F (ea)) (α0βD + ca)+(1− θ)F (ea) (α1βD + ca)+da+ea].
This target function is convex in ea, because the search technology is such
that f ′(ea) < 0. The optimal effort is finite because the benefit of search is
bounded and so, as ea → ∞, piha → −∞. An interior optimal choice of effort
solves the first order condition
FOC : − (1− θ) f(ea) (α0 − α1) βD + 1 = 0.
12WT1 < W
S
0 if and only if
(1−α1)L+cp
α1β
<
(1−α0)L+cp+ca
α0β
+D
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The solution to this equation is given by,
e∗ah = f
−1
(
1
(1− θ) (α0 − α1) βD
)
. (2.6)
The infringer exerts at least some effort when f(0) > 1
(1−θ)(α0−α1)βD , otherwise
e∗ah = 0.
The probability that strong evidence of invalidity is revealed for this opti-
mal effort level is p∗h = (1− θ)F (e∗ah). From the derivations above, we know
that if the parties did not settle earlier and W > W S1 , the parties will go to
trial whether there is weak or strong evidence of invalidity. Below we will refer
to this range as TT (for trial-trial). For returns, W S1 ≥ W > W S0 , the parties
will settle in the second stage if strong evidence was found, and proceed to
trial only if there is weak evidence. We will refer to this range as TS (for trial-
settlement). If W T1 ≤ W ≤ W S0 , the parties will settle in the second stage with
either weak or strong evidence. This range is empty if W T1 > W
S
0 . Based on
these conclusions, we write the patentee’s expected payoff in the high returns
to litigation region if a settlement is not reached in period 1:
pihp =

(1− p∗h)piT0,p + p∗hpiT1,p if W > W S1 ,
(1− p∗h)piT0,p + p∗h (s2,1 − dp) if W S1 ≥ W > max{W S0 ,W T1 },
(1− p∗h) (s2,0 − dp) + p∗h (s2,1 − dp) if W T1 ≤ W ≤ W S0 ,
(2.7)
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where, piTi,p and s2,i are defined in equations (2.1) and (2.5).
If −piha < pihp the parties will not settle in the first stage because any amount
that the infringer would agree to pay would be lower than what the patentee
expect to gain if she does not settle. In the first stage of negotiations, a
settlement can be reached if there exists s1 such that −piha ≥ s1 ≥ pihp . In this
case, the patentee will offer a settlement,
sh1 = −piha = [(1− p∗h)α0 + p∗hα1] βD + ca + da + e∗ah. (2.8)
The threshold W for early settlement in the high returns to litigation range is
determined by the solution to pihp = −piha . Depending on parameter values it can
fall in the region TT where the parties will go to trial regardless of the strength
of evidence, or in the range TS where the parties would go to trial only if the
infringer has weak evidence. Let WTT (e
∗
ah) solve (1− p∗h)piT0,p + p∗hpiT1,p = −piha .
When WTT (e
∗
ah) > W
S
1 it is the threshold return below which the parties
settle early. Let WTS (e
∗
ah) solve (1 − p∗h)piT0,p + p∗h (s2,1 − dp) = −piha . When
W S1 ≥ WTS (e∗a) > W S0 it is the threshold return below which the parties
settle early. The expressions for these two thresholds are given in the proof
of Lemma 1, both depend not only on effort but also on other parameters
of the model which we omitted from this notation for simplicity. The order
of the thresholds that determine whether the dispute will terminate in early
settlement, late settlement, or trial, in the high returns to litigation range,
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depends on whether trial costs are high, as formally stated in the following
Lemma.
Lemma 1. If trial costs are high so that cp+ca+L >
α1(e∗ah+da+dp)
(α0−α1)(1−(1−θ)F (e∗ah))
then
the thresholds satisfy W S1 > WTT (e
∗
ah) > WTS (e
∗
ah) , otherwise the thresholds
satisfy W S1 ≤ WTT (e∗ah) ≤ WTS (e∗ah).
The right hand side of the expression that defines high trial costs does
not depend on the cost parameters cp, ca, L (because the effort e
∗
ah which was
defined in (2.6) is independent of these costs). Thus, there are parameter
values for which this range is not empty. In proposition 1, we characterize the
outcome of the patent dispute in the high returns to litigation range.
Proposition 1. In the high returns to litigation range
(
W > W T1
)
,
(i) an early settlement is reached if W T1 < W ≤ min{WTS (e∗ah) ,WTT (e∗ah)};
(ii) a late settlement is reached when the infringer found strong evidence of
invalidity, and the patentee will litigate to trial when the infringer found weak
evidence of invalidity if W S1 ≥ W > WTS (e∗ah) ;
(iii) the patentee litigates to trial if W > max{W S1 ,WTT (e∗ah)}.
These three cases describe all possible outcomes in the high returns to liti-
gation region.
When the returns to litigation are sufficiently low, the parties settle early,
while when the returns are sufficiently high, no settlement can be reached.
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Proposition 1 shows that when trial costs are high, there exists a range of in-
termediate levels of return to litigation (W ) for which the parties cannot settle
early, but they reach a late settlement if the infringer found strong evidence
of invalidity. The intuition for why a late settlement could be reached is that
with new evidence against patent validity revealed, the patentee becomes more
pessimistic about her chances of prevailing in court and is therefore willing to
make a small enough settlement offer that will be accepted by the infringer
just before a trial. As the costs associated with a trial (ca, cp, L) increase, late
settlements are more likely to be reached. A decrease in discovery costs da+dd
or in the search effort, e∗ah, result in a lower threshold WTS (e
∗
ah) and thus, in
a wider range
(
WTS (e
∗
ah) ,W
S
1
)
in which a settlement is reached only in the
second stage if strong evidence was found.
2.3.2 Low Returns to Litigation
If W ≤ W T0 , trial is not a credible threat and the patentee will not initiate a
suit. Consider W T1 ≥ W > W T0 , so that after the second stage of negotiations,
if the parties did not reach an agreement, the patentee drops the suit if the
infringer has strong evidence of invalidity, but litigates to trial if the infringer
found only weak evidence. The infringer will therefore reject any positive
demand for settlement if he has strong evidence of invalidity. If the evidence is
weak, then if W ≤ W S0 , the parties will agree on a settlement s2,0 = α0βD+ca,
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and if W > W S0 , the patentee will litigate to trial.
If the initial settlement offer is rejected, the infringer will exert effort ea
that solves
−pi`a = min
ea≥0
[(1− (1− θ)F (ea)) (α0βD + ca) + da + ea] .
The infringer’s optimal effort in the low returns region is
e∗a` = f
−1
(
1
(1− θ) (α0βD + ca)
)
, (2.9)
when f(0) > 1
(1−θ)(α0βD+ca) , otherwise e
∗
a` = 0.
The patentee’s payoff if a settlement was not reached is:
pi`p =
 (1− p
∗
`)pi
T
0,p − p∗`dp if W T1 ≥ W > W S0 ,
(1− p∗`)s2,1 − dp if W T0 < W ≤ W S0 .
(2.10)
For W T0 < W < W
S
0 , an early settlement can always be reached. For
W T1 ≥ W > W S0 , a settlement s1 is reached if
(1− p∗`) (α0βD + ca) + da + e∗a` ≥ s1 ≥ (1− p∗`) (α0βW − (1− α0)L− cp)− dp.
(2.11)
This holds when W ≤ WTS (e∗a`) where WTS (e∗a`) solves (1− p∗`)piT0,p − p∗`dp =
74
−pi`a.13 The settlement offer is then
s`1 = (1− p∗` (e∗a`)) (α0βD + ca) + da + e∗a`. (2.12)
When W T1 ≥ W > WTS (e∗a`), no settlement agreement can be reached in either
the first or second period of negotiation, and so the patentee will litigate to
trial only if weak evidence of invalidity was found, and drop if strong evidence
of invalidity was found.
Proposition 2. For low returns to litigation
(
W ≤ W T1
)
,
(i) If W T1 ≥ W > WTS (e∗a`) , no settlement is reached. After search, if the
evidence of invalidity is weak the patentee will litigate to trial and if evidence
is strong, the patentee will drop the suit.
(ii) If W T0 < W ≤ WTS (e∗a`) , an early settlement is reached.
(iii) If W ≤ W T0 , there is no litigation.
In Figure 1, the low returns to litigation outcomes are illustrated below
the solid black line which indicates the threshold W T1 .
2.3.3 Search Effort and Settlements
Comparing search efforts in the high (2.6) and low (2.9) return ranges, we see
that for given parameter values (θ, α0, α1, D) , search effort is higher in the low
13It is the same expression WTS (.) as in the proof of lemma 1, only evaluated at the low
returns effort e∗a` and the corresponding probability p
∗
` (e
∗
a`) = (1− θ)F (e∗a`) .
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returns range e∗a` > e
∗
ah. Intuitively, the reason for this is that the benefit from
finding strong evidence that the patent is invalid in the low return region is
higher than in the high returns region because strong evidence would induce
the patentee to drop the suit in the low returns range, but not in the high
returns to litigation range.
Search effort is continuous in all parameters in each regime (high or low re-
turn). There is a discontinuity, however, in the optimal effort when the change
in α1,W , L, cp or β causes a switch from the high to the low returns to liti-
gation regimes. Nevertheless, the optimal search effort is (weakly) monotone
with respect to all the parameters of the model, except for the probability of
infringement (β). As we would expect, search effort increases with the proba-
bility of infringement almost everywhere, because the infringer benefits more
from showing invalidity if he is likely to be found infringing. However, an
increase in the probability of infringement that just causes a switch from the
low to the high returns to litigation, results in a jump down in search effort.
We derive detailed comparative statics in the appendix proposition A1. In the
next proposition, we focus of the effect of the probability of validity.
Proposition 3. (i) Search effort decreases in the patent’s probability of validity
(θ). (ii) Disputes over patents of lower probability of validity (θ) are more likely
to settle early.
The incentive to search is lower the more likely the patent is valid because
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for valid patents search does not lead to finding strong evidence. The probabil-
ity of finding invalidating prior art is higher the lower θ due to both the direct
effect of validity and due to the increase in search. This leads to a greater
incentive for the patentee to settle early.Turning to settlement amounts we
recall that a late settlement could be reached in the high return range, and
only when strong evidence of invalidity was revealed.
Proposition 4. When a late settlement is reached, it is lower than the highest
amount the infringer would have been willing to settle for in the first stage,
s2,1 < s
h
1 .
This is because parties settle late when the patentee’s position has been
weakened by new evidence of invalidity. Additionally the infringer’s search
efforts and discovery costs have been sunk at this late stage. In the appendix
proposition A2 we derive detailed comparative statics for settlement amounts.
Early settlement amounts depend on the infringer’s effort. However, since the
infringer chooses effort optimally, by the envelope theorem, the effect of each
parameter on the settlement amount equals its direct effect.
2.3.4 The Decision to File an Infringement Suit
Anticipating the chain of events described in the previous sections, the paten-
tee who identifies an infringer decides whether to file an action against the
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defendant for infringement of the patent. This requires the patentee (plain-
tiff) to incur an initial cost c0. This cost can capture preliminary legal counsel,
time, and administrative fees (but it does not include future litigation costs
which we account for separately). The cost c0 can also reflect expected losses
from a possible counter infringement suit. The patentee weighs the cost c0
against his expected payoff from initiating the suit.
Proposition 5. There is a threshold patent quality, θ∗, so that, all else equal,
the patentee files an infringement claim for θ > θ∗. The threshold is higher for
higher costs of filing a claim (c0), higher litigation costs (dp, cp) , higher losses
from invalidated patent (L) , or lower return to successful litigation (W ) .
2.4 Fee Shifting
In the current US system, each party in a patent dispute typically pays its
own legal fees. The court may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing
party only in exceptional cases. A provision for attorney fee shifting in patent
litigation has been proposed and debated. Proponents of attorney fee shifting
suggest that this rule can deter low-merit legal suits and eliminate nuisance
suits in which the plaintiff is unwilling to litigate to trial but only attempts to
extract settlement fees (see Chen [2013]). A strategic pursuit of settlements is
sometimes associated with the behavior of PAEs.
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Fee shifting makes the benefit of winning and the costs of losing larger. In
our model, however, the patentee can drop the suit when new evidence against
her patent is revealed. Thus, overall fee shifting will tend to have a positive
effect on the patentee’s expected payoffs and thus, encourage patent suits.14
To consider the effect of fee shifting in the context of this paper, we assume
that the courts shift litigation fees (dp, cp, ) or (da, ca, ), but not the infringer’s
effort to invalidate the patent (ea). The loser pays the litigation fee of both
parties. To simplify notation, we denote the total litigation costs as
C = da + dp + ca + cp.
The expected payoffs of the patentee and infringer if they go to trial are piTp =
αiβW − (1− αi)L− (1− αiβ)C and piTa = −α0βD−α0βC− ea for i = 0, 1. If
the patentee drops the suit, payoffs are the costs already incurred, (−dp) for
the patentee and (−da − ea) for the infringer.
In this section, we assume that
βα0 >
da + ca
C
> βα1. (2.13)
The inequality (2.13) implies that when the infringer only has weak or no evi-
dence of invalidity, the patentee’s probability of prevailing in court is high, so
14A similar intuition emerges in Bernhardt and Lee [2015] who analyze trial incentives in
a model with sequential litigation.
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that fee shifting is expected to save the patentee litigation costs, (1− βα0) (da + ca)−
βα0 (cp + dp) < 0. Conversely, if the infringer finds strong evidence of invalid-
ity, the patentee’s probability of prevailing in court is low, so that fee shifting
is expected to save the infringer costs, (1− βα1) (da + ca)−βα1 (cp + dp) > 0.
Consider the patentee’s decision whether to continue to trial or drop the
suit if no settlement has been reached. In the system without fee shifting, the
patentee will never litigate when W ≤ W T0 . In a system with fee shifting, if
the parties did not settle earlier and if strong evidence of invalidity was not
found, then the patentee will litigate if W > Ŵ T0 , where
Ŵ T0 =
(1− α0)L+ (1− βα0)C − dp
βα0
=
1
βα0
[(1− α0)L+ cp] + (1− βα0) (da + ca)− βα0 (cp + dp)
βα0
< W T0 .
Proposition 6. Under condition (2.13), for a return W in the non-empty
range
[
Ŵ T0 ,W
T
0
]
, in a system with fee shifting, some patentees will assert
the patent even though they would not have done so in a system without fee
shifting.
Fee shifting could encourage even a patentee with a low quality and rela-
tively low value patent to file an infringement suit. This is because fee shifting
makes the threat of going to court when no evidence of invalidity was revealed
a credible threat for a wider range of returns than in the system without fee
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shifting. These cases will settle early because WTS
(
ê∗a`
)
> W T0 .
We next consider the threshold that separates the low and the high returns
to litigation regions. If strong evidence of invalidity was found, the patentee
will litigate if W > Ŵ T1 , where
Ŵ T1 =
(1− α1)L+ (1− βα1)C − dp
βα1
. (2.14)
Comparing Ŵ T1 with W
T
1 , which define the thresholds for high return in the
fee shifting and standard systems respectively, we find that, under assumption
(2.13), Ŵ T1 > W
T
1 . Thus, the high returns to litigation range is smaller in a
system with fee shifting.
The infringer will choose search effort to solve
min
ea≥0
{[(1− (1− θ)F (ea))βα0 + (1− θ)F (ea)βα1] (D + C) + ea} .
The optimal search effort in the system with fee shifting is therefore,
ê∗ah = f
−1
(
1
(1− θ) (α0 − α1) β (D + C)
)
> f−1
(
1
(1− θ) (α0 − α1) βD
)
= e∗ah.
For values of W that fall in the high returns to litigation range with or
without fee shifting, the infringer’s search effort is higher in the fee shifting
case, and it increases with the patentee and the infringer’s fees (cp, ca, da, dp).
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Similarly, we find that search effort is higher if W fall in the low returns range
in the fee shifting system:
ê∗a` = f
−1
(
1
(1− θ) [α0β (D + C)− da]
)
> f−1
(
1
(1− θ) (α0βD + ca)
)
= e∗a` > e
∗
ah.
Comparing the outcomes under a fee shifting policy to those in a system
with no fee shifting we find the following:
Proposition 7. Under condition (2.13), in a legal system with fee shifting
compared to the standard system:
(i) the patentee is more likely to drop the suit if the infringer finds strong
evidence of invalidity;
(ii) if the parties do not settle early, then the infringer will exert more effort
to invalidate the patent;
(iii) the parties are less likely to settle late;
(iv) in the event of a late stage settlement, the settlement amount is smaller.15
If the parties do not settle early, then the infringer’s search effort would
be higher with fee shifting than without fee shifting. This gives the parties
an extra incentive to settle early. If the parties settle late, the settlement
amount will be smaller because the parties settle late only when the infringer
15If the inequalities in (2.13) are reversed, (which we find less plausible), the results in
(i) and (iv) are reversed. The results in (ii) and (iii) continue to hold if W is in the high
returns to litigation range in both systems, or in the low range in both systems. But not
necessarily if Ŵh` < W < Wh`.
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found strong evidence of invalidity, and in this case, the infringer expects
lower litigation costs in a system with fee shifting than in a system without
fee shifting. Therefore, the infringer will only agree to settle on a lower amount
in the fee shifting system.
2.5 Discussion
2.5.1 Other Policy Changes
The Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA), enacted on September 16th,
2011, features broad reforms to the US patent system. We discuss provisions
that fall within the scope of this paper. After March 16th, 2013, pursuant to
the AIA, the USPTO deemed several additional forms of prior art admissible.
These newly acceptable forms include, for example, foreign public use tech-
nologies. Additionally, the effective dates for admissible prior art shifted from
prior to the date of invention to either 1) prior to the filing date; or 2) prior to
the US or foreign priority date.16 The two changes - increasing the availability
of sources and lengthening the acceptable time period - can be interpreted
in our model as a decrease in the probability of validity θ. A decrease in θ
results in an increase in search effort by the infringer if a suit was filed and the
parties did not settle early (see Proposition 3). The decrease in θ also results
16See 35 U.S.C. 102
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in a decrease in the patentee’s expected payoff, which makes the patentee less
likely to file a patent infringement suit (see Proposition 5). A policy change
that strengthens the non-obviousness requirement for patentability can also
be modeled as a decline in the probability of validity θ and would result in the
same qualitative changes as those described above.
In 2012, the AIA introduced Inter Partes Reviews (IPR) as a new process
to challenge patent validity. Compare to challenges of validity in civil court,
IPR cost less and there is a lower burden of proof to invalidate a patent (see
Bar and Costello [2017]). We could view this as a decrease in The probability
that the patentee prevails when strong evidence of invalidity is found (α1)
and lower discovery costs da. We expect such changes to result in higher
search effort bun an ambiguous effect on early settlement amounts with lower
costs having a negative effect but higher search having a positive effect on the
settlement amount. In terms of timing, validity will likely be decided on before
infringement. We want to think of the timing discussed in our model as one
in which late settlement takes place after evidence of invalidity is revealed but
before IPR ruling is made. Settlements during the IPR process are permitted,
and in fact occur quite often.
Ownership identity obfuscation plays a key role in mitigating potential
losses faced by the patentee accusers. This practice (often associated with
PAEs) is typically done through the use of shell companies. The Innovation
Act sought to improve ownership transparency by requiring disclosure of any
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individual with financial stake in a patent used in litigation.17 Through two
mechanisms, reputation and financial, true ownership disclosure opens iden-
tified parties up to further harm in the event of a loss in litigation, which in
our model is captured by an increase in L. We find that an increase in L
increases the threshold W T1 so that more values W fall into the low returns to
litigation regime. In this range, search effort by the infringer is higher, and the
infringer will drop the suit if evidence of invalidity is found (Proposition 2).
Additionally, with higher loss L the expected payoff of the patentee is lower
and fewer patent suits are filed (Proposition 5).
2.5.2 Patent Assertion Entities
PAEs differ from their practicing entity counterparts. First, as they specialize
in the practice, PAEs likely face lower costs.18 In our model, this translates to
lower c0, dp and cp. Second, because these firms are non-practicing, PAEs avoid
the risk of countersuit, may face less reputation deterrents, and do not face
product disruptions which are typically seen in patent suits between practicing
firms [Chien, 2012]. This position allows for lower sustained losses in the event
of a patent invalidation (lower L). Lower trial costs and smaller losses if the
17The H.R. 3309 - Innovation Act (IA) was passed by the House of Representatives in
December 2013. According to Gollwitzer III [2015], the IA was removed from the Senate
Judiciary Committee’s agenda in 2014.
18See for example the 2013 report “Patent Assertion and US Innovation” at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent report.pdf.
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patent is invalidated make it more likely that PAEs hold patents that fall into
the high returns to litigation range. With high returns to litigation, if the
parties did not settle earlier, the patentee may proceed to trial even if the
infringer has strong evidence of invalidity. Moreover, by Proposition 5, given
their characteristics, for any return, W , a PAE has a lower threshold of patent
quality θ∗ for initiating patent infringement suits. We therefore expect PAEs
to assert relatively lower quality patents, and for cases that reach trial, we
predict that the probability that the PAE’s patent is held invalid would be
higher than for other litigated patents. These observations are consistent with
the findings of Allison et al. [2011] that “[...]product owners win 40% of their
cases across both the most-litigated and once-litigated data sets, while NPEs
win only 8%.”
2.6 Patentee Effort
In the previous sections we assume that the patentee finds strong evidence of
infringement before filing the infringement suit, which we believe is a reason-
able assumption, since the patentee knows filing a suit will put her patent at
risk of an invalidity challenge. Nevertheless, in this section we also consider
the possibility that the patentee and alleged infringer simultaneously choose
efforts to prove infringement and invalidity respectively, in the interim period.
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We maintain all the earlier assumptions, and add an ex-ante probability of
infringement, η; patentee effort, ep; and the conditional probability of find-
ing strong evidence of infringement when it exists, G (ep), which is increasing
and concave. Thus, the probability that the patentee finds strong evidence
of infringement is ηG (ep) . The probability that the court will find the patent
infringed when strong evidence of infringement is presented is β1 = β, and
when weak or no evidence is found, β0 < β. To limit the number of cases
considered, we focus on values of β0 sufficiently small so that if the patentee
does not find evidence of infringement, she will drop the suit, and restrict to
the high returns to litigation range W > W T1 .
The infringer and the patentee simultaneously choose effort levels ea and
ep. Infringer effort solves:
−piha = min
ea≥0
ηG (ep) [(1− (1− θ)F (ea)) (α0βD + ca) + (1− θ)F (ea) (α1βD + ca)]
+da + ea.
In the interior range:
ea (ep) = f
−1
(
1
ηG (ep) β (1− θ) (α0 − α1)D
)
.
This reaction function is increasing in patentee effort ep. Intuitively, the more
the patentee searches, the higher the probability that he would establish in-
fringement, in which case establishing invalidity is more beneficial to the ac-
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cused infringer.
Patentee effort solves:
pihp = max
ep≥0
ηG (ep) [(1− (1− θ)F (ea))Π0,1 + (1− θ)F (ea)Π1,1]− dp − ep
where,
Πi,1 = max {αiβD + ca, αiβW − (1− αi)L− cp} for i = 0, 1.
In the interior range:
ep (ea) = g
−1
(
1
η[(1− (1− θ)F (ea))Π0,1 + (1− θ)F (ea)Π1,1]
)
.
This reaction function is decreasing in infringer effort ea, because patentee
payoff in the case of weak evidence of invalidity is higher than her payoff with
strong evidence of invalidity, Π0,1 > Π1,1. The more the infringer searches, the
more likely evidence of invalidity will be strong, and the patentee’s benefit
from proving infringement is lower if the patent is likely to be found invalid.
Proposition 8. (Reaction functions and equilibrium efforts) With high re-
turns to litigation, W > W T1 : (i) The infringer’s effort to prove invalidity
(ea) increases with the patentee’s effort to prove infringement (ep). (ii) The
patentee’s effort decreases with the infringer’s effort. (iii) There is a unique
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equilibrium
(
e∗p, e
∗
a
)
.
In patent litigation, there is an important difference between efforts to
invalidate the patent and efforts to establish infringement. The patentee wins
if the infringer failed to convince the court that the patent is invalid and the
patentee succeeded to argue infringement. But the infringer wins if either she
success to argue invalidity, or if the patentee fails to show infringement. As a
result, if the patentee and infringer simultaneously exert effort to find evidence
of infringement and invalidity, the patentee effort decreases with the infringer
effort, while the infringer effort increases with the patentee’s effort.
2.7 Concluding Remarks
We offer a model of patent litigation that accounts for the timing of settlement,
and for the efforts that an infringer makes to invalidate the patent that he is
alleged of infringing. Parties to a dispute often settle early. If they do not
settle early, and the alleged infringer is successful in finding strong evidence
of patent invalidity, the patentee will have an incentive to either settle late,
or drop the suit, so as to keep his patent from being invalidated in court.
As a result, many “bad” patents will remain in the marketplace. Thus, our
paper strengthens the argument that we cannot rely on the court to correct
the imperfections of the patent office.
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In light of our model, we argue that PAEs, who likely have lower costs
associated with litigation, will tend to assert patents of lower average quality.
For a given patent quality, PAEs are more likely to fall into a high returns
to litigation range, meaning that they will be more inclined to litigate even
when there is evidence questioning the validity of their patent, while the firms
PAEs accuse will exert the same or lower effort in prior art search than if the
patentee was a practicing entity.
Our model suggests that, in a system with fee shifting, infringers will exert
more effort when searching for evidence to invalidate a patent. Parties will be
more likely to settle early. Some patentees that hold patents of low returns
will have an incentive to file an infringement suit where, absent fee shifting,
they would not have initiated the dispute. This is true even for patents of low
quality. Therefore, our model suggests that fee shifting does not necessarily
discourage infringement suits on low quality claims by patentees that intend
to benefit from early settlement.
Welfare considerations for patent litigation are complex, as the outcome of
a dispute likely affects not only the parties involved, but others such as ad-
ditional users of the invention, consumers and future innovators. Many agree
that bad patents impose a social cost. It thus seems reasonable that it is so-
cially desirable to determine the validity of patents that are involved in dispute
and that have a low probability of being valid. Our analysis, however, shows
that disputes settle early for patents that have a low probability of validity,
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and settle late for patents that had a higher ex-ante probability of validity, but
for which evidence of invalidity is revealed later. Inter Partes Review, which
was introduced following the America Invents Act, offers accused infringers
a way to challenge patent validity. In the current system, the reexamination
process terminates if the parties settle. Given our findings, we suggest that it
could be socially beneficial to require that a reexamination process that was
initiated be continued until a decision on validity is made. Such practice could
reduce the number of cases that settle after evidence of invalidity is revealed.
2.8 Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1. To find WTT (e
∗
ah) we solve (1− p∗h)piT0,p + p∗hpiT1,p = −piha or
(1− p∗h)(α0βW − (1− α0)L− cp − dp)︸ ︷︷ ︸
piT0,p
+ p∗h[α1βW − (1− α1)L− cp − dp]︸ ︷︷ ︸
piT1,p
= [(1− p∗h)α0 + p∗hα1] βD + ca + da + e∗ah.
To find WTS (e
∗
ah) we solve (1− p∗h)piT0,p + p∗h (s2,p − dp) = −piha or
(1− p∗h)(α0βW − (1− α0)L− cp − dp)︸ ︷︷ ︸
piT0,p
+ p∗h[α1βD + ca − dp]︸ ︷︷ ︸
s2,p−dp
= [(1− p∗h)α0 + p∗hα1] βD + ca + da + e∗ah.
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Solving for W in each equation we find:
WTT (e
∗
ah) :=
e∗ah+da+dp+cp+ca+L
β[(1−p∗h)α0+p∗hα1]
+D − 1
β
L,
WTS (e
∗
ah) :=
e∗ah+da+dp+(1−p∗h)(ca+cp+L)
β(1−p∗h)α0
+D − 1
β
L.
(A1)
To establish the needed inequality,
W T0 > WTT (e
∗
ah)⇔
L+ cp + ca
α1
>
L+ e∗a + da + dp + cp + ca
(1− p∗h)α0 + p∗hα1
⇔
L+ cp + ca
α1
− L+ cp + ca
(1− p∗h)α0 + p∗hα1
>
e∗a + da + dp
(1− p∗h)α0 + p∗hα1
⇔
L+ cp + ca >
α1 (e
∗
a + da + dp)
(α0 − α1) (1− p∗h)
Additionally,
WTT (e
∗
ah) > WTS (e
∗
ah)⇔
e∗ah + da + dp + cp + ca + L
(1− p∗h)α0 + p∗hα1
>
e∗ah + da + dp + (1− p∗h) (ca + cp + L)
(1− p∗h)α0
⇔
ca + cp + L
(1− p∗h)α0 + p∗hα1
− (1− p
∗
h) (ca + cp + L)
(1− p∗h)α0
>
e∗ah + da + dp
(1− p∗h)α0
− e
∗
ah + da + dp
(1− p∗h)α0 + p∗hα1
⇔
L+ ca + cp >
α1 (da + dp + e
∗
a)
(α0 − α1) (1− p)
Therefore, L+cp+ca >
α1(e∗ah+da+dp)
(1−α1)(1−(1−θ)F (e∗ah))
if and only if W S1 > WTT (e
∗
ah) >
WTS (e
∗
ah) .
Proof of Proposition 1. (i) When W < min {WTS (e∗ah) ,WTT (e∗ah)} , an early
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settlement is reached by definition of these thresholds. (ii) When W S1 > W >
WTS (e
∗
ah) , by definition of WTS, an early settlement cannot be reached. Also
by definition W S1 a late settlement can be reached if strong evidence was found,
and the parties will go to trial if only weak evidence was found. (iii) If there
are high trial costs then by lemma 1 we have W S1 > WTT (e
∗
ah) > WTS (e
∗
ah) .
Therefore, when W > max{W S1 ,WTT (e∗ah)} we also have W > WTS (e∗ah) and
therefore by definition of this threshold an early settlement cannot be reached.
By definition of W S1 a late settlement cannot be reached either. Thus, the
patentee will litigate to trial. If there are low trial costs, then by lemma 1
we have W S1 ≤ WTT (e∗ah) ≤ WTS (e∗ah) . When W > max{W S1 ,WTT (e∗ah)}
then WTT (e
∗
ah) falls in the range W > W
S
1 and by its definition when W >
WTT (e
∗
ah) no early settlement can be reached. Additionally W > W
S
1 implies
no late settlements and the patentee will litigate to trail.
Finally notice that we have covered all the possible values in the high re-
turns to litigation range because if trial costs are high, max{W S1 ,WTT (e∗ah)} =
W S1 and min{WTS (e∗ah) ,WTT (e∗ah)} = WTS (e∗ah) , and otherwise we have,
max{W S1 ,WTT (e∗ah)} = WTT (e∗ah) and min{WTS (e∗ah) ,WTT (e∗ah)} = WTT (e∗ah) .
Therefore, there are no gaps between the regions of W defined in the proposi-
tion.
Proof of Proposition 2. If W ≤ W T0 , the patentee will never litigate to trial,
therefore no settlement can be reached and there will be no litigation. In
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the range
(
W T0 < W ≤ W T1
)
, if no early settlement was reached and strong
evidence of invalidity was found, the patentee will drop the case, but he will
litigate to trial if only weak evidence was found. By (2.11) an early settlement
can be reached if W T0 < W ≤ WTS (e∗a`). For W > WTS (e∗a`) a late settlement
cannot be reached because W S0 ≤ WTS (e∗a`) and so whenever the parties do
not settle early, they do not settle late either. Therefore, when W > WTS (e
∗
a`)
the patentee litigates if only weak evidence was found, and drops the suit if
strong evidence of invalidity was found.
Lemma 2. In the high returns to litigation range
(
W > W T1
)
, the search
effort of the infringer increases with the amount of expected damages (D), it
decreases with the probability that the court will rule in favor of the patentee
even after the infringer reveals prior art (α1) and it decreases with the ex-ante
probability of validity (θ). In this range, search effort is independent of other
costs (ca, cp) , and of the patentee’s payoffs (W,L).
Proof of Lemma 2. We rewrite the first order condition for the choice of ea as
follows,
FOC : (1− θ) f(ea) (α0 − α1)D = 1.
f(ea) =
1
(1− θ) (α0 − α1)D.
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Differentiating with respect to a parameter η would give
dea
dη
=
1
f ′(ea)
∂
∂η
(
1
(1− θ) (α0 − α1)D
)
,
sign
dea
dη
= sign
∂ ((1− θ) (α0 − α1)D)
∂η
.
Thus, in the high return range, effort increases with α0 and D and decreases
with θ and α1.
Lemma 3. Assume W T1 > W > W
T
0 . The search effort of the infringer in-
creases with the amount of expected damages (D) and with the infringer’s
litigation cost (ca), it decreases with the ex-ante probability of validity (θ).
Proof of Lemma 3. We rewrite the first order condition for the choice of ea as
follows,
FOC : (1− θ) f(ea) (α0D + ca) = 1.
f(ea) =
1
(1− θ) (α0D + ca) .
Differentiating with respect to each parameter
dea
dη
=
1
f ′(ea)
∂
∂η
(
1
(1− θ) (α0D + ca)
)
,
sign
dea
dη
= sign
∂ ((1− θ) (α0D + ca))
∂η
.
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Thus, in the low return range, effort increases with α0, D, ca and decreases
with θ.
Lemma 4. For given parameter values, if f (0) > 1
(1−θ)(α0D+ca) then e
∗
a` > e
∗
ah,
otherwise e∗a` = e
∗
ah = 0.
Proof of Lemma 4. If f (0) > 1
(1−θ)(α0D+ca) , then e
∗
a` > 0, it is larger than e
∗
ah
if e∗ah = 0, or if both efforts are interior,
e∗a` = f
−1
(
1
(1− θ) (α0D + ca)
)
> f−1
(
1
(1− θ) (α0 − α1)D
)
= e∗ah
⇔ (1− θ) (α0D + ca) > (1− θ) (α0 − α1)D (because f ′ (ea) < 0).
⇔ (1− θ) (α1D + ca) > 0.
Otherwise, f (0) ≤ 1
(1−θ)(α0D+ca) ≤ 1(1−θ)(α0−α1)D and so e∗a` = e∗ah = 0.
Proposition A1. (Comparative statics- effort) The infringer’s effort
(i) increases with damages (D) , with the probability that the patentee
prevails if there is weak evidence of invalidity (α0) , or with a decrease in the
patent’s probability of validity (θ).
(ii) increases with trial costs (ca) in the low returns to litigation range; it
is constant in the high return range.
(iii) is constant in the probability that the court will rule in favor of the
patentee if there is strong evidence of invalidity for α1 <
L+cp
L+W
, it jumps down
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at this threshold with a switch from low to the high returns range and continues
to decline with α1 thereafter.
(iv) is constant with respect to W and L and cp in each regime. But, a
decrease in the return from successful litigation (W ), an increase in the loss
(L) or in trial costs (cp) that result in a switch from high to low returns to
litigation, results in an increase in search effort.
(v) increases with the probability of infringement (β) in each regime; if
(1−α1)L+cp
Wα1
< 1, then at this threshold effort jumps down with a switch from
low to high returns to litigation.
Proof of Proposition A1. The proof uses lemmas 2-4 stated and proved above.
Comparative statics with respect to each parameter in the high and low returns
to litigation range are provided in Lemma 2 and Lemma 3 respectively. For
changes in W, L or cp that do not result in a switch between high and low
returns to litigation regimes, we found that the optimal search efforts e∗a` and
e∗ah are independent of these parameters. A decrease in W or an increase in L
or cp could result in a switch from high to low returns region, and by Lemma
4, e∗ah ≤ e∗a`.
Proof of Proposition 3. (i) Show in Lemmas 2 and 3. (ii) Consider the high
returns to litigation range. We showed in lemma 3 that effort e∗ah decreases
with θ, therefore, p∗h = (1− θ)F (e∗ah) also decreases with θ. Now consider the
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thresholds given in (A1) in Lemma 1.
d
dθ
WTT (e
∗
ah) :=
∂
∂e
WTT (e
∗
ah)
de
dθ
+ ∂
∂p
WTT (e
∗
ah)
dp
dθ
= 1
β[(1−p∗h)α0+p∗hα1]
de
dθ
+
e∗ah+da+dp+cp+ca+L
β
(α0−α1)
[(1−p∗h)α0+p∗hα1]
2
dp
dθ
< 0.
d
dθ
WTS (e
∗
ah) =
∂
∂e
WTS (e
∗
ah)
de
dθ
+ ∂
∂p
WTS (e
∗
ah)
dp
dθ
1
β(1−p∗h)α0
de
dθ
+
e∗ah+da+dp
βα0
1
(1−p∗h)2
dp
dθ
< 0.
Both thresholds decreases as θ increases, and so does min{WTS (e∗ah) ,WTS (e∗ah)}.
This reduces the range of early settlement according to proposition 1. Simi-
larly in the low returns to litigation range, the threshold WTS (e
∗
a`) decreases
with θ.
Proof of Proposition 4. The parties may settle late in the high returns range
after strong evidence was found. In that case, settlement amount is given by
(2.5) for i = 1. Using early settlement amount derived in (2.8) we have:
sh1 = [(1− p∗h)α0 + p∗hα1] βD + ca + da + e∗ah
≥ α1βD + ca + da + e∗ah > α1βD + ca = s2,1.
The first inequality holds because a0 > a1.
Proposition A2. (Comparative statics- settlements)
(i) The late settlement amount is increasing in the infringer’s damages
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(D), trial cost (ca) , probability of infringement (β) and the probability that
the court favors the patentee given that patent was infringed (α1).
(ii) The early settlement amount is increasing in the infringer’s damages
(D), the infringer’s litigation costs (da, ca) , in the patent quality (θ) and in the
probability that the court rules in favor of the patentee if the infringer only has
weak evidence (α0) . In the high returns range it is increasing in the probability
that the court favors the patentee despite strong evidence of invalidity (α1) .
Settlement increases with infringement probability (β) in either regime. The
early settlement amount also increases if a change results in a switch from a
low to a high returns to litigation range. This may be caused by an increase
in the return from successful litigation (W ) , in the probability (α1) , in the
probability (β) , or a decrease in the loss (L) or in trial cost (cp).
Proof of proposition A2. i) Follows immediately from differentiating s2 = α1D+
ca.
(ii) We first note that e∗a minimizes the payment the infringer would need
to pay, therefore for any parameter η, ds1
dη
= ∂s1
∂η
+ ∂s1
∂e∗a
de∗a
dη
= ∂s1
∂η
. In the high
returns region,
∂sh1
∂θ
= F (e∗ah) (α0 − α1) βD > 0,
∂s`1
∂θ
= F (e∗ah) (α0βD + ca) > 0
∂sh1
∂D
= ((1− p(e∗ah)α0 + p(e∗ah))α1) β > 0,
∂s`1
∂D
= (1− p (e∗a`))α0β > 0
∂sh1
∂ca
=
∂sh1
∂da
=
∂s`1
∂da
= 1 > 0,
∂s`1
∂ca
= 1− p (e∗a`) > 0
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Next we argue that settlement increases around W T1 when there is a switch
from low to high returns to litigation. This occurs with an increase in W , or
in α1, and with a decrease in L or cp.
sh1 = (1− p(e∗ah)) (α0βD + ca) + p(e∗ah) (α1βD + ca) + da + e∗ah
> (1− p(e∗ah)) (α0βD + ca) + da + e∗ah
> (1− p(e∗a`)) (α0βD + ca) + da + e∗a` = s`1
Where the first inequality holds since p(e∗ah) (α1βD + ca) > 0. The second
inequality follows from the fact that e∗a` is chosen to minimize s
`
1 (ea).
Proof of Proposition 5. If the patentee expects to settle in period 1, (see con-
ditions in propositions 1 and 2) she expects a payoff s1 as given in (2.8) in the
high litigation case or in (2.12) for low returns to litigation case. Payoffs if the
patentee does not settle early are given in (2.7) in the high litigation range and
(2.10) in the low litigation range. It is easy to verify that within each range,
the patentee’s payoffs increase with the quality of his patent θ. An increase
in patent quality θ does not change the thresholds W T1 ,W
S
1 ,W
S
0 , but since by
proposition 3 an increase in θ reduces search effort ea, the thresholds WTT (ea)
and WTS (ea) decrease. As a result, an increase in θ can result in more litiga-
tion instead of either late or early settlement or more late settlement instead
of early settlements. These changes are also consistent with an increase in the
100
patentee’s payoff. Since expected payoffs increase in θ for any values of the
other parameters of the model, there is a threshold θ∗ above which expected
payoffs exceed the cost c0 and the patentee will file an infringement suit. If c0
is higher, a higher θ∗ would make the patentee break even.
It can also be verified that for every given θ, the expected payoffs increase
with W, and decrease with cp and L. Therefore, the threshold θ
∗ decreases
with W and increases with cp and L.
Proof of Proposition 6. In a system without fee shifting, patentees do not sue
if W ≤ W T0 , since their threat of litigation is not credible. In a system with fee
shifting, patentees sue if W > Ŵdrop, since their threat of litigation is credible
at least when only weak evidence of invalidity was found. Since we have shown
that Ŵdrop < W
T
0 , the set
(
Ŵ T0 ,W
T
0
)
is non-empty. For values of W in this
range, the patentee would sue in a system with fee shifting, but not in a system
without fee shifting. Note that, by definition, Ŵdrop and W
T
0 do not depend
on θ. Therefore, this range is non-empty for any θ.
Proof of Proposition 7. (i) By (2.14)
Ŵ T0 =
(1− α0)L+ (1− βα0)C − dp
βα0
=
1
βα0
[(1− α0)L+ cp] + (1− βα0) (da + ca)− βα0 (cp + dp)
βα0
< W T0 .
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Ŵ T1 =
(1− α1)L+ (1− βα1)C − dp
βα1
=
W T1 +
1
βα1
[(1− βα1) (da + ca)− βα1 (dp + cp)] .
Therefore, by (2.13), Ŵ T1 > W
T
1 .
(ii) We have show in the derivations above proposition 7 that, by (2.13),
effort is higher in the system with fee shifting.
(iii) With higher effort, the threshold WTS
(
ê∗a
)
is higher. The threshold
W S1 remains the same. Therefore the range of parameters for which there is
late settlement is smaller.
(iv) In the event of a late stage settlement, with no fee shifting, s2 =
α1βD+ca. With fee shifting, when only weak evidence was found the infringer
expected payoff, (and thus the most he would be willing to settle) is
ŝ2 = βα1 (D + C)− da = s2 − [(1− βα1) (da + ca)− βα1 (dp + cp)]
This settlement amount is smaller by (2.13).
Proof of Proposition 8. Differentiating ep (ea) and ea (ep) establishes the first
part of the proposition. If g (0) is small so that the patentee never exerts effort,
then in equilibrium
(
e∗p, e
∗
a
)
= (0, 0) . Otherwise, since the reaction functions
are continuous, ep (ea) is decreasing, ea (ep) is increasing and ea (ep)→ 0 when
ep → 0, but e−1p (0) > 0, there is a unique equilibrium.
Chapter 3
Endogenous Driving Behavior
in Veil of Darkness Tests for
Racial Profiling
Jesse Kalinowski
Matthew B. Ross
Stephen L. Ross
Abstract
Several prominent applications of the Veil of Darkness (VOD) test, where solar
variation is used to identify racial profiling in traffic stops, have found reverse
discrimination in cities widely purported to disproportionately target minori-
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ties. We develop a theoretical model of traffic enforcement and demonstrate
that the VOD test for racial profiling cannot distinguish between discrimina-
tion and reverse discrimination. In our model, this problem arises because
motorists rationally alter their driving behavior when faced with discrimina-
tory policing. For groups that face discrimination, our model implies that
motorists who previously did not speed choose to speed in darkness, when
demography cannot be observed, thus creating the possibility that the share
of stopped minority motorists increases in darkness. We develop a follow-up
test for identifying the direction of differential treatment by examining the
speed distribution of motorists across daylight and darkness. Using data on
traffic stops in Massachusetts made by State and Local Police, we reject the
VOD test for equal treatment and demonstrate that driving speeds of stopped
African-Americans are higher in darkness consistent with discrimination.
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3.1 Introduction
In the United States, the possibility that police officers and departments treat
minorities differently than whites has been the source of both political protest
and social unrest, especially with the recent rise of the “Black Lives Matter”
movement. To many advocates, the high share of minorities involved in both
traffic stops and vehicle searches is a clear indication of continued discrimi-
nation on the part of law enforcement. However, the empirical evidence of
discrimination in traffic stops and searches has been mixed. Although the
share of minorities involved in traffic stops or searches often far exceeds the
share of the local population, analysts almost never have information on the
actual racial composition of motorists on the road, the behavior of those mo-
torists, or other visible indicators of guilt (Kowalski and Lundman [2007], p.
168; Fridell et al. [2001], p. 22).1 Some researchers address this concern by
focusing on searches conditional on being stopped where the fraction of mi-
norities among stopped motorists is observed and where the success rate of
the searches can be used as an indicator for unobserved motorist attributes
(Knowles et al. [2001]; Anwar and Fang [2006]).2 These performance-based
studies have been criticized as being biased away from finding discrimination
1See recent evidence in Rhode Island by Mcdevitt et al. [2014] or North Carolina by
Baumgartner and Epp [2012].
2This performance based strategy arises from Becker’s (1957) classic model of taste based
discrimination. Such performance approaches have also been pursued in the study of mort-
gage lending discrimination. See Ross and Yinger [1999, 2002, chap. 8] for a review of that
literature.
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[Ayres, 2002]. Further, such approaches cannot address the central question
of whether racial discrimination exists in police decisions to stop motorists.
Several recent papers (Grogger and Ridgeway [2006]; Ridgeway [2009]; Hor-
race and Rohlin [2016]) pursue an alternative approach to identifying the ap-
propriate counterfactual or comparison basis for evaluating racial differences
in police stops. These papers postulate that race is less easily observable dur-
ing darkness and propose examining differences in the racial composition of
traffic stops in daylight relative to darkness. This strategy, coined the “Veil
of Darkness” by Grogger and Ridgeway [2006], is rapidly becoming a key tool
that policymakers use to examine police departments for evidence of discrim-
ination. In recent years, researchers have applied the VOD test in cities such
as Cincinnati, OH; Oakland, CA; Minneapolis, MI; New Orleans, LA; San
Diego, CA; Syracuse, NY; Portland, OR; and several in North Carolina.3 The
first statewide application by Ross et al. [2015] took place in Connecticut and
has served as model for proposed legislation and evaluations in California,
Oregon, and Rhode Island. The advantage of the VOD framework is that
the distribution of stopped motorists in darkness, when race is unobserved,
may provide a better indication of the distribution of motorists and motorist
3Citations for these applications include Oakland, CA [Grogger and Ridgeway, 2006];
Cincinnati, OH [Ridgeway, 2009]; Minneapolis, MN (Ritter and Bael [2009]; Ritter [2017]);
Syracuse, NY (Worden et al. [2010]; Worden et al. [2012]; Horrace and Rohlin [2016]);
Portland, OR [Renauer et al., 2009]; Durham, NC [Taniguchi et al., 2016d]; Greensboro, NC
[Taniguchi et al., 2016c]; Raleigh, NC [Taniguchi et al., 2016b]; Fayetteville, NC [Taniguchi
et al., 2016a]; New Orleans, LA [Masher, 2016]; and San Diego, CA [Chanin et al., 2016]
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behavior than alternative counterfactuals like the racial composition of com-
munity residents. If racial differences are larger during the daylight, then
this difference-in-differences test is inferred to imply evidence of discrimina-
tion against minority motorists. This strategy is similar to strategies that
compare treatment across officers of different races, such as Antonovics and
Knight [2009] or Anwar and Fang [2006], in that those papers use the racial
differences in stop rates or the ranking of stop rates by race across officer race
as a control for the inherent racial differences in the distribution of motorists.4
Grogger and Ridgeway [2006], who pioneered the VOD test in Oakland,
CA, and later Ridgeway [2009] in Cincinatti, OH, both find statistically in-
significant daylight versus darkness differences in the racial disparities of traf-
fic stops. In fact, for both papers, the authors note that racial disparities
are higher in darkness consistent with reverse discrimination, rather than dis-
crimination against African-American motorists, even though the police de-
partments in both of these cities faced substantial criticism for discriminating
against minority motorists. Given the importance of the VOD test for assessing
racial discrimination in traffic stops in the U.S., we provide a more complete
assessment of whether larger racial disparities in darkness can be interpreted
as reverse discrimination. Specifically, we extend equilibrium models of racial
profiling and police-motorist interaction by Knowles et al. [2001], Dharma-
4An important advantage is that the VOD, as compared to strategies that condition
on stop shares of minority officers, can detect discrimination even when all police officers
discriminate regardless of their own race.
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pala and Ross [2004], Anwar and Fang [2006], and Persico and Todd [2008] to
consider the effect of race blindness caused by darkness on motorist behavior.
To fix ideas, we develop the simplest model possible that captures several
key aspects of expected motorist behavior in terms of speeding:
1. Police are more likely to stop motorists traveling at higher speeds but sit-
uations exist where some motorists are stopped at speeds only modestly
above the speed limit while, at other times, motorists are not stopped
for significantly more severe speeding infractions;
2. at some times, some motorists choose to obey the speed limit;
3. a motorist who is on the margin between obeying the speed limit and
speeding will, if they decide to speed, choose a level that is discretely
over the speed limit (e.g. the choice to speed represents traveling at the
speed limit versus 3 or 4 miles per hour above as opposed to choosing
the speed limit versus 1/5th or 1/10th of a mile per hour above); and
4. when police stop costs rise, reducing the likelihood of being stopped at
any particular speed, motorists travel at higher speeds in equilibrium but
still have both a reduced likelihood of being stopped (a feature critical
for the validity of the VOD test).
We first document that the properties of the VOD test are unaffected by
the behavioral changes of motorists in darkness under the null hypothesis
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of equal treatment. However, we find that higher as well as lower relative
stop rates of minority groups in daylight are both potentially consistent with
discrimination. Specifically, when the likelihood of a minority being stopped
falls in darkness because race is unobserved (i.e. stop costs rise), two changes
occur: First, all else equal, minorities are less likely to be stopped and the
VOD test statistic increases above one. Second, some minorities who did not
commit an infraction during daylight are now willing to commit an infraction
in darkness, given the high stop costs in darkness, leading to a decrease in the
VOD test statistic. These findings imply that the racial disparities identified
by Grogger and Ridgeway [2006] in Oakland, CA and by Ridgeway [2009] in
Cincinnati, OH could actually indicate the presence of discrimination.
Finally, we use our theoretical model to examine the impact of a change
in stop costs on the speed distribution of stopped motorists. Our model is de-
signed so that higher stop costs/lower likelihood of stop raise optimal infraction
levels, i.e. increases speeding. However, the shift in the speed distribution of
stopped motorists is theoretically ambiguous. We calibrate our model against
speed distribution data from Massachusetts and show that changes in stop
costs create a shift in the distribution of speeds for stopped motorists that
is consistent with the shift in the distribution of motorists overall. There-
fore, the distribution of speeds for stopped motorists can be informative as to
the direction of discrimination. Admittedly, the speed distribution shifts arise
based on the beliefs of motorists, rather than the behavior of police, but such
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beliefs would seem to be especially germane when the VOD test rejects the
null hypothesis of equal treatment. In particular, our theoretical model is con-
sistent with concerns raised by Bell et al. [2014] that minority motorists often
“fear that they would be pulled over and experience significant “motivation to
survive the law enforcement encounter.”
Applying the VOD test to data from Massachusetts, the same data from
Antonovics and Knight [2009], we reject the null hypothesis of equal treat-
ment.5 Specifically, we establish an inter-twilight window where we observe
both darkness and daylight at the same time of day throughout the year. Con-
ditional on time of day, we find that the share of stopped motorists who are
African-American is different during the daylight than darkness. Due to our
theoretical results, however, we cannot rely on the value of the test statistic to
provide an indication of whether minority motorists are racially profiled by po-
lice or favored in their treatment. To address this limitation of the VOD test,
we draw on the theoretical prediction of our model that the speed distribution
of motorists will respond to changes in visibility, and our simulation results
that imply that the speed distribution shift for stopped motorists appears to
always be in the same direction as the shift for all motorists. In particular, we
develop a supplemental test that exploits the fact that if police officers have a
preference for stopping minorities over whites then the speed distribution for
5The Massachusetts data was originally reported in an article for The Boston Globe on
July 20, 2003 [Dedman and Latour, 2003]. Anbarci and Lee [2014] also use a subset of the
data to examine leniency in fines issued to motorists by Boston police.
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minority (white) motorists should shift to lower (higher) speeds in daylight.
We then test our hypothesis using the same local and State Police data from
Massachusetts and find a substantial negative shift in the speed distribution
of African-American motorists in daylight.
Motivated by Ridgeway [2009] and as a robustness check, we re-examine
both the VOD test and the speed distribution shifts utilizing the 90-day win-
dow centered on the spring and fall Daylight Savings Time (DST) changes to
exploit both the relatively instantaneous change in the time associated with
darkness at the DST shift and the relatively rapid change in the time of sun-
set during both the fall and spring. Unlike the traditional VOD estimation
strategy, this framework allows us to better control for seasonal differences in
driving behavior and the composition of motorists on the roadway by eliminat-
ing comparisons between driving during long summer days and early winter
evenings. We provide further validation of the robustness of our findings by
examining the speed distribution along several additional dimensions including
gender and age as well as vehicle age and color. Notably, we do not find statis-
tically significant shifts in the white speed distribution for other demographic
subgroups or vehicle characteristics. Our findings and robustness checks are
strongly consistent with African-American motorists driving slower during the
daylight because they expect to face a higher probability of being stopped than
whites at that time. When combined with the rejection of the null hypothe-
sis of equal treatment, this evidence supports a conclusion of racial profiling
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against African-Americans in traffic stops in Massachusetts.
The paper is organized as follows: The second section begins by develop-
ing a simple model of police traffic enforcement. We examine the VOD test
statistic first in a model where motorist driving behavior is exogenously de-
termined and then in a model where we make driving behavior endogenous.
After establishing that endogenous driving behavior creates a problem for the
traditional VOD test statistic, we discuss a supplemental test that indicates
the direction of the bias. In section three, we provide a detailed calibration of
our model for Massachusetts data and conduct a simulation of our proposed
test statistic. Our simulation shows that, under reasonable conditions, the
speed distribution of stopped minority motorists will uniformly shift leftward
during daylight. The fourth section provides descriptive statistics and applies
the VOD test to our sample of Massachusetts traffic stop data where we reject
the null for no discrimination. Here, we include a series of falsification tests
that show that we are unable to identify shifts in the speed distribution across
any other demographic or vehicular characteristics. The fifth and final section
concludes the paper and identifies areas in need of additional research.
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3.2 Theoretical Model
This section explores police-motorist interaction in a model of traffic enforce-
ment. The first two subsections begin by developing a model of traffic enforce-
ment and examining the implications of standard statistical tests of disparate
treatment. The third subsection examines the VOD test in the context of our
model of traffic enforcement. The fourth subsection develops an equilibrium
model of motorist behavior conditional on traffic enforcement and examines
the VOD test in that context. We demonstrates that the VOD test continues
to be valid under the null hypothesis of equal treatment. However, under the
alternative hypothesis, interpretation of the resulting test becomes problem-
atic when examined in the context of endogenous motorist behavior.
Our model illustrates that both minority and white motorists will ratio-
nally respond to changes in visibility by altering their driving behavior when
faced with disparate treatment. Specifically, in darkness when race is unob-
served, the changes in police behavior will lead to more minority motorists
committing infractions and less white motorists committing infractions, and
so discrimination against minorities can in principle lead to either a lower or
higher minority share of stops in daylight relative to darkness. In the final
subsection, we propose a theoretically motivated alternative to the VOD test
for gaining insights into the direction of unequal treatment based on com-
paring the speed distribution of stopped minority motorists during periods of
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daylight and periods of darkness. The advantage of our test is that it is more
robust to changes in motorist behavior than the magnitude of the VOD test
for indicating the direction of differential treatment.
3.2.1 Developing a Simple Model of Traffic Enforce-
ment
We begin by structuring the police officer’s decision as the choice of selecting
probability γ(i, d, φ) of making a stop. The officer’s choice or decision is made
after observing a non-negative infraction severity, i, e.g. miles per hour over the
speed limit; a motorist’s demography, d; and the circumstances surrounding
the stop, φ, which might include both environmental factors and factors related
to officers’ idiosyncratic preferences and current circumstances. We assume for
simplicity that d ∈ {m,w} is a dichotomous random variable that indicates
whether the motorist is a racial or ethnic minority, and sd is the positive police
stop cost associated with motorist race and ethnicity.
The officer’s maximization problem involves trading-off the stop pay-off, u,
and stop costs, which includes both race specific costs and a circumstance cost
defined by the function h(φ). The maximization problem takes the following
form:
max
γ(i,sd,φ)
[u(i)− h(φ)− sd]γ(i, sd, φ), (3.1)
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where γ ∈ [0, 1]. We make the following assumptions about police pay-offs
and costs:
Assumption 3.2.1. u is a twice differentiable, non-negative function, du(i)
di
>
0 and d
2u(i)
di2
> 0 ∀i > 0, limi→0 u(i) = u0 > 0 and u(0) = 0;
Assumption 3.2.2. φ ∼ Uniform(0, 1);
Assumption 3.2.3. h is a twice differentiable, non-negative function, dh(φ)
dφ
>
0 ∀ 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1, h(0) = 0 and limφ→1 h(φ) =∞;
Assumption 3.2.4. u0 − sd > 0 ∀d
We assume u is discontinuous at zero so that the officer receives no pay-off
for stopping a motorist who has a zero level of infraction, but has a pay-off
bounded away from zero for any positive infraction level. This assumption is
consistent with the current penalty structures in many states. We also assume
that u has increasing total and marginal pay-off with respect to the severity of
the infraction. The officer faces two costs for stopping a motorist: sd, a race
specific cost for stopping a motorist (henceforth ), and an additional circum-
stance specific cost, h(φ), resulting from factors like the officer’s idiosyncratic
preferences, geographic location, discretion, and contemporaneous opportunity
cost (henceforth, circumstances).
The introduction of circumstances allow for heterogeneity in whether indi-
viduals are stopped at a specific infraction level. The circumstances are drawn
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from a uniform (0,1) distribution without loss of generality because the mono-
tonic function h(φ) captures possible non-linearities in the mapping between
circumstances φ and an officer’s net pay-off. We do not impose a sign restric-
tion on the second derivative of h to allow for generality over circumstance
costs. For example, if circumstance costs were distributed unimodally such as
a chi-square distribution, the curvature of h must change sign over the range
of φ. Finally, assumption 3.2.4 requires a positive net pay-off for a stop under
some circumstances φ, even for an infinitesimally small positive level of infrac-
tion i. This effectively insures that the probability of stop is bounded away
from zero for any motorist with a non-zero infraction level and so allows for a
situation where motorists might choose not to commit an infraction.
Conditional on circumstances φ, demography d and the level of infraction i,
the solution to the officer’s problem requires an optimal infraction threshold,
above which the probability an officer makes a stop, given full information,
is equal to unity and otherwise the probability is zero due to the monotonic
relationship between pay-off and the severity of motorist violation. Specifically,
given the officer’s net utility of u(i)− h(φ)− sd ∀ i, the solution to her utility
maximization problem is
γ(i, sd, φ) =

1, if u(i) > h(φ) + sd
0, otherwise.
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Further, solving for zero net pay-off implies that an officer will stop all mo-
torists at any infraction level above some threshold level following a specific
stop-threshold function of
i∗(φ, sd) = u−1[h(φ) + sd] (3.2)
where u−1 maps from (u0,∞) to (0,∞) and h(φ) + sd is always greater than
u0. Finally, conditional on infraction severity and exploiting the monotonicity
of h(·), we can solve (3.2) for the circumstances when the net pay-off of a
stop is zero φ∗(i, sd), and officers will stop individuals with infraction level i
whenever circumstances are more favorable than φ∗(i, sd), i.e. φ < φ∗(i, sd).
The resulting expression for the stop threshold over circumstances is
φ∗(i, sd) = h−1[u(i)− sd], (3.3)
where h−1 maps from (0,∞) to (0, 1) and u(i) − sd is always greater than
zero. Recall that φ is distributed uniform (0,1); thus (3.3) also represents the
unconditional (i.e. circumstances have not been observed) probability that an
officer stops a motorist with infraction level i.
Lemma 5. (i) The infraction level representing the optimal stop-threshold,
i∗ = u−1[h(φ) + sd], is increasing in officer circumstances and demographic
based stop costs sd.
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(ii) The probability of an officer making a stop, φ∗(i, sd) = h−1[u(i) − sd], is
decreasing in stop costs sd and increasing in the level of infraction i.
Assumption 3.2.1 and the Inverse Function Theorem imply that u−1
′
(·) > 0
over its domain (u0,∞). Then by inspection it is clear that the derivative of
Equation (3.2) implies ∂i
∗
∂φ
> 0, ∂i
∗
∂sd
> 0. Assumption 3.2.3 and the Inverse
Function Theorem imply that h−1
′
(·) > 0, and by inspection it is clear that
the derivative of Equation (3.3) implies ∂φ∗
∂sd
< 0, and ∂φ
∗
∂i
> 0. QED
If the officer’s behavior is racially blind, e.g. the cost of stopping motorists
is equal across race sm = sw, the stop-threshold and the stop probability would
be constant across demographic groups, i∗(φ, sm) = i∗(φ, sw) and φ∗(i, sm) =
φ∗(i, sw), respectively. In the presence of disparate treatment, however, the
cost faced by an officer for stopping a minority motorist is lower than a white
motorist, sm < sw, implying that the stop-threshold for stopping a minority is
lower than that for a white, i∗m < i
∗
w. Definition 1 below presents this formally.
3.2.2 Standard Test for Disparate Treatment
We define the distribution f (i, d) as a mixed joint density function of motorists
who commit an infraction over the continuous measure of infraction severity, i,
and the dichotomous random variable of motorist demography, d. The distri-
bution represents the motorists on the roadway, in terms of their demographic
characteristics and driving behavior, who are at risk of being stopped by po-
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lice officers. As such, we refer to f (i, d) as the risk set of motorists. We also
implicitly assume that f (i, d) is equivalent to the analogous distribution of
motorists seen by police.
Definition 2. A police officer is racially biased against minorities of demog-
raphy d = m if they incur a lower cost, sm < sw, for stopping these motorists
and, as a result, has a lower threshold, i∗(φ, sm) < i∗(φ, sw), for making a
traffic stop.
Given the speed distributions of white and minority motorists, and using
(3.3), the probability that a motorist who is stopped by police is of demography
d is written formally by integrating over the product of the speed distribution
and the stop probability function φ∗. We first define the indicator stopped as
stopped =

1, if φ < φ∗(i, sw) and d = w or φ < φ∗(i, sm) and d = m
0, otherwise.
(3.4)
Then
p[d | stopped] =
∫∞
0
f (i, d)φ∗(i, sd)di∑
d∈{m,w}
∫∞
0
f(i, d)φ∗(i, sd)di
. (3.5)
The standard test for disparate treatment in police officer stops, i.e. ratio of
minorities stopped relative to whites, can be written as:
K =
p[m | stopped]
p[w | stopped] =
∫∞
0
f (i,m)φ∗(i, sm)di∫∞
0
f (i, w)φ∗(i, sw)di
. (3.6)
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Based on Definition (2), the null hypothesis of no disparate treatment for
the standard test in (3.6) equates officer costs across demographic groups, sm =
sw, yielding an equal likelihood of being stopped at any i, φ
∗(i, sm) = φ∗(i, sw).
Assuming the risk set is constant across demographic groups, f (i,m) = f (i, w),
under the null hypothesis the standard test will equal unity, p[m | stopped]/p[w |
stopped] = 1. In practice, the relevant minority and white populations may
differ in size, and the ratio K is compared to an estimate of the community
composition testing whether the minority-white ratio of stopped motorists
matches minority-white ratio of residents or motorists in the community.
However, this test statistic may not equal the minority-white ratio in the
community under the null hypothesis if distribution of infractions or risk set
of motorists differs across demographic groups. Racial differences in the dis-
tribution of infractions is referred to in the racial profiling literature as the
infra-marginality problem (see Anwar and Fang [2006]; and Knowles et al.
[2001]).
3.2.3 Examining the Veil of Darkness in a Model of
Traffic Enforcement
Grogger and Ridgeway [2006] attempt to carefully sidestep the infra-marginality
problem by developing an alternative procedure for measuring racial differences
in the risk set, i.e. the VOD test, that relies on a variation in visibility due
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to solar variation. The advantage of their procedure is that it requires no
external information on the relative risk set of motorists on the roadway. The
identification strategy and estimation procedure rely on seasonal patterns of
solar variation and discrete shifts in visibility created by DST. Identification
in the VOD comes from the assumption that police officers are better able
to perceive the demography of a motorist during daylight hours, and so these
shifts in visibility create circumstances where race is unobserved and circum-
stances where race is observed for which the risk set is stable across these
circumstances because the location and the time of day are held constant.
Specifically, the test statistic assesses whether there is a higher likelihood
of a minority motorist (relative to a non-minority) being stopped by police in
the presence of daylight (relative to darkness). We incorporate Grogger and
Ridgeway’s identification strategy in our model by denoting visibility with
v ∈ {v, v}, where we assume that periods of darkness occur at the lower
bound of visibility v and daylight occurs at the upper bound v.
Recall the officer’s maximization problem from (3.1):
max
γ(i,sv,d,φ)
[u(i)− h(φ)− sv,d]γ(i, sv,d, φ), (3.7)
where γ ∈ [0, 1].
We continue to make Assumptions 3.2.1 - 3.2.4 about police behavior but
will now further assume:
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Assumption 3.2.5. sv = sv,m = sv,w; and
Assumption 3.2.6. sv ∈ (sv,m, sv,w).
The first of these two assumptions requires that stop cost be equal across
groups during low visibility, v, because race is unobserved. The second as-
sumption requires that sv be between the stop costs for minority and white
motorists following the logic that if race is unobserved stop costs will be an
unknown weighted average of the minority and white stop costs. Accordingly,
under the null of equal treatment, sv is equal to the high visibility costs, sv, for
each group. The basic structure of the officer’s problem remains unchanged
between (3.1) and (3.7) as does Definition 1 and Lemma 1. As such, the
solution to her utility maximization problem in low visibility can be written
as:
γ(i, sv,d, φ) =

1, if i ≥ i∗(φ, sv)
0, i < i∗(φ, sv).
As before, we use the officer’s net utility to derive the equilibrium cir-
cumstances stop-threshold for a given infraction severity in low visibility,
φ∗(i, sv) = φ∗(i, sv,m) = φ∗(i, sv,w) for any i, which, like the officer’s stop
cost, is also bounded by the circumstance stop-thresholds in high visibility
φ∗(i, sv) ∈ (φ∗(i, sv,w), φ∗(i, sv,m)).
In the context of our theoretical model, a VOD test for disparate treatment
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can be written formally as:
KV OD =
p[m | stopped, v]p[w | stopped, v]
p[w | stopped, v]p[m | stopped, v]
=
∫∞
0
f (i,m)φ∗(i, sv,m)di
∫∞
0
f (i, w)φ∗(i, sv)di∫∞
0
f (i, w)φ∗(i, sv,w)di
∫∞
0
f (i,m)φ∗(i, sv)di
.
(3.8)
where the definition of stopped in the previous section is refined to be condi-
tional on visibility, i.e. φ∗ is based on sv,d. In practice, Grogger and Ridgeway
[2006] propose regressing race on visibility conditional on time of day and day
of week fixed effects in order to test for differences in the likelihood that the
motorist who was stopped belongs to the minority group. We verify for our
data that the implications of this test statistic are always consistent with the
results of an equivalent Grogger and Ridgeway [2006] style regression.
Under the null hypothesis of racially blind policing where sv = sv,m = sv,w,
we conclude that φ∗(i, sv) = φ∗(i, sv,m) = φ∗(i, sv,w) and (3.8) is equal to one.
Under the alternative hypothesis of disparate treatment where sv,m < sv < sv,w
and φ∗(i, sv,w) < φ∗(i, sv) < φ∗(i, sv,m), (3.8) is greater than one. Therefore,
our model of policing generates implications for this VOD test statistic that
are consistent with Grogger and Ridgeway’s use of the VOD test as a control
for demographic differences in the distribution of motorist’s driving behavior.
This identification strategy appears very reasonable when motorist behav-
ior is exogenous, but may be problematic if motorists respond to visibility in
their driving behavior. Motivated by Anwar and Fang [2006] and Knowles
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et al. [2001], we extend our model to a setting where the motorist’s decision
is an endogenous function of the stop-threshold, and as noted above, the stop
threshold varies with solar visibility because officers cannot observe race. We
then use this framework to consider further implications for the VOD test and
the assumption of a constant relative risk set over solar visibility.
3.2.4 An Equilibrium Model of Motorist Driving Be-
havior
The simple model we present above ignores potential changes in the equilib-
rium behavior of motorists. However, we expect that motorists will adjust
their infraction levels in response to changes in officer stop costs. Addition-
ally, the definition of racial bias in a VOD context implies that changes in
officer stop cost over visibility varies across demographic groups.
The motorist’s utility maximization problem, over infraction level, takes
the following form:
max
i(c,sd)
b(i, c)− τ(i)
∫ φ∗(i,sv,d)
0
Γ(φ)dφ (3.9)
where b(i, c) is the motorist pay-off for committing an infraction of a given
level i, c is a motorist preference parameter, τ is motorist costs associated
with being stopped when committing an infraction, and Γ(φ) is the probabil-
ity density function of φ distributed as uniform (0,1). We make the following
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assumptions about motorist behavior:
Assumption 3.2.7. b is a twice differentiable, non-negative function, ∂b
∂i
> 0,
and ∂
2b
∂i2
< 0 ∀ c and i ≥ 0, and b(0, c) = 0 and limi→∞ ∂b∂i = 0 ∀ c;
Assumption 3.2.8. ∂b
∂c
> 0 and ∂
2b
∂c∂i
> 0 ∀ c and for i > 0;
Assumption 3.2.9. τ is a twice differentiable, positive function, dτ
di
> 0 and
d2τ
di2
> 0 for i ≥ 0, and τ(0) > 0;
Assumption 3.2.10. ∂b
∂i
∣∣
i=0
≥ dτ
di
∣∣
i=0
h−1[u0 − sv,d] + τ(0)h−1′ [u0 − sv,d] ∀ c;
Assumption 3.2.11.
d2u
di2
du
di
≥ −h−1
′′
(·)
h−1′ (·)
∂u
∂i
∀i ≥ 0.
Assumption 3.2.12. c ∼ g(c, d) where there exists a ch,d such that g(c, d) =
0 ∀c > ch,d and g(ch,d) > 0.
The motorist maximizes the expected utility function in (3.9) with respect
to infraction severity. She takes the probability of being stopped, γ(i, sv,d, φ),
from the officer’s problem as given and integrates over the distribution of pos-
sible circumstances, φ. As such, the motorist compares the expected marginal
benefits and costs when choosing an optimal i′. The term, c, captures motorist
heterogeneity through context, e.g. recklessness, timing, sleep deprivation, etc.
We assume that the motorist benefit or pay-off is an increasing function of in-
fraction severity and that marginal benefit is diminishing. Additionally, both
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the benefit and the marginal benefit of infracting rise with recklessness, c. This
assumption simply initializes the direction of the effect of this parameter on
motorist benefit. We assume that the motorist’s cost and marginal cost are
increasing in infraction severity, and motorist’s cost is bounded away from zero
for infinitesimally small infraction levels, which is required to assure that some
motorists choose not to commit an infraction. The cost function is assumed
to be invariant to recklessness. We also assume, at low levels of infraction,
the marginal benefit of increasing infraction level is higher than the marginal
cost of increasing infraction level in order to assure an interior solution for
motorists who choose to commit an infraction. Finally, we impose a technical
assumption that the relative curvature (curvature relative to the slope) of the
officer’s utility function exceeds in magnitude the relative curvature of h−1
associated with the officer’s circumstance based stop costs in order to sign the
second order condition of the motorist’s problem.
Lemma 6. There exists a unique, non-negative optimal infraction level i
′
for
a motorist of type {c, d}. The optimal infraction level is increasing in crimi-
nality, c, whenever infraction levels are positive.
We first rewrite (3.9) using Assumption 1.2, that φ follows a uniform distri-
bution, and
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∫ φ∗(i′,sd)
0
Γ(φ) dφ = φ∗ (i′ (c, sd) , sd) as
max
i′(c,sd)
b(i, c)− τ(i)φ∗(i, sd). (3.10)
Thus, the motorist will solve the maximization problem in (3.10) by choosing
an optimal infraction level that satisfies the following first-order condition:
FOC ≡ ∂b(i, c)
∂i
− dτ(i)
di
φ∗(i, sv,d)− τ(i)∂φ
∗(i, sv,d)
∂i
= 0. (3.11)
By Assumption 3.2.7, the first term in (3.11) is positive, and by Assumption
3.2.9 and Lemma 1 the second and third terms are negative when including
the subtraction signs. Assumption 3.2.10 implies that the left hand side of
(3.11) is positive at i = 0. Assumption 3.2.7 requires that the first term go
to zero as i limits to infinity, and Assumption 3.2.9 implies that the second
term is non-zero. Therefore, by continuity of all functions over R+, a positive
solution to (3.11) exists. The second-order condition of the motorist’s problem
excludes the possibility of multiple equilibria and can be written formally as:
SOC ≡ ∂
2b(i, c)
∂i2
− d
2τ(i)
i2
φ∗(i, sv,d)− 2dτ(i)
di
∂φ∗(i, sv,d)
∂i
− τ(i)∂
2φ∗(i, sv,d)
∂i2
< 0.
(3.12)
The first term in (3.12) is negative based on Assumption 3.2.7, the second
term is negative based on Assumption 3.2.9, and the third term is negative
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based on Assumption 3.2.9 and Lemma 1. The final term is negative as well
assuring uniqueness. In order to show why the final term is negative, we draw
on the solution of the officer’s problem and the monotonicity of h(·). Recall
that φ∗(i, sv,d) = h−1[u(i)− sv,d]; we use this expression to expand the second
derivative of φ∗ from Equation (3.3):
∂2φ∗(i, sv,d)
∂i2
=
(
du(i)
di
)2
h−1
′′
(u(i)− sv,d) + d
2u(i)
di2
h−1
′
(u(i)− sv,d). (3.13)
The first term is ambiguous, but the second term is positive and dominates
the first term in the equation based on Assumption 3.2.11. Therefore, as long
as the curvature of h−1 is not too large, there exists a unique positive value of
i∗∗ that maximizes motorist payoff over R+ conditional on c and sv,d. If this
maximum pay-off is positive, then i′ = i∗∗ otherwise i′ = 0.
By total differentiation of the first order condition in (3.11), it is easy to
show that the optimal infraction level i∗∗ is increasing in criminality. Therefore,
di′
dc
=
di∗∗
dc
= −
∂2b
∂c∂i
SOC
> 0 ∀c and sv,d such that i′ > 0,
where SOC is the expression for the second order condition in (3.12) and
is negative as shown above, and the sign of the numerator is established by
Assumption 3.2.8. QED
Figure 3.1 provides examples of optimal infraction levels i∗∗ over different
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values of the preference parameter c. The dashed line designates motorist
expected costs by infraction level, and the solid line designates motorist pay-
off. The vertical dotted line designates the optimal speed i∗∗ for a specific
value of c where the cost and pay-off curves are parallel.
Note that the optimal infraction level may not be increasing unambiguously
with sv,d. In order to see this, we present the derivative of the first order
condition with respect to sv,d:
∂(FOC)
∂sv,d
= −∂τ
∂i
∂φ∗
∂sv,d
− τ(i) ∂
2φ∗
∂i∂sv,d
.
The first term is positive consistent with increases in infraction level as stop
costs rise. The second term is ambiguous because it depends upon h−1
′′
(·).
In order to assure an equilibrium where motorists behave as expected, i.e.
increasing infraction level when the stop costs of police increase, we impose
the following assumption:
Assumption 3.2.13.
∂τ
∂i
τ(i)
> −h
−1′′ (·)
h−1′ (·)
∂u
∂i
∀i ≥ 0.
This again limits the curvature of the second derivative of h−1, and assures
that
di
′
dsv,d
> 0.
In practice, this assumption holds in our simulations.
Lemma 7. For any set of functions satisfying assumptions 2.1 through 2.12,
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there exist parameter values such that a threshold c∗ exists, above which mo-
torists commit a traffic infraction at the optimal level i
′
, and below which
motorists do not commit an infraction in equilibrium. For such parameter val-
ues, limc→c∗ i
′
> 0 for c above c∗, and c∗ is decreasing in sv,d.
The proof proceeds by construction. Assume a benefit function b(i, c). Based
on Assumption 3.2.8, this benefit function approaches a finite maximum value
b(c) for any c as i increases. Now pick an arbitrary value of c. Assumption
3.2.4 assures that limi→0 φ∗(i, sv,d) = φ∗(sv,d) > 0. Therefore, we can set the
officer and motorist cost parameters so that τ(0)φ∗(sv,d) > b(c). For this cost
function, a motorist of type c never speeds and τ(i)φ∗(i, sv,d) always lies above
b(i, c). Now, because τ and b are differentiable and the second order condition
in the motorist problem is always negative, we can slowly and continuously
reduce the function τ by multiplying by a decreasing positive scaler less than
1 (where the scaler effectively acts as a parameter of the cost function) until
τ(i)φ∗(i, sv,d) just touches the function b(i, c) at one point. Given that the
slope of the benefit function over i at i = 0 is steeper than the slope of
τ(i)φ∗(i, sd), the two curves will touch, yielding zero net benefits, at a positive
value of i. For the selected parameters, the arbitrarily chosen c equals c∗. The
benefit curves for all values of c below c∗ lie below the benefits curve for c∗
(and similarly, all curves lie above for c above c∗). Therefore, for c below c∗,
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net benefits are always negative, and for c above c∗, net benefits are positive
over some range of i of R+.
In the proof of Lemma 2, we show that the optimal infraction level i∗∗
is positive for all c and that the function i∗∗ is monotonically increasing in
c. Therefore, for values of c below c∗, i∗∗ is positive and must lie below the
optimal infraction level for any c greater than c∗. This implies that the opti-
mal infraction level for any c greater than c∗ is bounded away from zero, or
limc→c∗ i
′
> 0 for all c > c∗.
An increase in sv,d unambiguously lowers φ
∗(i, sd) holding τ fixed. At the
c∗ above, the cost curve shifts down and net benefits are positive. Therefore,
a new tangency between the two curves holding b(i, c) and τ(i) fixed requires
a decrease in c∗ in order to lower the benefits curve down to just touch the
now lower τφ∗(i, sv,d). QED
Figure 3.1 helps illustrate the implications of Lemma 3. For very low values
of c, i.e. in the upper row of graphs in Figure 3.1, the cost of committing an
infraction always lies above the pay-off, but as c rises the benefit or pay-off
curve crosses the cost curve and an optimal, non-zero infraction level with
positive net benefits exists. Thus, drawing from a large population of c allows
us to construct a representative speed distribution. Figure 3.2 illustrates this
for c’s drawn from a skew normal distribution as in our simulations below.
We can use the distribution of motorists over race and recklessness, g(c, d),
to re-write (3.8), where we subscript to annotate that the risk set is now
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endogenous, such that:
KERS =
p[m | stopped, v]p[w | stopped, v]
p[w | stopped, v]p[m | stopped, v]
=
∫ ch
c∗ g(c,m)φ
∗(i
′
(c, sv,m), sv,m)dc
∫ ch
c∗ g(c, w)φ
∗(i
′
(c, sv), sv)dc∫ ch
c∗ g(c, w)φ
∗(i′(c, sv,w), sv,w)dc
∫ ch
c∗ g(c,m)φ
∗(i′(c, sv), sv)dc
,
(3.14)
where ch is the maximum value of c in the distribution.
Proposition 9. Under the null hypothesis of racially blind policing where
sv = sv,m = sv,w and i
∗
v = i
∗
v,m = i
∗
v,w, KERS is equal to one. However, under
the alternative hypothesis where sv,m < sv < sv,w and i
∗
v,m < i
∗
v < i
∗
v,w, parame-
ters exist for any set of functions satisfying assumptions 2.1 through 2.12 such
that KERS < 1 in equilibrium.
The first piece of Proposition 1 is trivial by inspection. Under the null, stop
behavior is unaffected by visibility and so the daylight probability of stop for
each group cancels with its darkness probability.
The proof of the second half of the proposition proceeds by construction.
First, based on Assumption 3.2.12, we impose distributions of c for whites
and African-Americans that both have the same finite maximum ch with a
non-zero density at that maximum. By Assumption 3.2.8, the benefit func-
tion approaches a finite maximum value b(ch) as i increases, and Assumption
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3.2.4 assures that limi→0 φ∗(i, sd) = φ∗(sd) > 0. Therefore, we can set the
officer and motorist cost parameters so that τ(0)φ∗(snull) > b(ch,d), subject to
the requirement under the null hypothesis that snull=sv = sv,w = sv,m. Now,
because τ and b are differentiable and the second order condition in the mo-
torist problem is always negative, we can slowly and continuously reduce the
function τ by multiplying by a decreasing positive scaler κ less than 1 until
τ(i)φ∗(i, snull) just touches the function b(i, ch,w) at one point which based on
Lemmas 2 and 3 will be at a positive value of i. We define the κ where this
occurs as κ∗. This construction assures that no one has an incentive to commit
an infraction and white and African-American motorists with c = ch are indif-
ferent between committing an infraction and not. KERS is not defined under
the current construction because the set of motorist for which stopped = 1 is
empty or more formally contains at most a set of motorists of measure zero.
However, KERS always equals 1 under the null hypothesis for non-empty sets,
and so limκ→κ∗ KERS = 1 for any κ > κ∗ because for all κ > κ∗ a positive
measure of African-American and white motorists commit infractions under
the null.
Now, for some κ > κ∗, we consider a marginal departure from the null
hypothesis where sv,w increases and sv,m decreases while holding sv fixed at
snull. Recall from (5) and (6) that the probability that a motorist who is
stopped in high visibility by police is white has a numerator that depends only
upon sv,w, and that the denominator cancels out with the denominator for the
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probability that a motorist is stopped is minority in 3.14. The numerator can
be written as
NUMw ≡
∫ ch
c∗
g(c, w)φ∗(i
′
(c, sv,w), sv,w)dc. (3.15)
The derivative of this term with respect to sv,w is
d(NUMw)
dsv,w
=− ∂c
∗
∂sv,w
g(c∗, w)φ∗(i′(c∗, sv,w), sv,w)
+
∫ ch
c∗
g(c, w)
(
∂φ∗
∂sv,w
+
∂φ∗
∂i
di′
dsv,w
)
dc.
(3.16)
A positive derivative in (3.16) increases the denominator in (3.14) and reduces
KERS to a value below 1 for a small increase in white high visibility stop costs,
sv,w, near the null hypothesis. The first term in the expression is unambigu-
ously positive based on Lemma 3 and the non-zero density at ch. Further, the
limit of the second term as κ approaches κ∗ is zero because the lower limit of
integration c∗ equals ch at κ∗ and the integrand is finite. Therefore,
lim
κ→κ∗
d(NUMw)
dsv,w
> 0 (3.17)
and by continuity there exist κ′ above κ∗ where the derivative is positive for all
κ∗ < κ < κ′. For changes in minority stop costs, the same two terms arise for
the derivative of the numerator of the probability that a stopped motorist is
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minority. As before, the integral term, which is equivalent to the second term
in (3.16), limits to zero. The equivalent term to the first term in (3.16) will
dominate the second term equivalent for all κ less than some κ′ as long as κ′ is
sufficiently close to κ∗. However, an increase in disparate treatment implies a
decrease in minority stop costs and so the change in the expression for κ near
κ∗ reduces the numerator of KERS reinforcing the effect of increasing white
stop costs. Therefore, we can always find a κ close enough κ∗ so that the effect
of entering white motorist and exiting minority motorists during high visibility
dominate any effects of changes in stop probability and driving speed yielding
a KERS less than one. QED
Consider a jurisdiction where motorists face disparate treatment, sv,m <
sv < sv,w. In our partial equilibrium treatment of the VOD test, we show
that the relative probability that a stopped motorist is minority increases dur-
ing daylight. However, this result no longer holds once we endogenize speed
through the motorist’s problem in the equilibrium setting. The intuition of our
finding is relatively straightforward; there will be two competing effects associ-
ated with a change from high to low visibility. On the one hand, an officer will
face a relatively higher cost for stopping white motorists during high visibility,
thus white motorists are in all probability less likely to be stopped even if they
are travelling faster. On the other hand, infra-marginal motorists, who were
close to indifferent between committing an infraction and not, will respond to
changes in stop costs by altering their driving behavior and committing infrac-
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tions, increasing the representation of whites and reducing the representation
of minorities in the pool of stopped motorists in high visibility. As is apparent
in our formal model, these effects will push the VOD test statistic in opposing
directions. Thus, the magnitude of (3.14) will depend on the size of these two
competing effects, and the size of the first term in (3.16) will depend upon
the density of motorists at c∗. If c follows a traditional unimodal distribution
with very low densities at extreme values of c, the size of this first term will
be positively related to the share of infra-marginal motorists or motorist who
do not commit infractions, a share that is typically unobserved in empirical
research on police stops.
The implication of our findings on the empirical application of VOD is of
critical importance. Grogger and Ridgeway [2006] and Ridgeway [2009] apply
the VOD to data collected by jurisdictions in response to repeated complaints
of racial profiling. The authors concluded that the test “yields little evidence
of racial profiling” in Oakland, CA (Grogger and Ridgeway [2006], p. 886)
and that “African-American motorists were less likely to be stopped during
daylight” in Cincinnati, OH (Ridgeway [2009], p. 14). These conclusions
were made based on findings, in both jurisdictions, that minority motorists
were stopped less frequently in daylight indicating potential “reverse racial
profiling” (Grogger and Ridgeway [2006], p. 884). As shown in the preceding
section, these conclusions are potentially incorrect given the possibility that
the relative risk set of motorists varies in response to changes in solar visibility.
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The evidence in these papers is entirely consistent with either white or minority
motorists being favored by police. In the next subsection, we will investigate
the possibility that shifts in the speed distribution might provide insights into
the direction of differential treatment when equal treatment is rejected by the
VOD test.
3.2.5 An Alternative Test for Disparate Treatment
In our model, recall that disparate treatment occurs during daylight and is
represented by lower stop costs for minority motorists, e.g. sv,m < sv,w. Since
darkness makes it difficult for police to discern the race of a motorist before
making a traffic stop, the VOD test proposes that officers face a common s sv
during darkness. Further, we assume that the in darkness is bounded such that
sv,m < sv < sv,w. Previously we show that under the alternative hypothesis
(i.e. in the presence of disparate treatment), the magnitude of the VOD test
statistic relative to 1 does not unambiguously determined the direction of
discrimination. As an alternative to interpreting the magnitude or sign of the
VOD test, we propose to directly examining the speed distribution of stopped
motorists exploiting the same solar variation used in the VOD test. Intuitively,
if the police stop cost falls for a group in daylight raising the probability of stop
at all speeds, individuals in this group will decrease their optimal speed, and
testing for shifts in the speed distribution will provide insights into whether
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stop costs are higher during high or low visibility for a given group.
However, we do not observe the speed distribution of all motorists, but
rather we only observe the speed distribution of motorists who are stopped by
police. Therefore, we need to examine the impact of differences in stop costs
on the speed distribution conditional on being stopped. We begin by writing a
function for one minus the CDF of the speed distribution for motorists whom
police stop which requires integrating over both motorist preferences, c, and
officer circumstances, φ, in order to capture the share of motorists stopped at
any speed or higher for a given group relative to the total number of motorist
stopped of that group. If the derivative of this expression (one minus the
CDF) with respect to stop costs is positive for all speeds or infraction levels,
then an increase in stop costs unambiguously shifts the speed distribution
of motorists upwards or to the right. Such a result would allow us to test
for the direction of discrimination, conditional on VOD based evidence of
differential treatment, by examining the change in the speed distribution of
stopped motorists between daylight and darkness for each race.
Our first step is to place conditions on the model so that the equilib-
rium probability of stop changes in the expected manner when stop costs rise.
Specifically, when stop costs rise, motorists drive faster because of lower stop
probabilities, but we do not expect motorists to drive so much faster that the
higher speeds actually more than undue the original decline in stop probabil-
ities that was the reason behind the faster speeds in the first place. The total
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derivative of φ∗ is
dφ∗
dsv,d
=
∂φ∗
∂sv,d
+
∂φ∗
∂i
di′
dsv,d
(3.18)
Notice that the first term implies a direct lower probability of being stopped
from higher stop costs, but the second implies an increase in stop probability
as optimal speed increases.
If we assume,
Assumption 3.2.14. ∂u
∂i
di′
dsv,d
< 1
and use the solution for φ∗(i, sd) = h−1 (u(i)− sv,d) in Equation (3.3), it can
be shown that
dφ∗
dsv,d
=
∂φ∗
∂sv,d
+
∂φ∗
∂i
di′
dsv,d
= −h−1′(u(i)− sv,d)
(
1− ∂u
∂i
di′
dsv,d
)
< 0 (3.19)
We recognize that Assumption 3.2.14 is not ideal because it is based on an
equilibrium function. However, the imposition of an assumption that individ-
uals do not completely undo exogenous changes in incentives through their
behavioral adjustments is relatively standard. Further, this assumption works
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in favor of the VOD test as a mechanism for distinguishing between disparate
treatment of minorities and reverse discrimination in that it assures that at
least the second term in (3.16) is consistent with disparate treatment against
minorities yielding KERS > 1. Further, the assumption appears to always hold
in our simulations below.
Our second step is to define the level of criminality c as a function of a
motorists optimal speed i′. Specifically, we can invert the monotonic function
i′(c, sv,d) in order to obtain a monotonic function
c′ ≡ c′(i, sv,d) such that i = i′(c′(i, sv,d), sv,d) ∀i > 0 (3.20)
Lemma 8. The level of criminality, c′, consistent with an optimal infraction
level, i, can be expressed as a function c′(i, sv,d) that is increasing in the sever-
ity of infraction and decreasing in stop cost.
The monotonicity of i
′
(c, sv,d) and the Inverse Function Theorem imply that
there will be a one-to-one monotonic mapping from i′(c, sv,d) to c′(i, sv,d) as
shown in the equality in (3.20). We differentiate this equality with respect to
i and sv,d yielding
1 =
∂i′
∂c
∂c′
∂i
and 0 =
∂i′
∂c
∂c′
∂sv,d
+
∂i′
∂sv,d
(3.21)
140
Accordingly, Lemma 2 and the above equations imply
∂c′(i′, sv,d)
∂i′
=
(
∂i′
∂c
)−1
> 0 and
∂c′(i′, sv,d)
∂sv,d
= − ∂i
′
∂sv,d
(
∂i′
∂c
)−1
< 0. QED
Now, we define G˜ as one minus the CDF of the speed distribution condi-
tional on being stopped (suppressing the visibility subscript and the minority
subscript from the distribution over c for convenience) as
G˜(i) ≡
∫ ch
c′(i,sd)
∫ φ∗(i′(c,sd),sd)
0
g(c)Γ(φ) dφdc∫ ch
c∗(sd)
∫ φ∗(i′(c,sd),sd)
0
g(c)Γ(φ) dφdc
. (3.22)
We utilize the equilibrium mapping from i to c in the motorist’s problem to
capture the portion of the distribution of motorists that travel above i. Note
that the density of c can be factored out of the first integral, and recall that
because φ follows a uniform distribution the resulting integral can rewritten
as
∫ φ∗(i′,sd)
0
Γ(φ) dφ = φ∗ (i′ (c, sd) , sd). Equation (3.22) is then equivalent to:
G˜(i) =
∫ ch
c′(i,sd)
g(c)φ∗ (i′ (c, sd) , sd) dc∫ ch
c∗(sd)
g(c)φ∗ (i′ (c, sd) , sd) dc
. (3.23)
Next, we calculate the derivative of (3.23) with respect to sd as
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dG˜(i)
dsd
=−
dc′(i,sd)
dsd
g (c′ (i, sd))φ∗ (i′ (c′ (i, sd) , sd) , sd)∫ ch
c∗(sd)
g(c)φ∗ (i′ (c, sd) , sd) dc
+
∫ ch
c′(i,sd)
g(c)dφ
∗(i
′
(c,sd),sd)
dsd
dc∫ ch
c∗(sd)
g(c)φ∗ (i′ (c, sd) , sd) dc
+
(∫ ch
c′(i,sd)
g (c)φ∗ (i′ (c, sd) , sd) dc
)
dc∗
dsd
g(c∗)φ∗(i
′
(c∗, sd), sd)(∫ ch
c∗ g(c)φ
∗ (i′ (c, sd) , sd) dc
)2
−
(∫ ch
c′(i,sd)
g (c)φ∗ (i′ (c, sd) , sd) dc
) ∫ ch
c∗ g(c)
dφ∗(i
′
(c,sd),sd)
dsd
dc(∫ ch
c∗ g(c)φ
∗ (i′ (c, sd) , sd) dc
)2 .
(3.24)
We multiply both sides by the denominator of the first two terms, which also
appears squared in the denominator in the second two terms. Then, in terms
three and four, we replace the ratio of the first term in the numerator to the
remaining term in the denominator with G˜(i) based on (3.23). We can then
reorganize by collecting the similar terms. The first and third terms both
involve the derivative of the lower limit of integration and are evaluated at
c′ and c∗, respectively. The second and fourth terms both involve integrals
of the derivative of φ∗ and can be converted into conditional expectations by
factoring out the mass of c contained within the limits of integration. Thus
we have
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∫ ch
c∗
g(c)φ∗ (i′ (c, sd) , sd) dc
dG˜(i)
dsd
=
−
(
dc′ (i, sd)
dsd
g (c′ (i, sd))φ∗ (i′ (c′ (i, sd) , sd) , sd)
− G˜(i)dc
∗ (sd)
dsd
g (c∗ (sd))φ∗ (i′ (c∗ (sd) , sd) , sd)
)
+H(c∗)G˜(i)
(∫ ch
c′(i,sd)
g (c)
G˜(i)H(c∗)
dφ∗
dsd
dc−
∫ ch
c∗(sd)
g (c)
H(c∗)
dφ∗
dsd
dc
)
,
(3.25)
where H(c∗) is the fraction of individuals who commit infractions, i.e. who
have a value of c above c∗.
The resulting expression is highly non-linear and has an ambiguous sign,
but very different in form than the requirements for interpreting the magni-
tude of the VOD test. Further, several factors point to this derivative having
a positive sign. Focusing first on the second expression on the right hand side
of (3.25) on the last line, the density term g(c) within each integral has been
scaled so that it represents a conditional density within the limits of integra-
tion, and so each integral represents a conditional expectation of the derivative
of φ∗ with respect to sd. This derivative is
dφ∗
dsd
= h−1
′
(u(i)− sd)
(
∂u
∂i
di′
dsd
− 1
)
, (3.26)
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which is negative based on Assumption 3.2.13. If this derivative decreases in
magnitude with c (a positive cross-partial derivative) then the second integral
will be larger and the entire expression will be positive. The cross-partial of
φ∗ with respect to sd and c is
d2φ∗
dcdsd
= h−1
′′ ∂u
∂i
di′
dc
(
∂u
∂i
di′
dsd
− 1
)
+ h−1
′
(
∂2u
∂i2
di′
dc
di′
dsd
+
∂u
∂i
d2i′
dcdsd
)
. (3.27)
The second of the two expressions involves the sum of two terms multiplied
by h−1
′
. The first term is positive, and it can be shown using the comparative
static derivation of di′/dsd, which is positive, that the second term is positive
as well if
Assumption 3.2.15. ∂
∂c
∂2b
∂i2
< 0.
Specifically, the numerator of the comparative static expression from Lemma
2 only involves t and φ∗, and the only term in the denominator (the second
order condition) that depends upon c is the second derivative of b with respect
to i, which is signed by Assumption 3.2.7. The assumption on the cross-partial
of b is relatively intuitive (unlike most third derivatives of preferences). Pref-
erences for infraction level increase the positive marginal benefit of infraction
level (Assumption 3.2.8), and Assumption 3.2.15 implies that preferences for
the level of infraction also increase the negative slope of the marginal benefit.
Therefore, when measured as a share of marginal benefit, the magnitude of the
change in the marginal benefit with c can increase or decrease, but the change
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in the marginal benefit cannot increase in absolute terms under assumption
3.2.15 - a larger first derivative in infraction level (marginal benefit) will require
a larger negative second derivative with respect to infraction level in order to
reduce the marginal benefits sufficiently as infraction level rises. Note that this
assumption is satisfied automatically based on maintained assumptions when
b is multiplicative in functions of b1(i) and b2(c), so that b(i, c) = b1(i)b2(c),
and
∂
∂c
∂2b
∂i2
=
∂b2
∂c
∂2b1
∂i2
< 0 (3.28)
since Assumption 3.2.8 requires the derivative of b2 to be positive and Assump-
tion 3.2.7 requires the second derivative of b1 to be negative. With the second
term positive under this assumption and general restrictions on the magnitude
of the second derivative of h−1, which pre-multiplies the first term in (3.27),
relative to the first derivative of h−1 in order to assure a well behaved equilib-
rium, we expect the entire second term of (3.25) to be positive over much of
the relevant parameter space.
Next, turning to the first term in the (3.25) on lines two and three, the term
involves the difference of very similar expressions except that one is based on
c′(i, sd), the level of preferences that yield infraction level i, and the other is
based on c∗(sd), the preference level where individuals are indifferent between
committing an infraction and not. Both expressions are negative in sign and so
the first expression contributes positive values to G˜(i) and the second expres-
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sion contributes negative values. Given the construction of G˜(i) for stopped
motorists, c′ is greater than or equal to c∗ so that φ∗(i′(c′, sd), sd) is greater in
magnitude than φ∗(i′(c∗(sd), sd); and G˜(i), which multiplies the second expres-
sion (on line 3), is less than or equal to 1. Both of these effects contribute to
a positive net value of the first term in G˜(i) and increase in magnitude with i.
If g(c) is unimodal and c∗ is below the mode of g(c), then g(c′) will be greater
than g(c∗) for small values of i when the first two effects are not large, and for
larger values of i, the first two effect may dominate anyway. //
Finally, we need to compare the magnitudes of the derivatives of c′ and c∗
with respect to sd. c
∗ is identified by the following equality (zero net benefits):
b(i′(c∗, sd), c∗)− φ∗(i′(c∗, sd), sd)t(i′(c∗, sd)) = 0. (3.29)
Totally differentiating this equation yields a simple expression for the deriva-
tive because the envelope theorem implies that all the terms involving deriva-
tives of i′ with respect to either c∗ or sd are multiplied by the first order
condition, which is zero, and so
dc∗
dsd
=
∂φ∗
∂sd
t
∂b
∂c
< 0. (3.30)
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We can also define c′ based on
i′(c′(i, sd), sd) = i (3.31)
Again, we can totally differentiate and use the comparative static results from
Lemma 2 and Assumption 3.2.13 to get
dc′
dsd
= −
di′
dsd
di′
dc
= −
d
di
(
∂φ∗
∂sd
t
)
d
di
(
∂b
∂c
) < 0. (3.32)
The derivative of c′ is the ratio of the slopes over infraction level of the same
terms in the expression for the derivative of c∗. At present, we do not have
specific intuition concerning the relative magnitude of the ratio of marginal
stop costs to marginal benefits from c as compared to the ratio of the slopes
of these two terms with respect to infraction severity.
In the next section, we will use calibrated simulation models to provide an
indication of the circumstances under which this derivative is positive under
the alternative hypothesis of discrimination against African-Americans espe-
cially relative to circumstances when the VOD statistic lies above or below 1
under the alternative hypothesis.
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3.3 Simulation
Simulating the theoretical model allows for two key results. First, we are able
to verify that there are parameter values that both match our stop and speed-
ing data for which KERS does not have the traditionally expected magnitude
under the alternative hypothesis of discrimination, but the speed distribution
does shift unambiguously in the expected direction. Second, it allows us to
test the flexibility of those circumstances.
To simulate the theoretical equilibrium, we use the following functional
forms:
u(i) = iη + u0 η > 1, u0 > sv,w
h−1(h) = h
a
ha+k
a > 2, k > 0
b(i, c) = b0i
α1eα2c b0 > 0, 0 < α1 < 1, α2 > 0
τ(i) = iµ + τ0 µ > 1, τ0 > 0
sv,w ≥ sv ≥ sv,m c ∼ skew normal, ω > 0
These forms satisfy most of the assumptions in the model, while retaining
the necessary ambiguity, notably in h−1. Specifically, the form of h−1 assures
that the distribution of costs associated with circumstances, h(φ), follows a
unimodal distribution over R+. We relax these assumptions in two specific
ways for convenience. First, b does not limit to a finite value with i, but does
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increase more slowly with i than τ for large values of i. Second, we select skew
normal as the distribution of c, which has non-zero density over R. However,
even after relaxing Assumption 3.20, we regularly find scenarios where KERS
is less than 1. Table 3.1 describes the 18 parameters necessary to specify in
our simulated model, delineated by whether we fix the parameter or calibrate
it using moments from the data described in the following section.
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Table 3.1: Simulation Parameter Names and Symbols
Parameter Name Symbol
Fixed
Mean of white infraction preference distribution mw
Std. Dev. of white infraction preference distribution σw
Initial level of officer pay-off u0
Shape parameter for distribution of circumstances a
Shift parameter for distribution of circumstances k
Rate of increase in officer pay-off η
Stop cost for minorities in light sv,m
Motorist payoff level parameter b0
Calibrated
Skewness of white infraction preference distribution skeww
Mean of minority infraction preference distribution mm
Std. Dev. of minority infraction preference distribution σm
Skewness of minority infraction preference distribution skewm
Rate of increase with infraction in motorist payoff α1
Rate of increase with preferences in motorist payoff α2
Initial level of infraction costs if stopped τ0
Rate of increase in infraction costs if stopped µ
Stop cost for whites in light sv,w
Stop cost in darkness sv
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Unfortunately, the data do not allow us only to recover identifying infor-
mation on both motorist and officer utility simultaneously because we have no
information on outcomes that are shaped separately by either officer or mo-
torist behavior. Thus, we choose nine parameters related to motorist behavior
to calibrate, and as a robustness check change the officer parameters and re-
calibrate motorist parameters. We calibrate these parameter values using 24
empirical moments, six speed percentiles (20th, 40th, 60th, 80th, 90th, and
95th) for each combination of daylight/darkness and minority/non-minority,
and one fixed moment, the fraction of whites not infracting. The latter is
unknown given data limitations, and central to the problem because a high
fraction of motorists not infracting implies a greater density of motorists who
are indifferent between infracting and not given our unimodal distribution of
c. Therefore, we chose 10% as a reasonably conservative upper-bound, and
then systematically lower the fraction while evaluating the VOD test statistic
and the shifts in the speed distribution. The initial police officer parameters
are selected via a manual calibration process in order to achieve a stable equi-
librium, and then we calibrate the motorist problem holding those parameter
fixed. Table 3.2 breaks down the fixed and calibrated parameter values for
each run of the simulation. In total, we calibrate to 7 combinations of fixed
parameters and fraction of whites not infraction. The first 3 columns in table
3.2 show these values for three levels of whites not infracting, 10%, 5%, and
2%. As discussed below, we then fix the fraction of whites not infracting at
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Table 3.2: Fixed and Calibrated Parameters Values
for each Simulation Run
10% 5% 2% 5% 5%
Fixed
mw 0 0 0
σw 1 1 1
k 700 700 700
u0 8.39 8.39 8.39
sv,m 1 1 1
a 2.1 2.05 2.25 2.1
η 1.01 1.01 1.03 1.09
Calibrated
mm 0.0012 0.0012 0.0012 0.0008 0.0013 0.0012 0.0013
σm 0.8969 0.8940 0.9018 0.9018 0.8921 0.8916 0.8886
skewm -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0005 -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0007
skeww 0.0049 0.0049 0.0048 0.0064 0.0047 0.0050 0.0051
α1 0.5006 0.5006 0.5006 0.5004 0.5006 0.5006 0.5006
α2 0.8542 0.8489 0.8460 0.8032 0.8342 0.8459 0.8446
τ0 93.799 73.796 62.4401 62.557 35.578 73.092 44.678
µ 2.2766 2.2857 2.2951 2.3134 2.2128 2.2479 2.2226
sv,w 2.7512 3.1044 3.2314 2.7444 3.7692 3.1209 3.3177
sv 2.1549 2.0025 1.9764 1.9086 2.0151 2.1400 1.9502
Note: Bolded values indicate manual changes for robustness. All non-fixed parameters
are re-calibrated to those changes.
5% and vary two fixed parameters: the shape parameter for distribution of cir-
cumstances, a; and the rate of increase in officer pay-off, η. These parameter
values are in columns 4 and 5, and 6 and 7, respectively, in table 3.2. Calibra-
tions are conducted by selecting 1000 draws on (0, 1) and then mapping those
draws into c for both a population of white and minority motorists using the
inverse of the CDF for the distributions of c for each race.
Figure 3.1 shows plots of motorist benefits and costs with a vertical line
designating the optimal level of positive infractions. The figure starts with
the preference parameters of 3, 2.5 and 2 standard deviations below the mean
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along the top row from left to right, 1 standard deviation below, zero and
one standard deviation above on the middle row, and finally 2, 2.5 and 3
standard deviations above the mean on the bottom row. The plots show a
clear progression of the optimal level of infraction (speed above the speed limit)
across varying levels of the preference parameter or criminality. Further, for
levels of 2 or more standard deviations below the mean, the cost curve always
lies above the benefits curve and motorists choose not to commit an infraction.
While starting near 1 standard deviation below, motorists switch to infracting
at their optimal positive level.
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Figure 3.1: Equilibrium for Select Levels of Criminality
Note: The horizontal axis is level of infraction (i.e. ’speed above the speed
limit’). The solid line, dashed line, and dotted line are motorist benefit,
motorist cost, and optimal solution, respectively.
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For a given set of parameter values, we simulate driving behavior using
equivalent draws for both the white and minority populations. Again, we draw
the same set of random numbers of (0, 1) for white and minority motorists,
which are then mapped into values of c for each population, but in order
to assure precision in the reported values these calculations are conducted
using 25,000 draws. Figure 3.2 illustrates this population behavior through a
representative speed distribution for whites. Using equivalent draws for white
and minority motorists implies that we do not directly recover the share of
motorists who are minority. Rather, we indirectly recover this information
by comparing the fraction of minority motorists stopped in the simulation
(FSIM) to the empirical analog (FDATA) and calculating the fraction minority
motorists in the population necessary to assure that the implied fraction of
stopped motorists who are minority equals FDATA. Noting that the simulated
population is exactly 50% minority, the implicit simulated share of minority
motorists is simply 0.5 times the fraction of motorists who are minority δT ,
where we find δT by solving FDATA = δTFSIM for T = Day and Night. We
present these results along side KERS calculations for context.
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Figure 3.2: Density of Infracting White Motorists
Table 3.3 presents the simulated speed distribution moments and the ac-
tual moments on which the calibration is based. The speed distribution is
illustrated by showing the speed at which stopped motorists are driving at the
20th, 40th, 60th, 80th, 90th and 95th percentiles of the speed distribution.
The columns are presented in pairs with the first column in each pair contain-
ing the speed at each percentile from the simulation and the second column
presenting the speed moments on which the calibration is based. The first
four columns present the speed distribution for minority motorists in daylight
and darkness, and the second four columns present the distribution for white
motorists. The simulation matches the speed moments from the data quite
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Table 3.3: Comparison of Simulation Moments to the Data
10% of Whites Not Infracting
Minority White
Day Night Day Night
Percentile Simulated Data Simulated Data Simulated Data Simulated Data
20 10.8665 11.9966 10.9793 12.1858 11.4538 11.1008 11.3374 10.7167
40 13.8992 14.6590 14.0329 15.1177 14.7386 14.8668 14.6336 14.5273
60 16.7758 17.1187 16.8954 17.6369 17.9037 18.2523 17.8081 17.9000
80 20.7347 20.4836 20.8470 20.8977 22.3612 22.5142 22.2756 22.0989
90 24.0900 23.6711 24.2139 23.9983 26.2626 26.4992 26.1923 25.7294
95 27.3353 27.0675 27.4117 26.9751 30.0364 30.3582 29.9703 29.4817
well almost always being within 1 mile per hour and often being within 1/2
mile per hour.
Table 3.4 presents the simulated shift of the speed distribution for both
stopped white and minority motorists. The speed distribution of minority
(white) motorists is clearly shifted to the right (left) in darkness, consistent
with higher (lower) stop costs for minorities (whites) when visibility is limited.
The unambiguous shift in the distribution of stopped motorists suggests that
for our model and calibrated parameter values our proposed test for the direc-
tion of discrimination can accurately capture whether minorities believe that
they are being discriminated against. As discussed above, if we reject the null
of equal treatment and the magnitude of the VOD test is not informative, we
argue that motorists responses to their beliefs of how they are being treated
is a reasonable standard for determining the actual direction of unequal treat-
ment. Notably, using equation (3.14), we also find a KERS of 0.95; well below
the threshold of 1, a value that in the past might have been interpreted as
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reverse discrimination. This value of KERS arises in spite of the fact that in
our model police have lower stop thresholds for African-Americans resulting
in a clear distributional shift in speeds when police can no longer identify race.
For the purpose of comparison, the similar statistic for Grogger and Ridgeway
[2006] is 0.80, and for our data in Massachusetts the statistic is 1.12.6 The
table also presents in the last two rows the predicted fraction of motorists who
are minority for our sample, and the model predicts a larger fraction of minor-
ity motorists in daylight relative to darkness. For comparison, we calculate the
average share of African-Americans as a fraction of the total number of whites
and African-Americans averaged across all towns and state police barracks in
our sample weighted by the number of stops during our inter-twilight window.
The average share African-American for our town subsample is 22.3 percent,
but the average for our state police sample is much smaller at 6.8 percent.
Table 3.5 presents the speed distribution shift from daylight to darkness
for all minority motorists and just those minorities who were stopped, for
parameters calibrated to 10% of white motorists not infracting. The first and
second columns replicate the information from Table 3.4, and columns 3 and 4
6See below for a description of the data. In order to be consistent with our preferred
logit models that control for day or week and time of day, we use the inter-twilight sample
to estimate a model of whether a stop is during daylight as a function of these controls,
and predict the probability of stop for each observation. Daylight stop probabilities are
based on unweighted averages from the inter-twilight sample, and darkness stop probabili-
ties are based on weighted averages using the predictive probability divided by one minus
the predicted probability of daylight as weights in order to assure that our VOD statistic
is calculate holding the covariates fixed on average across the daylight and the weighted
darkness motorist samples.
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Table 3.4: Simulation Percentile Moments
10% of Whites Not Infracting
Minority White
Percentile Day Night Difference Day Night Difference
20 10.8665 10.9793 -0.1128 11.4538 11.3374 0.1164
40 13.8992 14.0329 -0.1337 14.7386 14.6336 0.1050
60 16.7758 16.8954 -0.1195 17.9037 17.8081 0.0956
80 20.7347 20.8470 -0.1123 22.3612 22.2756 0.0856
90 24.0900 24.2139 -0.1239 26.2626 26.1923 0.0703
95 27.3353 27.4117 -0.0764 30.0364 29.9703 0.0661
MDay 0.1675
KERS 0.9524
0.5δDay 0.2307
0.5δNight 0.1744
Note: The calibrations are always within 0.05% of the target fraction of
whites not infracting. MDay is the fraction of minorities not infracting
during daylight. 0.5δ is the fraction of African-Americans in the simulation
population in daylight and darkness respectively.
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Table 3.5: Simulation Day and Night Speed Differences
10% of Whites Not Infracting
Stopped Drivers All Drivers
Percentile Minority White Minority White
20 -0.1128 0.1164 -0.4696 0.2890
40 -0.1337 0.1050 -0.4490 0.2735
60 -0.1195 0.0956 -0.4024 0.2391
80 -0.1123 0.0856 -0.3461 0.1982
90 -0.1239 0.0703 -0.3052 0.1691
95 -0.0764 0.0661 -0.2714 0.1453
present the shift in the speed distribution for all motorists. These distributions
are closely related because the distribution of stopped motorists is created by
using all motorists weighted by the probability of being stopped at each speed.
As expected, the speed distribution for all motorists are shifted in the same
direction as stopped motorists, but the magnitude of the shifts in the speed
distribution for stopped motorists is substantially muted by the stop behavior
of police and the distribution of circumstances. Regardless, unlike the VOD
test statistic, we do not observe any evidence of reversals where the speed
distribution shift for stopped motorists moves in the opposite direction of the
distribution shift for all motorists.
Next, we examine the impact of reducing the fraction of whites who choose
to not commit an infraction. In doing so, we move towards a situation where
the magnitude of the VOD test statistic might provide information on the di-
rection of discrimination because the density of motorists who are indifferent
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between infracting and not is much lower. We conduct three new calibrations
with the fraction of white not infracting set to 5, 2 and 1 percent. While
the KERS test statistic moves upwards as we lower the fraction not infract-
ing, the statistic remains below 1 for all three simulations. The reason that
the statistic never rises above 1 is because even when the fraction white not
infracting is very small in daylight discrimination under the alternative hy-
pothesis causes a substantially larger fraction of African-Americans not to
infract. These African-Americans can then choose to infract in darkness when
police do not observe race. Notably, the speed distribution shifts for stopped
motorists also gets larger and more closely resembles the shift for all motorists
as the fraction of motorists not infracting shrinks. As a result, in our simula-
tions, tests for speed distribution shifts of stopped motorists appear to have
substantial power to detect shifts in the population speed distribution under
circumstances involving discrimination against minorities and where the VOD
test statistics would never exceed 1.
In order to assess the robustness of our findings, we modify our parameters
from the officer’s problem and recalibrate our model. First, we modify a,
which determines the curvature of h−1. The parameter must be greater than
2, and in our initial simulations the parameter is set to 2.1. In table 3.7, we
set a to 2.05 and 2.25. Next, we modify η, which must exceed 1 and is set
to 1.01 in our simulations. We now set η to 1.03 and 1.09 and recalibrate.
As we can see in Table 3.7, our test is fairly robust to changes in both fixed
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Table 3.6: Simulation Day and Night Speed Differences
5% 2% 1%
Percentile Minority White Minority White Minority White
20 -0.2286 0.3496 -0.3116 0.4958 -0.3495 0.5567
40 -0.2290 0.3228 -0.2888 0.4526 -0.3306 0.5055
60 -0.2384 0.3062 -0.2811 0.4083 -0.3119 0.4680
80 -0.2104 0.2712 -0.2489 0.3577 -0.2801 0.4200
90 -0.1884 0.2199 -0.2131 0.3234 -0.2646 0.3784
95 -0.1421 0.2122 -0.2001 0.2816 -0.2378 0.3334
MDay 0.0994 0.0672 0.0400
KERS 0.9600 0.9788 0.9971
0.5δDay 0.2165 0.2000 0.1882
0.5δNight 0.1658 0.1548 0.1471
Note: The calibrations are always within 0.05% of the target fraction of
whites not infracting. MDay is the fraction of minorities not infracting
during daylight. 0.5δ is the fraction of African-Americans in the simulation
population daylight and darkness respectively.
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Table 3.7: Robustness Simulation Percentile Moments
for 5% White not Infracting
a = 2.05 a = 2.25 η = 1.03 η = 1.09
Percentile Minority White Minority White Minority White Minority White
20 -0.3226 0.3298 -0.1064 0.1837 -0.1956 0.3245 -0.1831 0.1224
40 -0.3263 0.3257 -0.1125 0.1457 -0.2044 0.2974 -0.1373 0.1016
60 -0.3105 0.2780 -0.0525 0.0993 -0.2131 0.2724 -0.1056 0.0777
80 -0.2917 0.2648 -0.0741 0.0661 -0.1807 0.2354 -0.0526 0.0529
90 -0.2692 0.2110 -0.0101 -0.0171 -0.1494 0.1783 -0.0219 0.0202
95 -0.2325 0.2052 -0.0080 0.0201 -0.1333 0.1579 0.0287 -0.0153
MDay 0.0870 0.1020 0.1047 0.0912
KERS 0.9755 0.9692 0.9646 0.9665
0.5δDay 0.2169 0.1866 0.1946 0.1945
0.5δNight 0.1673 0.1431 0.1490 0.1489
Note: The calibrations are always within 0.05% of the target fraction of whites not infracting.
MDay is the fraction of minorities not infracting during daylight. 0.5δ is the fraction of African-Americans
in the simulation population daylight and darkness respectively.
parameter values with the VOD test statistic always comfortably below 1, and
the speed distribution shifts for stopped motorists consistently in the right
direction except at the highest percentiles where matching the skewness of the
empirical speed distribution can be somewhat challenging.
3.4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we examine Massachusetts traffic stop data applying the impli-
cations of our theoretical model. We begin by summarizing the overall traffic
stop data and describing our construction of the analytical sample. Next,
we examine the analytical sample for evidence of discrimination using the
VOD approach. As established in our theoretical model, the coefficient esti-
mate from VOD is sufficient to identify unequal treatment, but uninformative
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about the direction of discrimination. Thus, we apply our alternative estima-
tion strategy that examines shifts in the speed distribution. Making use of the
richness of our data, we examine racial differences in the speed distributions of
stopped motorists between daylight and darkness using a quantile regression,
and we also conduct a series of tests for distributional changes across additional
motorist demographics and vehicle characteristics. Our findings provide strong
evidence that white and African-American motorists were treated differently
by Massachusetts police officers, and that African-American motorists, espe-
cially young male motorists, believed that they faced discrimination in traffic
stops.
3.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Our empirical analysis utilizes two distinct analytical samples and associated
visibility treatments, which we describe in this section. Following Grogger
and Ridgeway [2006], we focus on traffic stops made during an inter-twilight
window when solar visibility varies from seasonal changes and the Daylight
Savings Time (DST) change. Distinct from previous analyses, we focus ex-
plicitly on speeding stops so that we have a measure of infraction severity,
e.g. relative or absolute speed above the speed limit. As noted by previous
authors using the VOD approach, violations such as headlight outages or seat-
belt violations could potentially be correlated with motorist race and visibility.
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Thus, our focus on moving violations has the added advantage of insulating
the analytical sample from such confounding factors.
For our first sample, we wish to compare stops made at the same time
of day and day of week where some of those stops occurred during daylight
and some occurred in darkness. Therefore, we select only traffic stops made
between the earliest recorded sunset and latest end to civil twilight, i.e. the
so-called the inter-twilight window, for each location in the state. We select
the inter-twilight window because times outside of those ranges are either
always in daylight or always in darkness. We utilize data from the United
States Naval Observatory to identify this window and to eliminate traffic stops
that we cannot categorize as daylight or darkness, e.g. stops that occurred
during the actual civil twilight period as defined by the Naval Observatory.
Specifically, the inter-twilight window began at the earliest easternmost sunset
occurring in Orleans, MA at 4:09PM and the latest westernmost end to civil
twilight occurring in Mount Washington, MA at 9:08PM. Next, using the
date of the traffic stop and the Navel Observatory data, we eliminate periods
within the inter-twilight window that are neither exclusively dark or exclusively
daylight within the state. Specifically, we eliminate stops that occur during
civil twilight for that day in the state of Massachusetts. For example, on
the spring equinox of 2002 (March 20th) we categorize stops as daylight if
they occurred between the start of the inter-twilight period and that day’s
easternmost sunset at 5:52PM disregarding stops that occur after that time,
165
but before the westernmost end to civil twilight at 6:34PM, at which point the
darkness period of the sample begins for that day.7
The Massachusetts data contained a total of 1,048,575 spanning from April
2001 to January 2003 of which 200,576 were made for speeding. We restrict
our analytical sample to State Police, Boston, and municipal departments with
at least 100 speeding stops and with 10 percent African-American residents
according to the 2010 Census.8 These restrictions, along with limiting our
sample to only stops made of African-American and white motorists, left us
with 80,001 speeding stops and ensured that we had a sufficient number of
observations by town to include location fixed-effects in each of our estimates.
As mentioned, we focus on the 21,461 speeding stops made during the inter-
twilight window for which we can clearly identify the stop as being in either
complete darkness or daylight.
Table 3.8 presents descriptive statistics from our annual analytical sample
that relate directly to controls we include in our estimation procedure and
robustness checks. The traffic stops are concentrated more heavily during the
work week and during the early portion of the evening commute. African-
7The Massachusetts traffic stop data only contained the hour of the day that the stop
was made and had no information related to the minute. As a result, only traffic stops that
occurred during the inter-twilight window in an hour of complete daylight or darkness were
included. Although this additional restriction reduced the overall sample size, we do not
consider it a threat to the validity of the results.
8The municipal departments included in the analytical sample were Brocton, Everett,
Lynn, Milton, Randolph, Springfield, and Worcester. Separate barracks fixed-effects were
included for State Police.
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Table 3.8: Descriptive Statistics for Massachusetts Traffic Stop Data within
the Annual Inter-twilight Sample
Sample Size
All Times Intertwilight Window
All Stops Speeding Stops All Stops Speeding Stops
376,912 80,001 111,386 16,208
Speeding Stops within the Intertwilight Window
Season
Winter Spring Summer Fall
15.1% 28.8% 34.4% 21.7%
Day of the Week
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Sat & Sun
14.4% 14.8% 15.2% 14.2% 14.3% 27.2%
Time of Day
4:00 PM 5:00 PM 6:00 PM 7:00 PM 8:00 PM 8:00 PM
23.4% 23.9% 19.7% 9.9% 7.8% 15.3%
Motorist
African-American Male Age < 30
17.3% 73.6% 54.4%
Vehicle
Red Vehicle Vehicle Age < 11
16.4% 49.2%
Absolute Speed Over Limit
25th 50th Mean 75th
10mph 15mph 17mph 20mph
Relative Speed Over Limit
25th 50th Mean 75th
24% 35% 39% 50%
American motorists made up 17.6 percent of the sample while 73.9 percent of
the analytical sample was male and 54.5 percent were 30 years old or less. A
total of 16.2 percent of the motorists from the analytical sample were stopped
driving a red automobile while nearly half were in a vehicle less than 11 years
old. The demographics found in our analytical sample, i.e. speeding stops
within the inter-twilight window, are reasonably consistent with the overall
traffic stop data.
For our second sample and analysis, we further restrict our analytical sam-
ple to traffic stops occurring within 45 days of the three DST shifts in the
data. We restrict our sample to stops made during and after the evening com-
mute, at 4:00 or later and prior to 10:00 PM. This restriction is designed to
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capture the entire evening inter-twilight window, which typically falls between
5:00 and 9:00 PM during these 90 day periods around the DST shifts. For this
sample, our treatment variable is simply after the spring DST shift or before
the fall DST shift, which represents a treatment of more daylight during and
after the evening commute.9 This treatment exploits two sources of variation:
the 1 hour time delay in sunset in the spring or 1 hour earlier sunset in the fall
with the DST shift, and the relatively rapid seasonal change in sunset timing
that occurs during spring and fall - a change of almost 2 hours during the 90
day period. For example, the earliest easternmost sunset (westernmost end to
twilight) across the 90 day DST window of spring 2002 changed from 5:21PM
(6:02PM) to 8:00PM (8:47PM) including the 1 hour DST shift. As noted
above, by focusing on this period of rapid change in the timing of sunset, we
avoid confounding changes in daylight with well documented, broad seasonal
changes in travel patterns between summer and winter.10 Table 3.9 presents
the descriptive statistics from this more restrictive subsample of 7,210 traffic
stops. The volume of stops across time of day and day of the week closely
mirror those observed in the overall analytical sample. The demographic and
9Unlike in the annual sample, we include all stops in our sample regardless of whether it
is twilight or the hour of the day is completely in darkness or daylight.
10In principle, we could estimate a regression discontinuity analysis controlling for the
calendar day as a running variable and only obtaining identification using the variation
associated with the 1 hour DST shift. However, we have insufficient power to conduct such
an analysis. The coefficients on both the running variable and the DST shift variable are
both sizable and consistent with a higher likelihood of stopped motorists being African-
American in daylight, but individually both of these sources of variation lead to statistically
insignificant estimates
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Table 3.9: Descriptive Statistics for Massachusetts Traffic Stop Data within
the DST Inter-twilight Sample
Sample Size
All Times Intertwilight Window
All Stops Speeding Stops All Stops Speeding Stops
143,157 29,617 40,125 7,210
Speeding Stops within the Intertwilight Window
DST Window
Fall 2001 Spring 2002 Fall 2002
30.8% 36.6% 32.7%
Day of the Week
Monday Tuesday Wednesday Thursday Friday Sat & Sun
15.3% 15.5% 14.6% 15.0% 13.6% 26.1%
Time of Day
4:00 PM 5:00 PM 6:00 PM 7:00 PM 8:00 PM 8:00 PM
23.7% 22.3% 16.5% 11.3% 11.4% 14.8%
Motorist
African-American Male Age < 30
17.8% 74.6% 54.4%
Vehicle
Red Vehicle Vehicle Age < 11
15.8% 52.0%
Absolute Speed Over Limit
25th 50th Mean 75th
12mph 16mph 17mph 20mph
Relative Speed Over Limit
25th 50th Mean 75th
25% 36% 40% 50%
vehicular characteristics in this more restrictive subsample are also comparable
to the annual data.
3.4.2 Primary Estimates
In this section we examine the analytical sample for evidence of discrimination.
We begin by estimating the traditional VOD test using a logistic regression and
find evidence suggesting the presence of unequal treatment or discrimination.
The VOD test, i.e. the odds of a stopped motorists of demography d in
daylight v relative to darkness v, is written such that:
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(
P (d|v, t, dow, sv, b)
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2 t+β
T
3 dow+β4sv+β
T
5 b (3.33)
In Equation 3.4.2, we model the relative odds ratio as a function of v de-
noting visibility, t for time of day, dow for day of the week, sv for overall traffic
stop volume, and b for heterogeneous barracks/town effects. We estimate a
weighted regression using maximum quasi-likelihood estimation where the er-
ror term takes a logistic distribution (see McCullagh and Nelder [2000]).11
Visibility is our variable of interest and is captured by a dummy variable for
either daylight for our full sample or the period with more daylight in our re-
stricted sample i.e. before (after) the fall (spring) DST shift. Time of day and
day of week effects are captured using a series of binary variables. These fixed
effects assure that the effect of daylight is identified by comparing stops for
periods with comparable levels and composition of traffic activity. Similarly,
we include a series of barrack/town fixed-effects for each of the eight municipal
departments (including Boston) as well as for individual State Police troops.
In an effort to better capture idiosyncratic fluctuations in driving patterns,
we also include a continuous variable constructed by standardizing the overall
(out of sample) daily inter-twilight traffic stop volume across the state. Note
11We follow Grogger and Ridgeway [2006] by using reverse regression so that any mea-
surement error, in terms of motorist race, is absorbed by the error term.
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that relative to the sample described in Table 3.8 we drop 21 observations
where gender was not recorded and restrict the sample by an additional 654
stops by only including motorists between 18 and 65 years of age.12
Most stops occur in daylight, and our sample varies considerably across
towns and state police barracks in terms of the share of stops occurring in
darkness. Towns or barracks with very few stops in darkness will provide, at
best, very noisy estimates of changes in the minority share of stops between
daylight and darkness. Therefore, our estimates include weights that are cal-
culated in order to given each town a relative weight equal to the reciprocal of
the variance of the individual town/barracks specific estimate of racial differ-
ence. Specifically, we estimating Equation 3.4.2 as a logistic regression and
replace the overall visibility indicator with a full set of interactions between
visibility and the barracks/town fixed-effects. Using the standard error on the
estimates of visibility for each barrack/town σβ1,b , we calculate a weight for
each stop in each barrack/town as:
wi,b =
(
Nb(i) ∗ σ2β1,b(i)
)−1
/
(∑
j
(
Nb(j) ∗ σ2β1,b(j)
)−1)
where Nb is the number of stops i in any barracks or town. Similar to GLS,
these weights are based on the inverse of the variance placing higher weights
on locations that provide the most precise estimates of racial differences (re-
12These sample restrictions did not substantively impact the estimates
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gardless of the magnitude of the racial differences in these locations). 13
Table 3.10 presents coefficient estimates from applying our estimation equa-
tion to both the main analytical sample and to the alternative subsample where
we restrict traffic stops to those occurring within 45 days of the DST shift (the
90 day DST sample). Across the estimates, we sequentially introduce an in-
creasingly comprehensive set of control variables. The leftmost panel contains
estimates using the full annual inter-twilight sample where the majority of the
variation comes from broad seasonal changes in the length of daylight. The
coefficient estimates indicate that there is a statistically significant 0.35 to
0.48 increase in the log-odds of a stopped motorist being of minority descent
during daylight. We obtain similar estimates ranging from a 0.35 to 0.37 log-
odds increase using the more restrictive sample of stops where we only include
stops within 45 days of the three DST shifts occurring in the data. We con-
sistently reject the null hypothesis of equal treatment across all models and
samples. While our basic findings are robust across model specifications, the
very stable magnitude of the estimates for the DST window sample suggest
that there is little correlation between the treatment and motorist or automo-
bile observables, implying a balanced sample across traffic stop volume and
towns/barracks.14
13Reweighting has only modest effects on the point estimates for the visibility indicators.
14Although Smith [2016] reports evidence that motor vehicle crashes increase near the
spring DST shift, we expect sleep impairment to be concentrated during the morning com-
mute (i.e. out of our sample) and to have homogeneous effects across demographic groups.
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Table 3.10: Logistic Regression Estimates of Demography on Visibility in
Traffic Stops Made for Speeding within the Annual and DST Inter-twilight
Sample
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Annual Sample 45 Day DST Sample
Daylight
0.350*** 0.439*** 0.483*** 0.369** 0.372** 0.348*
(0.0678) (0.0722) (0.0853) (0.170) (0.168) (0.194)
Day of Week X X X X X X
Time of Day X X X X X X
Daily Volume X X
DST Window X X
Troop FE X X
Note 1: A coefficient estimate concatenated with a * represents a p-value ≤ .1, ** represents
a p-value ≤ .05, and *** represents a p-value ≤ .01 level of significance.
Note 2: Standard errors are clustered at the barracks level.
Our theoretical model has shown that, in the presence of discrimination,
the share of minority motorists stopped may increase or decrease in darkness
so that the VOD test statistic presented in the theory section may lie above
or below 1 under the alternative hypothesis of discrimination against African-
Americans. Equivalently, the regression coefficieint on visibility in this context
may take on either positive or negative values leaving us unable to identify the
direction of the discrimination.15 Therefore, we next directly examining the
speed distribution of stopped motorists using unconditional quantile regres-
15As discussed above, we verify for our data and using the information in Grogger and
Ridgeway that our test statistic yields results consistent with the reverse regression method-
ology typically used in VOD tests. We obtain a VOD test statistic greater than 1, and
positive estimates on daylight, while Grogger and Ridgeway obtain negative estimates on
daylight and the estimate of the VOD test statistic using the figures from their paper is
0.80.
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sion. In all of the proceeding estimates, we focus on absolute speed over the
speed limit but Appendix 2 contains parallel estimates using relative speed.
We estimate an unconditional quantile regression following Firpo et al.
[2009] using a software package described by Borgen (2016). Put simply, our
estimation follows a three step procedure where we (1) construct a transformed
speed variable using kernel density estimation, (2) define the re-centered in-
fluence function (RIF) variable for each quantile in the transformed speed dis-
tribution, and (3) use RIF as the outcome variable in a linear model, so-called
RIF-OLS or unconditional quantile regression ([Firpo et al., 2009]). As with
our estimates of the VOD test statistic, we apply the weight wi,b that allows
us to obtain a composite estimate for our sample providing more weight to the
subsamples of stops from towns or barracks that provide the most information
for identifying racial differences.
Our sample of observations where we observe miles per hour over the speed
limit of stopped motorists (spdi) is reduced by 902 stops because of unreported
speed limits in some of the data. 16 Using this sample, we create a kernel
density by smoothing spdi so that we can observe an estimated density from
at any discrete point in the speed distribution:
16The Boston Globe, the original data steward, eliminated information on speed traveled
when the information in the record raised concerns about data quality including speeds
greater than 200 mph and speed zones greater than 65 mph or less than 15 mph.
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f̂K (spdi) =
1(∑
j
√
wj,b
)h n∑
j=1
√
wj,bK
(
spdi − spdj
h
)
(3.34)
The bandwidth parameter h is selected using a standard optimal bandwidth
function where h = 9m
10
/n
1
5 with m = min
(√
var (spd),
interquartile rangespd
1.349
)
.
The kernel function K is robust to a variety of alternate functional forms but
is specified as Epanechnikov in our estimates. We obtain a smoothed speed
and density at each numeric τ decile of the distribution since we now have a
continuous representation of the distribution.
Next, we calculate the RIF for each decile τ in the kernel smoothed speeding
data within the inter-twilight sample as follows:
RIF
(
spdi : qτ , Fŝpd
)
= qτ +
τ − I {spdi ≤ qτ}
fspd (qτ )
(3.35)
where qτ and fspd are the estimated speed and density at decile τ based on
the kernal smoothing estimate of the speed distribution, and I is an indicator
function.
Using the decile RIF’s for each i observation, we estimate changes in the
speeding distribution by estimating linear models for the RIF at each decile
τ using the following model specification:
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RIFτ,i = βτ,0 + βτ,1di + βτ,2vi + βτ,3 (di ∗ vi) + βTτ,3ti + βTτ,4dowi+
βτ,5svi + βτ,6li + β
T
τ,7bi + ετ,i
(3.36)
where the variable di is a dichotomous indicator variable equal to unity when
the motorist was of African-American descent, and vi is a binary variable
indicating the presence of the daylight during the traffic stop. As with the VOD
estimates, our parameter of interest βτ,3 is the coefficient on the interaction of
these two variables, which captures racial heterogeneity in speed distribution
shifts. As with equation Equation 3.4.2, we include controls for ti time of
day, dowi day of week, svi daily traffic volume, and bi barracks/town fixed-
effects. In addition, we add fixed effects associated with 5 mile per hour speed
limit bins.17 Table 3.11 presents the results from applying equation 3.36
to the annual inter-twilight (panel 1) and 45 day DST sample (panel 2) of
Massachusetts traffic stops for each decile of the absolute speed distribution.18
As shown in Table 3.11, we find strong evidence in the annual inter-twilight
sample that minority motorists shift to slower speeds during daylight hours.
17Most speed limits are in multiples of 5 mph so we divide the bins at the one’s digits of
7 and 2 so that the bins are relatively evenly spaced around the multiples of 5. Speed limits
of 5 or 10 mph do not occur in Massachusetts and stops for 15 mph speed limits are placed
in a bin that is 17 mph or lower, followed by a bin that is 17 mph to 22 mph. Similarly, 60
mph is a relatively rare speed limit so it is pooled with 65 mph in a top bin that is formally
defined as 57 mph or higher
18As noted, estimates using relative speed as the dependent variable are contained in
Appendix 2.
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Table 3.11: Unconditional Quantile Regression Estimates of Absolute Speed
on Visibility and Demography within the Annual and DST Inter-twilight
Sample
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Annual Sample
African-American
-0.015 -0.015 0.407 0.384 0.384 0.817 0.284 0.511 -0.348
(0.129) (0.129) (0.809) (0.300) (0.300) (0.628) (0.552) (0.951) (0.553)
Daylight
0.021 0.021 -0.294 -0.363 -0.363 0.683 0.073 0.503 -0.437
(0.165) (0.165) (0.791) (0.446) (0.446) (1.085) (0.580) (1.178) (0.657)
Daylight x African-American
-0.164 -0.164 -4.179*** -1.716*** -1.716*** -2.291** -0.824* -0.712 0.280
(0.164) (0.164) (1.353) (0.473) (0.473) (1.062) (0.466) (0.726) (0.488)
45 Day DST Sample
African-American
0.053 0.053 -0.194 0.087 0.087 0.799 -0.009 1.011 0.424
(0.092) (0.092) (1.024) (0.350) (0.350) (0.802) (0.500) (0.813) (0.483)
DST
0.031 0.031 0.121 -0.060 -0.060 0.818 0.403 1.465 0.601
(0.112) (0.112) (0.643) (0.338) (0.338) (0.715) (0.423) (0.941) (0.364)
DST x African-American
0.137 0.137 -2.555*** -0.904*** -0.904*** -2.124 -0.567 -1.237 -0.596
(0.137) (0.137) (0.724) (0.284) (0.284) (1.372) (0.432) (1.097) (0.607)
Note 1: A coefficient estimate concatenated with a * represents a p-value ≤ .1, ** represents
a p-value ≤ .05, and *** represents a p-value ≤ .01 level of significance.
Note 2: The estimates include a daily traffic volume control, six binary indicator variables
for time of day, seven for day of week, speed limit fixed-effects, and barracks fixed-effects.
Note 3: Standard errors are clustered at the barracks level.
Although we find negative coefficient estimates on the interaction between de-
mography and visibility across the entire distribution, only those above the
30th percentile were found to be statistically significant in the annual sample.
Similarly, we find statistically significant negative shifts between the 30th and
the 50th percentiles of the speed distribution for the more restrictive 45 days
DST sample. Several of the estimates are significant at the 1 Percent level and
this pattern is unlikely to have arisen due to type 1 error. In both samples,
white motorists are not observed to adjust their behavior in response to visi-
bility. Although our theoretical model does predict that white motorists shift
towards faster speeds during daylight, we believe that this shift will be small
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and difficult to detect due to the fact that white motorists constitute nearly
82 percent of the overall population of traffic stops. Therefore, on average, po-
lice stop costs in darkness may be relatively close to police stop costs during
daylight. Estimates using the relative speed distribution align with Table 3.11
and are presented in Table A.1 of the Appendix. Figure 3.3 plots a graphical
depiction of the effect of daylight on the African-American and white speed
distributions by applying kernel density estimation to the more restrictive 90
day DST window.
Figure 3.3: Kernel Density Estimates of the Absolute Speed Distribution by
Demography within the DST Inter-twilight Sample
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Note 1: The bandwidth of the kernel density estimates has been set to half a standard
deviation.
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It seems plausible that specific subgroups of African-American motorists
may face more discrimination than others. In particular, we postulate that the
results from Table 3.11 and Figure 3.3 could be driven predominantly by dis-
crimination against young African-American males. In an effort to investigate
this hypothesis further, we apply our quantile regression model to the data but
condition on age and gender subgroups where we define young as 30 years of
age or less. Table 3.12 presents the results of this exposure analysis where we
find strong evidence confirming our hypothesis that young African-American
males are driving the results from Table 3.11. We provide estimates for rel-
ative speed in Table A.2 of the Appendix. Using both absolute and relative
speed in the annual and 45 day DST samples, we find strong evidence that the
downward shift of the speed distribution in daylight is largest and most sig-
nificant for young African-American males. We also find consistent evidence
of slower speeds for young African-American females in daylight. For older
African-American males and females, the negative shift in the distribution in
daylight only arises consistently for the annual sample that relies heavily on
seasonal variation.
Our analysis of the speed distribution of stopped motorists evidence, cou-
pled with our finding of a non-zero coefficient estimate from the VOD test, sug-
gests that Massachusetts police disproportionately stopped African-American
motorists from 2001 to 2003. Specifically, the evidence supports the conclusion
that police officers in Massachusetts treat white and African-American mo-
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Table 3.12: Unconditional Quantile Regression Estimates of Absolute Speed
on Visibility and Demography by Age and Gender Subgroup within the
Annual and DST Inter-twilight Sample
Annual Sample
Daylight x Male
Young
-0.134 -0.134 -4.293*** -2.471*** -2.096*** -1.313** -1.313** -0.288 0.423
(0.257) (0.257) (0.823) (0.418) (0.582) (0.488) (0.488) (0.787) (0.924)
Old
-0.259 -0.259 -1.316* -1.842** -1.842** -2.202 -0.605 -0.676 1.302
(0.325) (0.325) (0.654) (0.782) (0.782) (1.516) (0.775) (0.764) (0.785)
African-American Female
Young
-0.235 -0.235 -2.990* -1.152 -1.152 -1.030 -0.151 0.220 -0.654
(0.191) (0.191) (1.439) (0.911) (0.911) (2.599) (1.501) (1.635) (1.773)
Old
-0.389 -0.389 -1.070** -2.632* -1.214 -0.689 -1.511 -1.059 -0.494
(0.255) (0.255) (0.484) (1.350) (0.699) (0.795) (1.050) (1.110) (2.149)
45 Day DST Sample
DST x Male
Young
-0.077 -0.077 -2.630*** -2.048*** -1.985* -1.911** -1.911** -1.863* -2.296
(0.364) (0.364) (0.686) (0.475) (1.025) (0.887) (0.887) (1.047) (2.559)
Old
0.478 0.478 -0.497 -0.418 -0.418 -0.461 -0.110 -0.839 0.518
(0.345) (0.345) (0.863) (0.652) (0.652) (1.126) (1.070) (1.113) (1.309)
African-American Female
Young
-0.880*** -0.880*** -2.756 -0.831 -0.831 -3.167 -0.066 -0.213 -1.133
(0.252) (0.252) (2.029) (1.734) (1.734) (2.849) (2.268) (2.145) (2.652)
Old 0.957** 0.957** -0.070 1.339 0.231 0.231 0.049 1.249 -0.296
(0.333) (0.333) (0.902) (1.190) (1.105) (1.105) (0.601) (0.729) (1.460)
Note 1: A coefficient estimate concatenated with a * represents a p-value ≤ .1, ** represents
a p-value ≤ .05, and *** represents a p-value ≤ .01 level of significance.
Note 2: The estimates include a daily traffic volume control, six binary indicator variables
for time of day, seven for day of week, speed limit fixed-effects, and barracks fixed-effects.
Note 3: Standard errors are clustered at the barracks level.
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torists differently, and that African-American motorists believe that they were
racially profiled by those police officers, particularly young African-American
males.
Of course, a natural concern is that individuals may have changed their
driving behavior in darkness for reasons other than racial profiling, and mo-
torist race is only one factor on which motorist differ in how they respond to
changes in visibility. In the next section, we address this concern by examining
whether motorists differ by motorist or vehicle attributes in terms of how they
change their driving behavior in daylight.
3.4.3 Falsification Tests
The first thing to notice is that coefficient on daylight in Table 3.11 is typically
small and statistically insignificant, and the only sizable coefficient estimates
(sixth decile in the annual sample and the sixth to tenth decile in the 90 day
DST sample) are positive. Therefore, we find no evidence that white motorists
drive slower in daylight (due to glare or heavier traffic volume for example) as
is observed for African-American motorists. Next, we utilize the subsample of
white motorists to examine whether we observe differential shifts in the speed-
ing distribution across other motorist demographic or vehicle characteristics.
As above, we estimate quantile regression models of absolute and relative speed
using both the annual and 90 day DST samples and relative speed estimates
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Table 3.13: Unconditional Quantile Regression Estimates of Absolute Speed
on Visibility and Vehicle Age for White Motorists within the Annual and
DST Inter-twilight Sample
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Annual Sample
Vehicle Age < 11
-0.072 -0.072 -0.068 -0.035 -0.036 -0.135 -0.270* 0.149 0.292
(0.082) (0.082) (0.397) (0.165) (0.145) (0.217) (0.143) (0.561) (0.401)
Daylight
-0.061 -0.061 -0.508 -0.478 0.435 0.362 0.107 0.613 1.013
(0.195) (0.195) (1.131) (0.615) (0.830) (0.733) (0.652) (1.250) (0.778)
Daylight x Vehicle Age < 11
0.035 0.035 -0.175 -0.086 -0.214 -0.368 -0.190 -0.899 -0.902*
(0.063) (0.063) (0.422) (0.206) (0.227) (0.240) (0.252) (0.656) (0.502)
45 Day DST Sample
Vehicle Age < 11
-0.053 -0.053 -0.328** -0.277* 0.177 -0.174 -0.114 0.326 -0.141
(0.068) (0.068) (0.134) (0.154) (0.247) (0.248) (0.231) (0.372) (0.477)
DST
0.060 0.060 -0.105 -0.111 0.502 0.620 0.520 2.035** 1.731***
(0.115) (0.115) (0.422) (0.413) (0.452) (0.497) (0.405) (0.780) (0.264)
DST x Vehicle Age < 11
-0.028 -0.028 0.160 0.018 -0.654* -0.371 -0.317 -1.842** -0.718
(0.160) (0.160) (0.299) (0.351) (0.372) (0.364) (0.397) (0.661) (0.660)
Note 1: A coefficient estimate concatenated with a * represents a p-value ≤ .1, ** represents
a p-value ≤ .05, and *** represents a p-value ≤ .01 level of significance.
Note 2: The estimates include a daily traffic volume control, six binary indicator variables
for time of day, seven for day of week, speed limit fixed-effects, and barracks fixed-effects.
Note 3: Standard errors are clustered at the barracks level.
are presented in Tables A.1 through A.6 of the Appendix. We examine the
speed distribution for old and new vehicles in Table 3.13 and corresponding
Table A.3 of the Appendix. We define new vehicles as those aged 10 years
or less but our estimates are robust to alternative delineations. There is little
evidence suggesting that the speed distribution differentially shifts in response
to visibility across these particular vehicle characteristics. Out of 18 interac-
tion coefficients only 1 is significant at the 5 percent level and 2 are significant
at the 10 percent level.
Next, we examine the speed distribution for white motorists conditional on
vehicle color. Specifically, Table 3.14 disaggregates white motorists reported
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Table 3.14: Unconditional Quantile Regression Estimates of Absolute Speed
on Visibility and Vehicle Color for White Motorists within the Annual and
DST Inter-twilight Sample
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Annual Sample
Red Auto.
-0.153 -0.153 -0.053 -0.141 -0.141 0.133 0.212 -0.048 -0.400
(0.149) (0.149) (0.654) (0.318) (0.318) (0.453) (0.341) (0.996) (0.750)
Daylight
-0.044 -0.044 -0.547 -0.519 -0.519 0.269 0.181 0.178 0.039
(0.190) (0.190) (0.962) (0.537) (0.537) (0.728) (0.675) (1.149) (0.604)
Daylight x Red Auto.
0.271 0.271 0.395 0.279 0.279 -0.009 0.233 0.434 1.064
(0.223) (0.223) (1.225) (0.501) (0.501) (0.414) (0.389) (1.130) (0.888)
45 Day DST Sample
Red Auto.
-0.086 -0.086 0.691 0.617 0.846 0.908 0.927 0.347 -0.125
(0.140) (0.140) (0.851) (0.721) (0.731) (0.858) (0.849) (1.299) (0.902)
DST
0.066 0.066 0.071 0.016 0.111 0.504 0.420 0.727 0.723**
(0.199) (0.199) (0.497) (0.468) (0.548) (0.513) (0.495) (0.737) (0.323)
DST x Red Auto.
0.055 0.055 -0.834 -0.801 -1.152 -1.413 -1.437 -1.501 -0.222
(0.122) (0.122) (0.887) (0.824) (0.805) (0.984) (0.980) (1.118) (0.983)
Note 1: A coefficient estimate concatenated with a * represents a p-value ≤ .1, ** represents
a p-value ≤ .05, and *** represents a p-value ≤ .01 level of significance.
Note 2: The estimates include a daily traffic volume control, six binary indicator variables
for time of day, seven for day of week, speed limit fixed-effects, and barracks fixed-effects.
Note 3: Standard errors are clustered at the barracks level.
as driving a red vehicle from those in all other color automobiles. Testing the
classic notion that police target red vehicles when making traffic stops, we
do not find any observable preference for stopping these automobiles. None
of the estimates are statistically significant. The estimates using the relative
speed distribution align with those below and are shown in Table A.4 of the
Appendix.
In Table 3.15 and corresponding Table A.5 of the Appendix, we present
the speed distribution for traffic stops made of white motorists by age. In
particular, we examine the impact of visibility on the speed distribution for
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motorists 30 years of age or less versus older motorists. As above, there is very
little evidence in support of a shift in the speed distribution of white motorists
by age; only one rejection at the 10 percent level out of 18 tests.
Table 3.15: Unconditional Quantile Regression Estimates of Absolute Speed
on Visibility and Age for White Motorists within the Annual and DST
Inter-twilight Sample
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Annual Sample
Age < 31
0.183** 0.183** 1.388*** 0.615*** 1.063*** 1.140*** 1.274*** 2.277*** 1.684***
(0.082) (0.082) (0.385) (0.185) (0.218) (0.205) (0.236) (0.238) (0.154)
Daylight
-0.081 -0.081 -0.866 -0.675 0.158 -0.001 -0.129 -0.451 0.317
(0.227) (0.227) (1.029) (0.556) (0.851) (0.666) (0.543) (0.932) (0.451)
Daylight x Age < 31
0.062 0.062 0.398 0.239 0.236 0.252 0.188 0.932 0.293
(0.110) (0.110) (0.450) (0.226) (0.270) (0.276) (0.304) (0.598) (0.405)
45 Day DST Sample
Age < 31
0.203 0.203 0.524*** 0.477*** 0.647** 0.852*** 0.871*** 1.354** 2.030***
(0.167) (0.167) (0.145) (0.120) (0.303) (0.276) (0.232) (0.634) (0.504)
DST
-0.097 -0.097 -0.295 -0.276 -0.211 0.031 -0.052 0.390 0.396
(0.123) (0.123) (0.422) (0.369) (0.413) (0.277) (0.252) (0.328) (0.606)
DST x Age < 31
0.260 0.260 0.507* 0.327 0.666* 0.724 0.737 1.236 1.731
(0.227) (0.227) (0.282) (0.258) (0.379) (0.561) (0.456) (1.384) (1.454)
Note 1: A coefficient estimate concatenated with a * represents a p-value ≤ .1, ** represents
a p-value ≤ .05, and *** represents a p-value ≤ .01 level of significance.
Note 2: The estimates include a daily traffic volume control, six binary indicator variables
for time of day, seven for day of week, speed limit fixed-effects, and barracks fixed-effects.
Note 3: Standard errors are clustered at the barracks level.
In Table 3.16 and corresponding Table A.6 of the Appendix, we present
the speed distribution for traffic stops made of white motorists by gender.
Specifically, we examine the effect of visibility on the speed distribution for
both male and female motorists. For the gender subsample estimates, we do
observe a substantially larger number of rejections of the null hypothesis of
no differences across the deciles, but we do not observe any consistent pattern
with season variation associated with males driving slower during daylight and
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Table 3.16: Unconditional Quantile Regression Estimates of Absolute Speed
on Visibility and Gender for White Motorists within the Annual and DST
Inter-twilight Sample
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Annual Sample
Male
-0.075 -0.075 1.010** 0.362 0.485** 1.252*** 1.216*** 3.273*** 1.885***
(0.057) (0.057) (0.434) (0.243) (0.170) (0.212) (0.238) (0.572) (0.314)
Daylight
-0.116 -0.116 -0.027 -0.394 0.456 0.695 0.544 1.512 1.233*
(0.123) (0.123) (1.275) (0.723) (0.900) (0.562) (0.495) (1.027) (0.687)
Daylight x Male
0.102 0.102 -0.741 -0.159 -0.157 -0.659* -0.672* -1.750*** -0.880**
(0.107) (0.107) (0.448) (0.229) (0.189) (0.309) (0.324) (0.550) (0.409)
45 Day DST Sample
Male
0.016 0.016 0.103 -0.023 -0.040 0.445 0.470* 1.293* 1.856*
(0.076) (0.076) (0.184) (0.227) (0.208) (0.354) (0.256) (0.672) (0.898)
DST
0.126 0.126 -0.101 -0.166 -0.249 -0.036 -0.104 0.224 0.824
(0.132) (0.132) (0.479) (0.461) (0.472) (0.500) (0.452) (1.008) (0.951)
DST x Male
-0.103 -0.103 0.119 0.100 0.550** 0.627* 0.617** 1.133 0.706
(0.197) (0.197) (0.438) (0.397) (0.247) (0.305) (0.258) (0.776) (1.244)
Note 1: A coefficient estimate concatenated with a * represents a p-value ≤ .1, ** represents
a p-value ≤ .05, and *** represents a p-value ≤ .01 level of significance.
Note 2: The estimates include a daily traffic volume control, six binary indicator variables
for time of day, seven for day of week, speed limit fixed-effects, and barracks fixed-effects.
Note 3: Standard errors are clustered at the barracks level.
the variation during the DST window consistent with males driving faster in
daylight. As discussed in detail in the exposure analysis from Section 4.2,
we found strong evidence that age and to some extent gender have a strong
impact on the speed distribution of African-American motorists. In examining
the speed distribution of white motorists, however, we are unable to detect any
consistent effect across these same demographic dimensions.
In contrasting the subgroup analysis conducted in Section 4.2 with the
falsification tests conducted in this section, it seems clear that white motorist
driving speed is relatively unaffected by visibility, suggesting that differences in
responses to daylight is a phenomenon concentrated primarily among African-
185
American motorists. In both the annual and 90 day DST samples, we found
very little evidence that observable attributes had any impact on the distribu-
tion of speed. As noted throughout the text, these estimates were consistent
using both absolute and relative speed above the requisite speed limit. These
results provide strong empirical evidence that our test is able to identify the
direction of discrimination.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper, we develop a model of police and motorist behavior concerning
speeding and speeding stops. Using this model, we examine the behavior of
minority motorists in darkness when race cannot be observed under the al-
ternative hypothesis of discrimination against minority motorists for speeding
stops in daylight. Not surprisingly, our model predicts that the speed distribu-
tion of minority motorists is shifted to faster speeds during darkness relative to
daylight. Using our model, we consider the recently developed “Veil of Dark-
ness” test for racial profiling, which uses racial differences in stops in darkness
as a benchmark to assess whether discrimination exists in police stops made
in daylight. Our model implies that the VOD test for differential treatment of
white and minority motorists is still consistent under the null hypothesis, but
when the null of equal treatment is rejected, the value of the test statistic is not
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informative as to whether a given group is being favored or disfavored in police
stop decisions. However, our model suggests that a shift in the distribution of
the driving speeds of stopped motorists can be used to identify the direction
of treatment, at least from the perspective of the motorists themselves.
We apply the VOD test to data from Massachusetts and consistently reject
the null of equal treatment using a variety of models. We then examine the
speed distribution and again find statistically significant evidence of slower
speeds in daylight by minority motorists. These findings are consistent with
racial discrimination in speeding stops against minority motorists. Further, we
assess daylight/darkness differences in the speed distribution along a number
of other dimensions including age and gender, and we do not find consistent
evidence of a shift in the speed distribution for any subgroups other than
minority motorists.
These findings call into question reliance on solely VOD tests for identifying
racial differences in the rate of police stops. Such tests, which have become
ubiquitous in recent years, can only identify differential treatment. Unless we
are willing to rely on information revealed by motorist behavior, as done in
this paper, it is impossible to identify whether police are discriminating against
minority motorists with tests of this type. As such, our results points to the
need for the development of additional methods for calculating counterfactuals
for the purpose of assessing the racial distribution of police stops, especially
methods that are not sensitive to the behavioral adjustments of motorists.
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3.6 Empirical Appendix
188
T
ab
le
A
.1
:
U
n
co
n
d
it
io
n
al
Q
u
an
ti
le
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
E
st
im
at
es
of
R
el
at
iv
e
S
p
ee
d
on
V
is
ib
il
it
y
an
d
D
em
og
ra
p
h
y
w
it
h
in
th
e
A
n
n
u
al
an
d
D
S
T
In
te
r-
tw
il
ig
h
t
S
am
p
le
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
A
n
n
u
al
S
am
p
le
A
fr
ic
an
-A
m
er
ic
an
0.
45
0
0.
49
3
0.
66
8
1.
43
1*
*
1.
05
9*
*
1.
48
0*
1.
92
8
4.
42
0*
*
7.
28
8*
*
(0
.7
19
)
(0
.5
69
)
(0
.5
27
)
(0
.5
24
)
(0
.4
57
)
(0
.7
95
)
(1
.2
19
)
(1
.5
21
)
(2
.7
29
)
D
ay
li
gh
t
0.
49
0
0.
88
8
1.
45
8
1.
11
9
-0
.5
16
-0
.5
16
-0
.8
88
-2
.4
28
-2
.1
64
(1
.0
04
)
(0
.8
67
)
(1
.0
59
)
(0
.8
51
)
(1
.0
55
)
(1
.3
70
)
(1
.6
61
)
(3
.1
27
)
(3
.9
46
)
D
ay
li
gh
t
x
A
fr
ic
an
-A
m
er
ic
an
-0
.0
56
-0
.3
12
-0
.2
15
-1
.5
70
*
-4
.3
24
**
-6
.4
61
**
-8
.1
32
**
-1
1.
17
0*
**
-1
4.
26
2*
**
(0
.8
10
)
(0
.6
65
)
(0
.8
93
)
(0
.7
52
)
(1
.7
80
)
(2
.2
40
)
(2
.8
22
)
(3
.1
94
)
(4
.6
51
)
45
D
ay
D
S
T
S
am
p
le
A
fr
ic
an
-A
m
er
ic
an
0.
97
0
0.
78
1
2.
17
7*
2.
25
8*
*
1.
45
1
0.
03
5
0.
47
4
4.
20
6*
*
2.
08
1
(0
.7
21
)
(0
.7
48
)
(1
.1
67
)
(0
.9
85
)
(1
.0
58
)
(0
.9
70
)
(1
.3
41
)
(1
.8
32
)
(1
.4
63
)
D
S
T
0.
89
0
0.
78
1
1.
46
0
1.
10
5*
0.
87
8
-0
.2
57
-0
.4
15
-0
.8
51
1.
07
6
(0
.9
57
)
(0
.6
69
)
(0
.9
36
)
(0
.5
67
)
(0
.5
72
)
(0
.5
43
)
(0
.8
44
)
(1
.1
23
)
(1
.4
03
)
D
S
T
x
A
fr
ic
an
-A
m
er
ic
an
0.
36
3
0.
81
1
0.
43
4
0.
23
5
-1
.9
48
-3
.2
91
**
-3
.3
95
*
-6
.5
11
*
-7
.6
41
**
*
(1
.0
11
)
(0
.7
59
)
(1
.4
21
)
(0
.9
41
)
(1
.8
16
)
(1
.3
84
)
(1
.7
33
)
(3
.5
35
)
(1
.9
02
)
N
ot
e
1:
A
co
effi
ci
en
t
es
ti
m
at
e
co
n
ca
te
n
at
ed
w
it
h
a
*
re
p
re
se
n
ts
a
p
-v
a
lu
e
≤
.1
,
*
*
re
p
re
se
n
ts
a
p
-v
a
lu
e
≤
.0
5
,
a
n
d
*
*
*
re
p
re
se
n
ts
a
p
-v
al
u
e
≤
.0
1
le
v
el
o
f
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
.
N
ot
e
2:
T
h
e
es
ti
m
at
es
in
cl
u
d
e
a
d
ai
ly
tr
affi
c
vo
lu
m
e
co
n
tr
o
l,
si
x
b
in
a
ry
in
d
ic
a
to
r
va
ri
a
b
le
s
fo
r
ti
m
e
o
f
d
ay
,
se
ve
n
fo
r
d
ay
of
w
ee
k
,
sp
ee
d
li
m
it
fi
x
ed
-e
ff
ec
ts
,
an
d
b
ar
ra
ck
s
fi
x
ed
-e
ff
ec
ts
.
N
ot
e
3:
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
cl
u
st
er
ed
at
th
e
b
ar
ra
ck
s
le
ve
l.
189
T
ab
le
A
.2
:
U
n
co
n
d
it
io
n
al
Q
u
an
ti
le
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
E
st
im
at
es
of
R
el
at
iv
e
S
p
ee
d
on
V
is
ib
il
it
y
an
d
D
em
og
ra
p
h
y
b
y
A
ge
an
d
G
en
d
er
S
u
b
gr
ou
p
w
it
h
in
th
e
A
n
n
u
al
an
d
D
S
T
In
te
r-
tw
il
ig
h
t
S
am
p
le
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
A
n
n
u
al
S
am
p
le
D
ay
li
gh
t
x
M
al
e
Y
ou
n
g
0.
04
2
-0
.6
75
-0
.5
07
-0
.7
63
-4
.4
93
**
-6
.9
42
**
-1
1.
12
9*
**
-1
2.
16
7*
**
-1
5.
33
1*
**
(1
.0
34
)
(1
.2
02
)
(1
.1
16
)
(1
.2
27
)
(2
.0
66
)
(2
.3
56
)
(2
.6
88
)
(2
.7
99
)
(2
.7
17
)
O
ld
-0
.3
06
0.
32
2
-0
.1
46
-1
.9
51
**
-1
.9
06
**
*
-5
.4
51
*
-8
.1
14
*
-1
2.
84
8*
*
-1
8.
50
8*
*
(0
.9
32
)
(0
.5
79
)
(0
.7
19
)
(0
.8
27
)
(0
.4
71
)
(2
.6
06
)
(3
.9
87
)
(5
.1
42
)
(6
.4
99
)
A
fr
ic
an
-A
m
er
ic
an
F
em
al
e
Y
ou
n
g
-0
.9
06
-0
.6
00
0.
89
3
-1
.8
62
-5
.8
76
*
-6
.9
93
**
*
-5
.5
08
-4
.7
07
-5
.9
00
(1
.6
84
)
(1
.5
27
)
(1
.3
58
)
(1
.2
23
)
(2
.9
60
)
(2
.0
17
)
(3
.6
54
)
(4
.3
44
)
(1
1.
36
0)
O
ld
-1
.4
17
-1
.7
13
-1
.4
31
-1
.0
91
-1
.7
08
-3
.6
46
*
-5
.7
61
*
-5
.8
09
*
-1
3.
19
2*
*
(1
.2
77
)
(1
.1
54
)
(1
.3
24
)
(1
.1
28
)
(1
.2
35
)
(1
.7
15
)
(3
.0
02
)
(2
.8
46
)
(5
.4
06
)
45
D
ay
D
S
T
S
am
p
le
D
S
T
x
M
al
e
Y
ou
n
g
-0
.5
88
-0
.4
62
-2
.6
31
**
-0
.9
73
-5
.6
35
*
-6
.3
35
**
*
-8
.9
47
**
*
-1
3.
63
6*
*
-1
2.
69
7*
**
(0
.9
47
)
(1
.1
57
)
(1
.1
31
)
(1
.3
59
)
(3
.0
97
)
(1
.8
27
)
(2
.5
70
)
(4
.6
85
)
(4
.1
40
)
O
ld
2.
95
0
2.
37
4
2.
85
0
1.
72
3
0.
29
3
-0
.8
38
-2
.1
65
-5
.7
69
-7
.2
11
**
*
(2
.2
89
)
(1
.8
61
)
(2
.0
18
)
(1
.8
82
)
(2
.2
96
)
(1
.7
36
)
(2
.7
61
)
(4
.2
06
)
(2
.3
55
)
A
fr
ic
an
-A
m
er
ic
an
F
em
al
e
Y
ou
n
g
-4
.0
61
*
-1
.7
86
*
-2
.4
09
-4
.2
26
**
-5
.3
10
-5
.8
64
-1
.1
63
-0
.2
13
-4
.0
39
(1
.7
66
)
(0
.8
63
)
(1
.8
95
)
(1
.8
20
)
(3
.8
25
)
(4
.2
79
)
(9
.3
58
)
(1
3.
95
4)
(1
6.
38
6)
O
ld
-0
.9
23
3.
98
4*
*
4.
60
9*
3.
10
8
4.
60
9*
*
3.
88
1
7.
69
8*
*
6.
48
2*
*
2.
40
7
(2
.6
69
)
(1
.6
68
)
(2
.0
16
)
(2
.3
44
)
(1
.8
07
)
(2
.4
96
)
(2
.9
19
)
(2
.2
15
)
(4
.4
94
)
N
ot
e
1:
A
co
effi
ci
en
t
es
ti
m
at
e
co
n
ca
te
n
at
ed
w
it
h
a
*
re
p
re
se
n
ts
a
p
-v
a
lu
e
≤
.1
,
*
*
re
p
re
se
n
ts
a
p
-v
a
lu
e
≤
.0
5
,
a
n
d
*
*
*
re
p
re
se
n
ts
a
p
-v
al
u
e
≤
.0
1
le
v
el
o
f
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
.
N
ot
e
2:
T
h
e
es
ti
m
at
es
in
cl
u
d
e
a
d
ai
ly
tr
affi
c
vo
lu
m
e
co
n
tr
o
l,
si
x
b
in
a
ry
in
d
ic
a
to
r
va
ri
a
b
le
s
fo
r
ti
m
e
o
f
d
ay
,
se
ve
n
fo
r
d
ay
of
w
ee
k
,
sp
ee
d
li
m
it
fi
x
ed
-e
ff
ec
ts
,
an
d
b
ar
ra
ck
s
fi
x
ed
-e
ff
ec
ts
.
N
ot
e
3:
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
cl
u
st
er
ed
at
th
e
b
ar
ra
ck
s
le
ve
l.
190
T
ab
le
A
.3
:
U
n
co
n
d
it
io
n
al
Q
u
an
ti
le
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
E
st
im
at
es
of
R
el
at
iv
e
S
p
ee
d
on
V
is
ib
il
it
y
an
d
V
eh
ic
le
A
ge
fo
r
W
h
it
e
M
ot
or
is
ts
w
it
h
in
th
e
A
n
n
u
al
an
d
D
S
T
In
te
r-
tw
il
ig
h
t
S
am
p
le
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
A
n
n
u
al
S
am
p
le
V
eh
ic
le
A
ge
<
11
0.
02
4
0.
14
6
0.
41
2
-0
.2
84
0.
08
5
0.
22
9
1.
51
9*
0.
79
1
1.
46
6
(0
.2
93
)
(0
.6
65
)
(0
.5
70
)
(0
.4
89
)
(0
.5
65
)
(0
.7
35
)
(0
.7
33
)
(0
.8
95
)
(1
.1
85
)
D
ay
li
gh
t
0.
14
4
0.
72
8
1.
48
9
1.
29
3
0.
22
5
-0
.7
16
-0
.6
79
-2
.1
86
-1
.8
52
(0
.6
01
)
(1
.2
14
)
(1
.1
48
)
(0
.9
99
)
(1
.0
56
)
(1
.6
97
)
(2
.1
62
)
(3
.6
55
)
(5
.3
29
)
D
ay
li
gh
t
x
V
eh
ic
le
A
ge
<
11
-0
.2
21
0.
22
3
0.
48
4
0.
75
8
0.
49
5
-0
.0
98
-1
.0
63
-0
.2
51
-0
.3
91
(0
.2
82
)
(0
.8
70
)
(0
.5
58
)
(0
.4
86
)
(0
.3
46
)
(0
.5
62
)
(0
.8
10
)
(0
.9
72
)
(1
.5
57
)
45
D
ay
D
S
T
S
am
p
le
V
eh
ic
le
A
ge
<
11
0.
01
5
0.
07
7
0.
58
7
0.
15
9
0.
33
0
1.
32
3*
1.
84
5*
*
2.
52
4*
*
1.
23
1
(0
.4
67
)
(0
.4
74
)
(0
.6
43
)
(0
.5
22
)
(0
.6
82
)
(0
.7
35
)
(0
.7
98
)
(1
.1
11
)
(1
.7
07
)
D
S
T
0.
62
8
0.
63
2
0.
83
5
1.
43
6
1.
06
2
0.
91
2
-0
.1
76
0.
69
8
2.
20
1
(1
.0
56
)
(0
.6
95
)
(0
.7
64
)
(0
.9
20
)
(0
.8
17
)
(0
.5
47
)
(1
.0
52
)
(1
.1
23
)
(1
.8
76
)
D
S
T
x
V
eh
ic
le
A
ge
<
11
0.
07
3
0.
11
6
-0
.0
80
-0
.2
17
0.
24
2
-1
.2
38
-1
.8
97
-4
.2
62
*
-2
.9
34
(0
.5
78
)
(0
.5
24
)
(0
.6
63
)
(0
.8
46
)
(1
.0
57
)
(1
.0
18
)
(1
.2
28
)
(2
.0
48
)
(2
.9
23
)
N
ot
e
1:
A
co
effi
ci
en
t
es
ti
m
at
e
co
n
ca
te
n
at
ed
w
it
h
a
*
re
p
re
se
n
ts
a
p
-v
a
lu
e
≤
.1
,
*
*
re
p
re
se
n
ts
a
p
-v
a
lu
e
≤
.0
5
,
a
n
d
*
*
*
re
p
re
se
n
ts
a
p
-v
al
u
e
≤
.0
1
le
v
el
o
f
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
.
N
ot
e
2:
T
h
e
es
ti
m
at
es
in
cl
u
d
e
a
d
ai
ly
tr
affi
c
vo
lu
m
e
co
n
tr
o
l,
si
x
b
in
a
ry
in
d
ic
a
to
r
va
ri
a
b
le
s
fo
r
ti
m
e
o
f
d
ay
,
se
ve
n
fo
r
d
ay
of
w
ee
k
,
sp
ee
d
li
m
it
fi
x
ed
-e
ff
ec
ts
,
an
d
b
ar
ra
ck
s
fi
x
ed
-e
ff
ec
ts
.
N
ot
e
3:
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
cl
u
st
er
ed
at
th
e
b
ar
ra
ck
s
le
ve
l.
191
T
ab
le
A
.4
:
U
n
co
n
d
it
io
n
al
Q
u
an
ti
le
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
E
st
im
at
es
of
R
el
at
iv
e
S
p
ee
d
on
V
is
ib
il
it
y
an
d
V
eh
ic
le
C
ol
or
fo
r
W
h
it
e
M
ot
or
is
ts
w
it
h
in
th
e
A
n
n
u
al
an
d
D
S
T
In
te
r-
tw
il
ig
h
t
S
am
p
le
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
A
n
n
u
al
S
am
p
le
R
ed
A
u
to
.
-0
.6
00
-0
.2
25
-0
.2
52
0.
03
5
0.
09
6
0.
09
4
-0
.1
91
-0
.8
88
2.
17
3
(0
.9
30
)
(1
.0
49
)
(0
.8
33
)
(0
.6
90
)
(0
.9
63
)
(1
.1
90
)
(1
.1
67
)
(1
.7
49
)
(2
.2
77
)
D
ay
li
gh
t
0.
49
5
0.
77
5
1.
87
0*
2.
64
9*
*
-0
.2
02
-0
.9
40
-1
.6
62
-3
.1
88
-1
.9
19
(0
.9
13
)
(0
.8
25
)
(1
.0
40
)
(1
.1
45
)
(1
.7
51
)
(1
.8
49
)
(2
.3
43
)
(4
.0
77
)
(5
.4
17
)
D
ay
li
gh
t
x
R
ed
A
u
to
.
0.
49
6
0.
15
7
-0
.3
78
-0
.0
76
-0
.1
16
0.
76
2
2.
27
7
3.
55
1*
*
1.
10
3
(1
.7
70
)
(1
.6
80
)
(1
.2
61
)
(1
.2
93
)
(1
.4
08
)
(1
.3
09
)
(1
.5
11
)
(1
.4
62
)
(2
.3
49
)
45
D
ay
D
S
T
S
am
p
le
R
ed
A
u
to
.
-0
.6
31
0.
09
6
0.
93
6
1.
36
4
-0
.1
72
0.
11
9
0.
07
3
1.
63
5
3.
60
5
(1
.2
72
)
(1
.6
78
)
(1
.7
74
)
(2
.2
73
)
(1
.8
07
)
(1
.6
46
)
(2
.1
15
)
(3
.3
60
)
(6
.4
33
)
D
S
T
0.
62
4
0.
76
9
0.
88
5
1.
45
7
0.
75
9
0.
05
0
-1
.6
39
*
-2
.2
40
1.
04
5
(1
.1
63
)
(0
.6
46
)
(0
.7
78
)
(0
.9
10
)
(0
.5
97
)
(0
.7
25
)
(0
.9
31
)
(1
.9
31
)
(1
.9
58
)
D
S
T
x
R
ed
A
u
to
.
1.
77
5
-0
.0
34
0.
11
7
0.
20
7
1.
81
6
-0
.1
26
0.
79
1
-2
.9
05
-5
.8
99
(1
.5
60
)
(2
.2
08
)
(2
.0
04
)
(2
.6
23
)
(1
.8
15
)
(1
.3
50
)
(2
.1
12
)
(2
.0
31
)
(6
.6
74
)
N
ot
e
1:
A
co
effi
ci
en
t
es
ti
m
at
e
co
n
ca
te
n
at
ed
w
it
h
a
*
re
p
re
se
n
ts
a
p
-v
a
lu
e
≤
.1
,
*
*
re
p
re
se
n
ts
a
p
-v
a
lu
e
≤
.0
5
,
a
n
d
*
*
*
re
p
re
se
n
ts
a
p
-v
al
u
e
≤
.0
1
le
v
el
o
f
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
.
N
ot
e
2:
T
h
e
es
ti
m
at
es
in
cl
u
d
e
a
d
ai
ly
tr
affi
c
vo
lu
m
e
co
n
tr
o
l,
si
x
b
in
a
ry
in
d
ic
a
to
r
va
ri
a
b
le
s
fo
r
ti
m
e
o
f
d
ay
,
se
ve
n
fo
r
d
ay
of
w
ee
k
,
sp
ee
d
li
m
it
fi
x
ed
-e
ff
ec
ts
,
an
d
b
ar
ra
ck
s
fi
x
ed
-e
ff
ec
ts
.
N
ot
e
3:
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
cl
u
st
er
ed
at
th
e
b
ar
ra
ck
s
le
ve
l.
192
T
ab
le
A
.5
:
U
n
co
n
d
it
io
n
al
Q
u
an
ti
le
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
E
st
im
at
es
of
R
el
at
iv
e
S
p
ee
d
on
V
is
ib
il
it
y
an
d
A
ge
fo
r
W
h
it
e
M
ot
or
is
ts
w
it
h
in
th
e
A
n
n
u
al
an
d
D
S
T
In
te
r-
tw
il
ig
h
t
S
am
p
le
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
A
n
n
u
al
S
am
p
le
A
ge
<
31
0.
44
5*
1.
65
3*
**
1.
46
1*
**
1.
98
7*
**
1.
99
3*
**
2.
52
1*
**
1.
64
9*
3.
45
3*
**
3.
44
1*
**
(0
.2
34
)
(0
.3
74
)
(0
.3
95
)
(0
.4
24
)
(0
.4
55
)
(0
.4
56
)
(0
.9
35
)
(1
.0
96
)
(1
.1
28
)
D
ay
li
gh
t
-0
.0
37
0.
99
2
1.
48
9
1.
47
3
0.
46
8
-1
.1
37
-2
.2
82
-2
.5
92
-2
.1
19
(0
.6
11
)
(0
.7
98
)
(1
.0
42
)
(0
.9
08
)
(1
.0
27
)
(1
.6
49
)
(2
.2
94
)
(3
.7
11
)
(5
.7
41
)
D
ay
li
gh
t
x
A
ge
<
31
0.
09
2
-0
.4
01
0.
30
4
0.
25
4
-0
.1
33
0.
47
7
1.
68
0
0.
19
5
-0
.2
41
(0
.3
34
)
(0
.4
84
)
(0
.4
56
)
(0
.6
73
)
(0
.5
99
)
(0
.5
91
)
(1
.1
28
)
(1
.0
56
)
(1
.7
62
)
45
D
ay
D
S
T
S
am
p
le
A
ge
<
31
0.
94
4*
1.
00
4*
*
0.
80
4*
1.
60
2*
*
0.
80
7
0.
81
3
1.
24
0
3.
00
0*
2.
89
7*
(0
.4
74
)
(0
.3
51
)
(0
.3
91
)
(0
.5
83
)
(1
.0
76
)
(1
.4
61
)
(1
.2
85
)
(1
.4
63
)
(1
.4
51
)
D
S
T
-0
.0
19
0.
08
4
-0
.2
46
0.
13
4
-0
.0
60
-0
.7
77
-1
.8
28
-1
.8
41
1.
46
5
(0
.9
85
)
(0
.5
55
)
(0
.7
63
)
(0
.5
82
)
(1
.0
63
)
(1
.2
76
)
(1
.3
93
)
(1
.9
79
)
(2
.0
56
)
D
S
T
x
A
ge
<
31
1.
21
5
1.
06
9
1.
82
1*
*
2.
11
1*
2.
21
2
1.
80
4
1.
07
9
0.
41
7
-1
.5
35
(0
.8
01
)
(0
.6
76
)
(0
.8
01
)
(1
.1
43
)
(1
.8
49
)
(1
.9
80
)
(1
.9
24
)
(2
.6
11
)
(2
.2
52
)
N
ot
e
1:
A
co
effi
ci
en
t
es
ti
m
at
e
co
n
ca
te
n
at
ed
w
it
h
a
*
re
p
re
se
n
ts
a
p
-v
a
lu
e
≤
.1
,
*
*
re
p
re
se
n
ts
a
p
-v
a
lu
e
≤
.0
5
,
a
n
d
*
*
*
re
p
re
se
n
ts
a
p
-v
al
u
e
≤
.0
1
le
v
el
o
f
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
.
N
ot
e
2:
T
h
e
es
ti
m
at
es
in
cl
u
d
e
a
d
ai
ly
tr
affi
c
vo
lu
m
e
co
n
tr
o
l,
si
x
b
in
a
ry
in
d
ic
a
to
r
va
ri
a
b
le
s
fo
r
ti
m
e
o
f
d
ay
,
se
ve
n
fo
r
d
ay
of
w
ee
k
,
sp
ee
d
li
m
it
fi
x
ed
-e
ff
ec
ts
,
an
d
b
ar
ra
ck
s
fi
x
ed
-e
ff
ec
ts
.
N
ot
e
3:
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
cl
u
st
er
ed
at
th
e
b
ar
ra
ck
s
le
ve
l.
193
T
ab
le
A
.6
:
U
n
co
n
d
it
io
n
al
Q
u
an
ti
le
R
eg
re
ss
io
n
E
st
im
at
es
of
R
el
at
iv
e
S
p
ee
d
on
V
is
ib
il
it
y
an
d
G
en
d
er
fo
r
W
h
it
e
M
ot
or
is
ts
w
it
h
in
th
e
A
n
n
u
al
an
d
D
S
T
In
te
r-
tw
il
ig
h
t
S
am
p
le
0.
1
0.
2
0.
3
0.
4
0.
5
0.
6
0.
7
0.
8
0.
9
A
n
n
u
al
S
am
p
le
M
al
e
0.
04
4
1.
78
9*
2.
16
5*
**
1.
78
6*
*
2.
07
0*
*
2.
40
6*
2.
04
9
4.
07
6*
**
7.
55
8*
*
(0
.2
69
)
(1
.0
13
)
(0
.6
17
)
(0
.7
64
)
(0
.9
54
)
(1
.3
36
)
(1
.3
33
)
(0
.7
93
)
(3
.2
19
)
D
ay
li
gh
t
0.
43
4
2.
51
4
4.
03
7*
*
2.
81
6
1.
94
5
0.
36
3
-1
.6
26
-2
.7
79
-3
.1
57
(0
.3
16
)
(1
.4
56
)
(1
.5
09
)
(1
.7
40
)
(1
.9
13
)
(3
.3
75
)
(4
.0
76
)
(5
.0
54
)
(4
.0
46
)
D
ay
li
gh
t
x
M
al
e
0.
05
4
-1
.4
74
-1
.8
09
**
-1
.3
44
-1
.3
41
-1
.5
64
-0
.3
97
-2
.0
71
-2
.4
95
(0
.4
64
)
(1
.0
59
)
(0
.6
30
)
(1
.0
36
)
(1
.1
54
)
(1
.3
14
)
(1
.7
09
)
(1
.1
96
)
(3
.6
93
)
45
D
ay
D
S
T
S
am
p
le
M
al
e
1.
03
8*
0.
60
1
0.
58
3
0.
53
5
0.
33
3
1.
13
2
0.
37
6
1.
64
2
2.
80
2
(0
.5
89
)
(0
.4
22
)
(0
.4
90
)
(0
.6
88
)
(0
.9
62
)
(1
.0
34
)
(0
.8
23
)
(1
.3
06
)
(2
.1
70
)
D
S
T
1.
54
2*
*
0.
94
3*
*
0.
68
3
0.
53
8
-0
.2
28
0.
00
6
-3
.5
35
**
*
-3
.6
73
**
-2
.1
85
(0
.6
75
)
(0
.3
61
)
(0
.9
42
)
(1
.1
80
)
(0
.9
88
)
(0
.9
99
)
(1
.1
56
)
(1
.3
72
)
(2
.4
80
)
D
S
T
x
M
al
e
-1
.1
82
-0
.3
48
0.
10
5
1.
03
5
1.
85
7
0.
28
2
3.
08
7*
**
2.
79
1
3.
76
6
(1
.1
77
)
(0
.8
06
)
(0
.7
07
)
(0
.8
99
)
(1
.0
99
)
(0
.9
99
)
(0
.9
62
)
(1
.8
80
)
(2
.9
96
)
N
ot
e
1:
A
co
effi
ci
en
t
es
ti
m
at
e
co
n
ca
te
n
at
ed
w
it
h
a
*
re
p
re
se
n
ts
a
p
-v
a
lu
e
≤
.1
,
*
*
re
p
re
se
n
ts
a
p
-v
a
lu
e
≤
.0
5
,
a
n
d
*
*
*
re
p
re
se
n
ts
a
p
-v
al
u
e
≤
.0
1
le
v
el
o
f
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
.
N
ot
e
2:
T
h
e
es
ti
m
at
es
in
cl
u
d
e
a
d
ai
ly
tr
affi
c
vo
lu
m
e
co
n
tr
o
l,
si
x
b
in
a
ry
in
d
ic
a
to
r
va
ri
a
b
le
s
fo
r
ti
m
e
o
f
d
ay
,
se
ve
n
fo
r
d
ay
of
w
ee
k
,
sp
ee
d
li
m
it
fi
x
ed
-e
ff
ec
ts
,
an
d
b
ar
ra
ck
s
fi
x
ed
-e
ff
ec
ts
.
N
ot
e
3:
S
ta
n
d
ar
d
er
ro
rs
ar
e
cl
u
st
er
ed
at
th
e
b
ar
ra
ck
s
le
ve
l.
Bibliography
John R Allison, Mark A Lemley, and Joshua Walker. Patent Quality and
Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants. The Georgetown Law Journal,
99:677–712, 2011.
John R Allison, Mark A Lemley, and David L Schwartz. Understanding the
Realities of Modern Patent Litigation. Texas Law Review, 92:1769–1801,
2014.
Nejat Anbarci and Jungmin Lee. Detecting racial bias in speed discounting:
Evidence from speeding tickets in Boston. International Review of Law and
Economics, 38:11–24, jun 2014.
Michael Anderson and Jeremy Magruder. Learning from the Crowd: Regres-
sion Discontinuity Estimates of the Effects of an Online Review Database*.
The Economic Journal, 122(563):957–989, sep 2012.
Kate Antonovics and Brian G Knight. A New Look at Racial Profiling: Evi-
194
195
dence from the Boston Police Department. Review of Economics and Statis-
tics, 91(1):163–177, feb 2009.
Shamena Anwar and Hanming Fang. An Alternative Test of Racial Preju-
dice in Motor Vehicle Searches: Theory and Evidence. American Economic
Review, 96(1):127–151, feb 2006.
Sinan Aral. The Problem With Online Ratings. MIT Sloan Management
Review, 55(2):47–52, 2014.
Vidya Atal and Talia Bar. Prior art: To search or not to search. International
Journal of Industrial Organization, 28(5):507–521, sep 2010.
Ian Ayres. Outcome Tests of Racial Disparities in Police Practices. Justice
Research and Policy, 4(1-2):131–142, dec 2002.
Eytan Bakshy, Jake M. Hofman, Winter A. Mason, and Duncan J. Watts.
Everyone’s an influencer. In Proceedings of the fourth ACM international
conference on Web search and data mining - WSDM ’11, page 65, New York,
New York, USA, 2011. ACM Press. ISBN 9781450304931.
Talia R. Bar and Brendan Costello. Patent Validity Challenges and The Amer-
ica Invents Act. oct 2017.
Frank R Baumgartner and Derek Epp. NORTH CAROLINA TRAFFIC STOP
STATISTICS ANALYSIS: Final Report To The North Carolina Advocates
196
For Justice Task Force On Racial and Ethnic Bias Prepared By. Technical
report, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2012.
Patrick Baylis. Temperature and Temperament : Evidence from Twitter. 2018.
Lucian Arye Bebchuk. Litigation and Settlement under Imperfect Information.
The RAND Journal of Economics, 15(3):404, 1984.
Gina Castle Bell, Mark C. Hopson, Richard Craig, and Nicholas W. Robin-
son. Exploring Black and White Accounts of 21st-Century Racial Profiling:
Riding and Driving While Black. Qualitative Research Reports in Commu-
nication, 15(1):33–42, jan 2014.
D. Bernhardt and F. Z. X. Lee. Trial Incentives in Sequential Litigation.
American Law and Economics Review, 17(1):214–244, mar 2015.
James Bessen and Michael J Meurer. The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes.
Cornell Law Review, 99(2), 2014.
Gary Bolton, Ben Greiner, and Axel Ockenfels. Engineering Trust: Reciprocity
in the Production of Reputation Information. Management Science, 59(2):
265–285, feb 2013.
Luis Cabral and Ali Hortacsu. The Dynamics of Seller Reputation: Evidence
from Ebay. The Journal of Industrial Economics, 58(1):54–78, mar 2010.
197
Matias D Cattaneo, Ann Arbor, Roc´ıo Titiunik, and Gonzalo Vazquez-Bare.
Inference in regression discontinuity designs under local randomization.
Technical Report 2, 2016.
Joshua Chanin, Megan Welsh, Dana Nurge, and Stuart Henry. Traffic enforce-
ment in San Diego, California An analysis of SDPD vehicle stops in 2014
and 2015. Technical report, San Diego State University, 2016.
Emily H. Chen. Making Abusers Pay: Deterring Patent Litigation by Shifting
Attorneys’ Fees. Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 28:351–381, 2013.
Colleen V. Chien. Patent Assertion Entities, dec 2012.
Colleen V. Chien. Patent Trolls by the Numbers. Santa Clara Univ. Legal
Studies Research, Paper No., mar 2013.
Jay Pil Choi. Patent Litigation as an Information-Transmission Mechanism,
1998.
Jay Pil Choi and Heiko Gerlach. A Theory of Patent Portfolios. American
Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 9(1):315–351, feb 2017.
Robert D. Cooter and Daniel L. Rubinfeld. Analysis of Legal Resolution
Disputes and Their Resolution, 1989.
Charlene Cosandier, Henry Delcamp, Aija Leiponen, and Yann Me´niere. De-
fensive and offensive acquisition services in the market for patents. 2014.
198
Claude Crampes and Corinne Langinier. Litigation and Settlement in Patent
Infringement Cases. The RAND Journal of Economics, 33(2):258, 2002.
Katrin Cremers, Fabian Gaessler, Dietmar Harhoff, Christian Helmers, and
Yassine Lefouili. Invalid but infringed? An analysis of the bifurcated patent
litigation system. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 131:218–
242, nov 2016.
Weijia Dai, Ginger Z Jin, Jungmin Lee, and Michael Luca. Optimal Aggrega-
tion of Consumer Ratings: An Application to Yelp.com. 2012.
Bill Dedman and Francie Latour. Speed Trap: Who Gets a Ticket and Who
Gets a Break?, jul 2003.
Chrysanthos Dellarocas. Strategic Manipulation of Internet Opinion Forums:
Implications for Consumers and Firms. Management Science, 52(10):1577–
1593, oct 2006.
Dhammika Dharmapala and Stephen L Ross. Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle
Searches: Additional Theory and Evidence. Contributions in Economic
Analysis & Policy, 3(1), jan 2004.
By Uwe Dulleck, Rudolf Kerschbamer, and Matthias Sutter. The Economics
of Credence Goods : An Experiment on the Role of Liability , Verifiability
, Reputation , and Competition. American Economic Review, 101(April):
530–559, 2011a.
199
Uwe Dulleck and Rudolf Kerschbamer. On Doctors, Mechanics, and Com-
puter Specialists: The Economics of Credence Goods. Journal of Economic
Literature, 44(1):5–42, 2006.
Uwe Dulleck, Rudolf Kerschbamer, and Matthias Sutter. The Economics of
Credence Goods: An Experiment on the Role of Liability, Verifiability, Rep-
utation, and Competition. American Economic Review, 101(2):526–555, apr
2011b.
Joseph Farrell and Robert P Merges. Incentives to Challenge and Defend
Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent office Errors and Why
Administrative Patent Review Might Help. Berkeley Technology Law Jour-
nal, 19:943, 2004.
Joseph Farrell and Carl Shapiro. How Strong Are Weak Patents? American
Economic Review, 98(4):1347–1369, 2008.
Paul Fenn and Neil Rickman. Delay and Settlement in Litigation. The Eco-
nomic Journal, 109(457):476–491, 1999.
Apostolos Filippas, John J Horton, and Joseph M Golden. Reputation Infla-
tion. mar 2018.
Sergio Firpo, Nicole M. Fortin, and Thomas Lemieux. Unconditional Quantile
Regressions. Econometrica, 77(3):953–973, 2009.
200
Gary M. Fournier and Thomas W. Zuehlke. The Timing of Out-of-Court
Settlements. The RAND Journal of Economics, 27(2):310, 1996.
Andrey Fradkin, Elena Grewal, and David Holtz. The Determinants of Online
Review Informativeness: Evidence from Field Experiments on Airbnb. apr
2018.
Lorie A. Fridell, Police Executive Research Forum., and United States. Depart-
ment of Justice. Office of Community Oriented Policing Services. Racially
biased policing : a principled response. Police Executive Research Forum,
2001. ISBN 1878734733.
Matthew Gentzkow and Jesse M. Shapiro. What Drives Media Slant? Evi-
dence From U.S. Daily Newspapers. Econometrica, 78(1):35–71, 2010.
Matthew Gentzkow, Bryan Kelly, and Matt Taddy. Text as Data. mar 2017.
Arthur Gollwitzer III. Innovation Act Update, 2015.
Jeffrey Grogger and Greg Ridgeway. Testing for Racial Profiling in Traffic
Stops From Behind a Veil of Darkness. Journal of the American Statistical
Association, 101(475):878–887, sep 2006.
T. Groseclose and J. Milyo. A Measure of Media Bias. The Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 120(4):1191–1237, nov 2005.
201
Marie Gryphon. Assessing the Effects of a Loser Pays Rule on the American
Legal System: An Economic Analysis and Proposal for Reform. Rutgers
Journal of Law & Public Policy, 8, 2011.
William C. Horrace and Shawn M. Rohlin. How Dark Is Dark? Bright Lights,
Big City, Racial Profiling. Review of Economics and Statistics, 98(2):226–
232, may 2016.
Yu-Chin Hsu and Shu Shen. Testing for Treatment Effect Heterogeneity in
Regression Discontinuity Design. 2016.
Nan Hu, Jie Zhang, and Paul A. Pavlou. Overcoming the J-shaped distribution
of product reviews. Communications of the ACM, 52(10):144, oct 2009.
Steffen Huck, Gabriele K. Lu¨nser, and Jean-Robert Tyran. Competition fosters
trust. Games and Economic Behavior, 76(1):195–209, sep 2012.
Guido W Imbens and Thomas Lemieux. Regression discontinuity designs: A
guide to practice. Journal of Econometrics, 142:615–635, 2008.
Avery Katz. Measuring the Demand for Litigation : Is the English Rule Really
Cheaper ?, 1987.
Rudolf Kerschbamer and Matthias Sutter. The Economics of Credence Goods
– a Survey of Recent Lab and Field Experiments*. CESifo Economic Studies,
63(1):1–23, mar 2017.
202
Jay P Kesan and Gwendolyn G Ball. How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An
Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Dis-
putes. Washington University Law Review, 84(2), 2006.
John Knowles, Nicola Persico, and Petra Todd. Racial Bias in Motor Vehicle
Searches: Theory and Evidence. Journal of Political Economy, 109(1):203–
229, feb 2001.
Brian R. Kowalski and Richard J. Lundman. Vehicle stops by police for driving
while Black: Common problems and some tentative solutions. Journal of
Criminal Justice, 35(2):165–181, mar 2007.
Jonathan Lafky. Why do people rate? Theory and evidence on online ratings.
Games and Economic Behavior, 87(December 2013):554–570, 2014.
Corinne Langinier and Philippe Marcoul. The Search of Prior Art and the
Revelation of Information by Patent Applicants. Review of Industrial Or-
ganization, 49(3):399–427, nov 2016.
Jean O. Lanjouw and Josh Lerner. The Enforcement of Intellectual Property
Rights: A Survey of the Empirical Literature. Springer US, Boston, MA,
2000.
David S Lee and Thomas Lemieux. Regression Discontinuity Designs in Eco-
nomics. Journal of Economic Literature, 48(2):281–355, jun 2010.
203
Frances Z.Xu Lee and Dan Bernhardt. The optimal extent of discovery. RAND
Journal of Economics, 47(3):573–607, aug 2016.
Mark A Lemley and Carl Shapiro. Probabilistic Patents. Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 19(2):75–98, 2005.
Lingfang Li, Steven Tadelis, and Xiaolan Zhou. Buying Reputation as a Signal
of Quality: Evidence from an Online Marketplace *. 2018.
Bing Liu. Sentiment analysis and opinion mining. Morgan & Claypool, 2012.
ISBN 1608458849.
Michael Luca. Reviews, Reputation, and Revenue: The Case of Yelp.Com.
2016.
Michael Luca and Georgios Zervas. Fake It Till You Make It: Reputation,
Competition, and Yelp Review Fraud. Management Science, 62(12):3412–
3427, dec 2016.
Jeff Masher. What The “Veil of Darkness” Says About New Orleans Traffic
Stops, 2016.
Dina Mayzlin, Yaniv Dover, and Judith Chevalier. Promotional Reviews: An
Empirical Investigation of Online Review Manipulation. American Eco-
nomic Review, 104(8):2421–2455, aug 2014.
204
M. J. Mazzeo, J. H. Ashtor, and S. Zyontz. Do NPEs Matter? Non Practicing
Entities and Patent Litigation Outcomes. Journal of Competition Law and
Economics, 9(4):879–904, dec 2013.
Justin McCrary. Manipulation of the running variable in the regression dis-
continuity design: A density test. Journal of Econometrics, 142(2):698–714,
feb 2008.
P. (Peter) McCullagh and John A. Nelder. Generalized linear models. Chap-
man and Hall, 2000. ISBN 9780412317606.
Jack Mcdevitt, Janice Iwama, and Lisa Bailey-Laguerre. RHODE ISLAND
TRAFFIC STOP STATISTICS DATA COLLECTION STUDY. Technical
report, Northeastern University Institute on Race and Justice, 2014.
Michael J. Meurer. The Settlement of Patent Litigation. The RAND Journal
of Economics, 20(1):77, 1989.
Lev Muchnik, Sinan Aral, and Sean J Taylor. Social influence bias: a random-
ized experiment. Science (New York, N.Y.), 341(6146):647–51, aug 2013.
Finn A˚rup Nielsen. A new ANEW: Evaluation of a word list for sentiment
analysis in microblogs. arXiv, mar 2011.
Chris Nosko and Steven Tadelis. The Limits of Reputation in Platform Mar-
kets: An Empirical Analysis and Field Experiment. jan 2015.
205
Myle Ott, Claire Cardie, and Jeff Hancock. Estimating the prevalence of
deception in online review communities. In Proceedings of the 21st interna-
tional conference on World Wide Web - WWW ’12, page 201, New York,
New York, USA, 2012. ACM Press. ISBN 9781450312295.
Amanda Pallais. Inefficient Hiring in Entry-Level Labor Markets. American
Economic Review, 104(11), 2014.
Nicola Persico and Petra E. Todd. The Hit Rates Test for Racial Bias in
MotorVehicle Searches. Justice Quarterly, 25(1):37–53, mar 2008.
Jennifer F. Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde. Settlement, Litigation, and the
Allocation of Litigation Costs. The RAND Journal of Economics, 17(4):
557, 1986.
Brian Renauer, Chris Henning, and Emily Covelli. Benchmarking Portland
Police Bureau Traffic Stop and Search Data. Technical report, Criminal
Justice Policy Research Institute, 2009.
Greg Ridgeway. Cincinnati Police Department Traffic Stops: Applying
RAND’s Framework to Analyze Racial Disparities. RAND Corporation,
Monograph, 2009.
Joseph Ritter and David Bael. Detecting Racial Profiling in Minneapolis Traf-
fic Stops: A New Approach. CURA Reporter, 39(1-2):11–17, 2009.
206
Joseph A. Ritter. How do police use race in traffic stops and searches? Tests
based on observability of race. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organiza-
tion, 135:82–98, mar 2017.
Matthew B. Ross, James Fazzalaro, Ken Barone, and Jesse Kalinowski. Traffic
Stop Data Analysis and Findings, 2013-14. Technical report, Institute for
Municipal and Regional Policy, 2015.
Mark Schankerman and Suzanne Scotchmer. Damages and Injunctions in
Protecting Intellectual Property. The RAND Journal of Economics, 32(1):
199, 2001.
Joel L. Schrag. Managerial Judges: An Economic Analysis of the Judicial
Management of Legal Discovery. The RAND Journal of Economics, 30(2):
305, 1999.
Warren F. Schwartz and Abraham L. Wickelgren. Credible Discovery, Set-
tlement, and Negative Expected Value Suits. The RAND Journal of Eco-
nomics, 40(4):636–657, 2009.
Peter Siegelman and Joel Waldfogel. Toward a Taxonomy of Disputes: New
Evidence Through the Prism of the Priest/Klein Model. The Journal of
Legal Studies, 28(1):101–130, jan 1999.
Austin C. Smith. Spring Forward at Your Own Risk: Daylight Saving Time
207
and Fatal Vehicle Crashes. American Economic Journal: Applied Eco-
nomics, 8(2):65–91, apr 2016.
Kathryn E. Spier. The Dynamics of Pretrial Negotiation. The Review of
Economic Studies, 59(1):93–108, jan 1992.
Travis Taniguchi, Joshua Hendrix, Brian Aagaard, Kevin Strom, Alison Levin,
and Stephanie Zimmer. A test of racial disproportionality in traffic stops
conducted by the Fayetteville Police Department:, 2016a.
Travis Taniguchi, Joshua Hendrix, Brian Aagaard, Kevin Strom, Alison Levin,
and Stephanie Zimmer. A test of racial disproportionality in traffic stops
conducted by the Raleigh Police Department:, 2016b.
Travis Taniguchi, Joshua Hendrix, Brian Aagaard, Kevin Strom, Alison Levin,
and Stephanie Zimmer. A test of racial disproportionality in traffic stops
conducted by the Greensboro Police Department:, 2016c.
Travis Taniguchi, Joshua Hendrix, Brian Aagaard, Kevin Strom, Alison Levin,
and Stephanie Zimmer. Exploring racial disproportionality in traffic stops
conducted by the Durham Police Department:. Technical report, Research
Triangle Park, NC: RTI International., 2016d.
Catherine E. Tucker. Patent Trolls and Technology Diffusion. apr 2013.
208
Zhongmin Wang. Anonymity, social image, and the competition for volunteers:
A case study of the online market for reviews. B.E. Journal of Economic
Analysis and Policy, 10(1), 2010.
Robert E. Worden, Sarah J. McLean, and Andrew P. Wheeler. Stops by
Syracuse Police, 2006 – 2009. Technical report, The John F. Finn Institute
for Public Safety, 2010.
Robert E. Worden, Sarah J. McLean, and Andrew P. Wheeler. Testing for
Racial Profiling With the Veil-of-Darkness Method. Police Quarterly, 15
(1):92–111, mar 2012.
